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This dissertation examines an increasingly common phenomenon in the post-
Cold War context, the military coalition. At the heart of the dissertation is thus the  
question: what explains political leaders’ participation and burden-sharing decisions on 
military coalitions? In tackling the question, two distinct lines of research were brought 
together; the one based on alliances, the other based on foreign policy decision making. 
Based on the two lines of research, an explanatory framework was developed that 
combined the insights of alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory.  
A set of hypotheses was derived and tested, utilizing a multimethod approach: 
statistical, case study, and experimental analyses.  
Overall, the results of applying the multimethod approach is suggestive of the 
strength of the poliheuristic theory, with a supporting role of alliance dependence thesis, 
in understanding participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions. 
Moreover, though in large part the second Iraq War (2003 -) was used as the reference in 
much of the dissertation, an implicit underlying claim of the current research is that the 
findings may be extended to any broad context wherein the development of a military 
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 INTRODUCTION AND THEORY 
 
This dissertation attempts to address state behavior with respect to decisions on 
an increasingly common post-Cold War alliance type – the military coalition, a form of 
limited alliance. The dissertation is leveraged at answering the following question: what 
explains political leaders’ participation and burden-sharing decisions on military 
coalitions? This chapter presents the current state of the literature on the topic, and 
illustrates the possibility of fruitfully exploring two distinct lines of research related to 
the topic. Based on a reading of the relevant literature and the main explanatory 
framework, a set of hypotheses is derived. This introductory chapter also presents a 
discussion of the main methods used to investigate the principal research question. 
 
FPDM and Mid-level Theorizing 
 Over the years, foreign policy analysis has witnessed the development of several 
mid-range theories for understanding foreign policy decision making (FPDM) and 
outcomes, including bureaucratic politics (Allison, 1971; Art, 1973; Maoz, 1990; Ripley, 
1995; Kaarbo, 1998), operational code (George, 1969, 1979, 1997; Holsti, O., 1970; 
Foyle, 1997; Walker et al, 1998; Walker, 2003), personality/distance-profiling 
(Hermann, 1974, 1984; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Preston, 2001), image/schema/maps 
(Holsti, 1976; Axelrod, 1976; Hermann et al, 1997; Schafer, 1997;  Lepgold and 
Lamborn, 2001), decision units (Janis, 1972; Hermann et al, 1987; Garrison, 1999, 2001; 
Gaenslen, 1992; Hagan and Hermann, 2001; Haney, 1997; Hoyt and Garrison, 1997; 
Redd, 2002;  Schafer and Crichlow, 2002; Kowert, 2002), and role theory (Holsti, K.,  
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field has still lagged behind in scientific development, relative to other, more “realist- 
grounded” theories in IR, such as alliance theory, deterrence theory, power theory, etc. 
This, at least in part, may owe to the fact that past research on foreign policy decision 
making (FPDM) has been hampered by a less-than faithful attention to at least two types 
of generalizable comparisons: cross-national and cross-theoretical (Kaarbo, 2003).  
 Most studies in foreign policy decision making tend to reflect a U.S.-centric bias 
(Smith, 1986; Neack et al, 1995; Hudson and Vore, 1995; Light, 1994; White, 1999), as 
well as tending to an over-reliance on the related U.S. use of force literature to draw 
inferences (eg. Ostrom and Job, 1986; Powlick, 1991; Holsti, 1992; James and Oneal, 
1991; Jacobs and Page, 2005). Where there may be exceptions, and where a more cross-
national study is attempted, the focus also often tends to be limited to advanced 
industrial democracies in specific geographical domains, such as Western Europe 
(Foyle, 2003). This may be akin to what is typically found in many other topical fields of 
investigation in the discipline, such as economic voting where most comparative studies, 
until of late, have tended to focus disproportionately on Western Europe (eg. Powell and 
Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999). This situation in FPDM may, in part, be 
explained by a lack of systematic tools, such as multi-country surveys, that are necessary 
for undertaking proper cross-national studies. Thus, albeit the implied corrective may 
hold mainly for correlational-type of empirical investigations, this is a glaring weakness 
of the FPDM field, and one that deserves to be tackled. 
 At least one of the aims of incorporating a more explicitly cross-theoretical1  
method of investigation is to compare and contrast relevant competing explanations for 
properly understanding a phenomena in foreign policy. A more explicitly cross-
theoretical investigation will, thus, tend to contribute to the weeding-out of alternative 
explanations, in favor of the most plausible one (George and Bennett, 2005). As well, 
theoretical comparisons tend to make more transparent the strengths and weaknesses of 
various explanations of a common phenomenon which, in turn, allow for a possible 
integration of different insights. However, to date, and with the exception of a few 
studies (eg. Allison, 1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 
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2005), there has very much been a dearth of such consciously cross-theoretical 
investigations in FPDM.  
Indeed, the proposition that causal inferences acquire greater strength and 
meaning when they are less context-bound - such as to particular spatial or temporal 
domains – is, in most circumstances, unlikely to be vigorously challenged2.  However, 
the neglect of such aforementioned necessary cross-national and cross-theoretical 
comparisons has hampered the development of “normal science” and creation of 
generalizable findings required for advancement of the field of foreign policy decision 
making (Rosenau, 1968; Hudson and Vore, 1995; Carlsnaes, 2002; Kaarbo, 2003). A 
need to address these types of neglect thus forms a part of the motivational basis of the 
current study. A slightly different problem seems to exist in the area of alliance research.  
 
Limited Alliances: Military Coalitions in Alliance Research 
Unlike with “alignments”3, the “military coalition” shares in common with the 
“alliance”4 the expectation of some joint use of force in the event of conflict. Thus, a 
first cut of the argument suggests that a “military coalition” can be thought of as a 
particular type of alliance, albeit one that is both more temporally-circumscribed, more 
mission-specific and/or target-specific, and less formally institutionalized (O’Halloran, 
2000; Dibb, 2002; Tertrais, 2004) than is usually denoted by the conventional term 
“alliance”. Hence, it may be accurate to term such an entity as a form of “limited 
alliance”. From a historical perspective, the military coalition, has been atypical 
compared to the traditional alliance. However, some obvious historical examples can be 
pointed out. During the 19th Century Napoleonic Wars, for instance, there existed 
numerous European military coalitions, or limited alliances, arrayed against France. In 
the second part of the 20th Century, during the Cold War, some of the more notable 
international conflicts involving limited alliances, include: Korean War (1950), Vietnam 
War (1965), Lebanon (1982), Suez Crisis (1956), and Grenada (1990). In the post-Cold 
War period, limited alliances formed in the first Gulf War (1990), Somalia (1993), 
Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2002) among others.  
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By way of a reminder, some of the broader theories on conventional alliances 
include collective goods/benefits approaches (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Thies, 
1987), structural balance from a system-level perspective (McDonald and Rosecrance, 
1985; Snyder, 1997), formal game-theoretic accounts (Wagner, 1983; Niou and 
Ordeshook, 1994), and rational choice (Altfeld, 1984; McGnnis, 1990). For the most 
part, however, most such traditional theories of alliance formation and development fail 
to give systematic treatment to the concept of “coalition”, a key concept in limited 
alliances. An exception to this theoretical lacuna may be Riker’s (1962) game-theoretic, 
coalition theory with its focus on the “size principle” and “minimum winning coalition”. 
It is claimed that the basic tenets of the theory can be applied to understand coalition 
politics in international settings (Riker, 1962: 211-46; also, Alpert and Bernstein, 1974). 
However, the theory has not convincingly overcome a myriad of  theoretical, conceptual, 
and measurement issues that consequently hinder its broader applicability in 
international settings (Russett,1968; Kaplan, 1963). At least one problematical issue has 
to do with the observation that - outside of a self-enforcing body such as the U.N. whose 
activities require adherence to majority vote -  coalition politics in interstate relations, 
such as alliance formation, are rarely circumscribed by a need for “minimum winning 
coalition” (Russett, 1968) 
 On the other hand, however, when it comes to motivations or incentives for 
coalition formation or participation, the ideas of balancing and band-wagoning (Walt, 
1987), associated with the structural balance approach, does still provide a useful 
starting point for the issues under consideration in this research. In its original 
formulation, Walt (1987) suggests that state behavior regarding alliances is motivated in 
part by two dominant concerns: the goal of balancing against a threat, and the goal of 
band-wagoning with the threat (or dominant power), against another state(s). 
 These ideas have been applied to understand coalition formation, or limited 
alliance, in the post-Cold War era in at least a couple of studies. Schweller (1994) 
suggests that, for many states, band-wagoning motives for economic gain principally 
drove their coalition participation in the first Gulf War (Iraq I). Similarly, in analyzing 
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state responses to the second Gulf War (Iraq II) coalition, Rhodes (2004) suggests that 
continental balancing goals motivated state behavior in the case of Germany and France, 
whereas a careful interplay of band-wagoning and “bridging” goals (ie. between Western 
Europe and the U.S.) drove the responses of most Central European countries.  
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, there exists a common problematique 
with these studies. Partaking of a common neorealist foundation – as typified in the 
broader approaches to alliances (ie. collective goods, structural balance, game theory, 
rational choice, etc) – these studies of military coalitions under-appreciate the internal 
dynamics of state behavior. In particular, the domestic factors and constraints that bear 
on decisions by the national leaders of the state regarding coalitions, or limited alliances, 
are more often than not ignored5. 
 
Domestic Politics as Potential Common Ground 
Paradoxically, this general under-appreciation of the role of domestic level 
factors on limited alliances, such as military coalitions, has occurred concomitant with 
an increasing awareness of the impact of such factors on alliances writ large. Indeed, 
among scholars of traditional alliances, there has been an increasing recognition of the 
role of domestic constraints and pressures that may impact upon decisions on alliances. 
According to Snyder (1997: 143), for instance: “Much more common are cases in which 
the systemic constraints leave considerable room for choice [on alliances], and domestic 
constraints then determine actual choices, or at least narrow the range of choice”. 
Sources of such  domestic level factors, or constraints, include individual-level 
considerations, such as the leader’s need to balance foreign policy choices with his/her 
need to maintain broad domestic coalitions to ensure continued political survival (eg. 
Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999); indeed, as claimed by one observer, “shifts in 
[domestic] coalitions do alter alliances”. (Morrow, 2000). Domestic constraints may also 
include more macro-level factors such as characteristics of the regime. Pressured by such 
things as domestic audience costs (Fearon, 1994; Smith, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 
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1999), for instance, democratic regimes tend to make more credible and enduring 
alliance commitment choices, as compared to autocratic regimes.  
This increasing recognition, within the traditional alliance literature, of the 
interplay between domestic and external factors seems to dove well with a long-held 
parallel trend in the sub-field of FPDM. But whereas in much of the past, the inescapable 
domestic logic of FPDM was largely limited to investigations of processes involving 
individual constraints (eg. cognition) and institutional constraints (eg. organizational 
pathologies) and their interaction with external pressures to effect outcomes, FPDM 
scholars are also now beginning to delve below these elite-level processes, to the society 
at large. In fact, borrowing in part from findings in other fields of the discipline, many 
are now beginning to understand that domestic public opinion often imparts important 
influences on elite-level processes in foreign policy choices both within the US (eg. 
Graham, 1994; Powlick and Katz, 1998; Foyle, 1997) and cross-nationally (eg. La 
Balme, 2000; Sinnott, 2000; Isernia et al, 2002). The “black-box” of foreign policy 
decision making may thus have to be enlarged to accommodate such potential 
interactions, as well as to better understand the conditions under which such interactions 
are most likely to occur, especially in non-US contexts (Foyle, 2003).    
In sum then, though their different core working assumptions (Ripley, 1993) may be 
viewed by some as a mutual point of departure sans viable comparative analysis, both 
FPDM and the neorealist-based alliance literature6, do seem to converge with an 
increasing appreciation for the import of domestic level factors. This convergence on the 
domestic logic of the two research programs thus suggest an opening for a fruitful 
comparison of competing explanations for understanding foreign policy decisions on 
limited alliances, such as the military coalition.                                                                                                     
 
Main Explanatory Framework: Poliheuristic Theory  
This study, then, attempts to demonstrate the relevance of some of these 
outstanding issues, and they inform the illustration of a credible explanation for 
understanding state decisions on participation in military coalitions. As the main 
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explanatory framework, then, this study principally employs the poliheuristic theory 
(PH) of foreign policy decision making (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz et al, 1997; 
Mintz, 2003, 2004) to examine (non)participation decisions by various states in the 
second Gulf War coalition. In this section, a brief outline - including core assumptions - 
of the primary theoretical framework is presented. 
 
Main Assumptions of Poliheuristic Theory 
In comparison to other theories of foreign policy decision making, a distinctive 
feature of the poliheuristic theory is its explicit recognition that political leaders employ 
a mixture of decision strategies. The decision process is sequential, and is divided into 
first and second stages. The first stage is dominated by cognitive processes, while the 
second stage is captured by analytic processes – either lexicographic or utility 
maximization, cost-benefit calculations associated with rational choice and expected-
utility theories (eg. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984). 
Thus, the theory aims at bridging both cognitive and rational choice theories of decision 
making on war and peace, and conflict in general (Mintz, 2003).  
A complex decision environment, characterized by time constraints, limited 
information, and stress is what a political leader often faces in times of crisis or conflict. 
Under such conditions, the decision-maker employs simple decision rules, or heuristics: 
in the first stage, cognitive shortcuts are used; in the second stage, a more analytic, 
expected-utility calculus is used, to arrive at final policy decision.  
The decision process, particularly in the first stage, is underscored by five basic 
assumptions, or characteristics (Mintz and Geva, 1997: 84-7; Mintz, Geva, and 
DeRouen, 1994; Mintz, 2004): non-holistic search, dimension-based search, non-
compensatory principle, satisficing principle, and order sensitivity. The initial stage of 
search for policy options is non-holistic because comparisons among options are made 
within certain narrow alternative set and attribute set. The search is also dimension-
based in that each alternative policy option is examined along the most important 
dimension (eg. political dimension), and those that fail to meet a certain threshold are 
 8
rejected from further consideration (Mintz, 1993). The decision process is also driven by 
a non-compensatory principle: alternatives that are unacceptably low along a certain 
crucial dimension (eg. political dimension) cannot be compensated for by a higher value 
along another dimension (eg. economic or military). Such alternatives are, therefore, 
dismissed. Since alternatives are rejected or retained (for second stage) based on whether 
or not they are acceptable along a certain dimension – instead of all dimensions - the 
process is characterized as “satisficing”, rather than maximzing or optimizing. And the 
search for alternatives is order sensitive since the sequence or order in which dimensions 
(eg. political, military, economic, or strategic) are invoked have an impact on decision 
strategies and final choice.   
In the second stage, the poliheuristic theory assumes that the decision process 
reflects a more analytic mode. Thus, the remaining alternatives (ie. retained alternative 
policy options) are examined sequentially along the other dimensions, based on standard 
cost-benefit calculations. Usually, these dimensions involve strategic and military 
interests (Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 2002; Brulé, 2005), but can involve economic ones as 
well. The poliheuristic theory expects the final policy choice to be reflective of an option 
whose total benefits relative to costs are the highest, compared to the other options.  
 
Non-compensatory Political Dimension and Loss Avoidance   
Political leaders, like all decision-makers, have a preference order. The usual 
primary preference for political leaders is the maintenance of power, attained in part 
through domestic popular support and approval. Leaders are thus naturally averse to 
policy options that entail possible losses (eg. decrease in support/approval of policy) in 
the domestic political arena.  
Relatedly then, for political leaders, the domestic political consequences of 
policy choice is usually the most crucial factor, or dimension, in weighing policy 
alternatives. Indeed, “domestic politics is the essence of decision”(Mintz and Geva, 
1997: 83; also, Mintz, 1993: 598-603). At a deeper level, moreover, this implies that 
political leaders are relatively more “loss averse” than “gain accepting” in this area. This 
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in turn suggests the logic of the non-compensatory principle: losses in the domestic 
political dimension cannot be compensated for, or offset, by gains in other dimensions 
(eg. economic or military dimensions).         
 
Decision Process and Outcome 
A particular strength of the poliheuristic theory is that it connects decision 
processes with outcomes. In this vein, then, the cognitive-based, non-compensatory, 
political dimension of the first phase adds an important insight to the decision process 
that has heretofore been ignored in much of the conventional literature on alliances and, 
more specifically, military coalitions.  
In relation to decisions on military coalition (non)participation, the poliheuristic 
theory suggests that cognitive motivations or preferences (ie. avoidance of political loss) 
act as an initial filter for weeding out acceptable from unacceptable policy options. Only 
those options that meet a certain threshold along this non-compensatory dimension will 
be considered by state leaders. The process then proceeds to the second stage where a 
more analytic calculation – based on either utility maximization or lexicographic 
considerations - will determine the final policy choice by the state’s leader. The result or 
outcome of this poliheuristic decision process is the state’s decision on (non) 
participation, as well as the level of such (eg. active military support versus passive 
military support).  
Critically, however, and per the calls for a more comparative approach and a 
more conscientious cross-pollination of ideas and explanations (Rosenau, 1968; Hudson 
and Vore, 1995; Carlsnaes, 2002; Kaarbo, 2003), the alliance dependence thesis (Bennett 
et al, 1994) presents itself as an important component within the larger poliheuristic 
theory. In other words, though it is doubtful that alliance dependence thesis can stand on 
its own, it may still play an important role in the development of the poliheuristic model 
of military coalition formation.  
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Alliance Dependence (AD) Thesis 
Indeed, one relevant study7 does come closer to addressing some of the 
aforementioned neglected issues in the alliance literature, and how the situation of 
hitherto under-appreciated impact of domestic-level factors may be rectified in 
understanding the military coalition, or the limited alliance. In their investigation of 
coalition dynamics of the first Gulf War, Bennett et al (1994) employ extensive process-
tracing techniques on well-chosen “most-likely” cases: France, Germany, Japan, U.K. 
and Egypt, to assess the impact of various influences on foreign policy decision making 
and on subsequent state responses to external pressures on participation and burden-
sharing in the military coalition of the first Gulf War.  
The study identifies both external and internal factors that influence such foreign 
policy decisions. Among the external factors, they cite “collective action”, “balance of 
threat”, and “alliance dependence”; internal factors are: “state autonomy and domestic 
society” and “bureaucratic politics”. The study pays particular attention to the role of 
alliance dependence. 
Much of Bennett et al’s (1994) alliance dependence thesis draws on the alliance 
security dilemma (Snyder,1984; also Kupchan, 1988: 324-5; Lake, 1996).) faced by 
asymmetrically dependent allies. For dependent allies, two considerations dominate their 
strategic choice: abandonment versus entrapment8. Abandonment can take several 
forms: an ally may realign with the opponent, abrogate the terms of the alliance treaty, 
fail to live up to explicit commitments, or fail to provide support in expected situations. 
Entrapment occurs when a state becomes involved in a conflict whose outcome is central 
to the interests of the ally but is only marginal to one’s own interests. The dilemma for 
dependent allies arises from the inverse relationship between abandonment and 
entrapment: higher levels of credible commitment to the ally will tend to reduce the risks 
of abandonment, but will also tend to increase the risks of entrapment (Snyder, 1984: 
467). A resolution to the dilemma requires “chiefly a  comparison and trade-off between 
the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment” (Snyder, 1984: 467).  
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Dependence can be economic and/or military. Each type of dependence carries 
with it the implication of costly adjustment, in the event of alliance rupture, or benefits, 
such as military aid or economic aid, in the event of compliance. According to Bennett et 
al (1994), therefore,  a smaller ally will tend to support its larger ally if the pressures of 
dependence – and thus costs and risks of abandonment - outweigh the costs and risks of 
entrapment9. These costs and risks are weighed via alliance bargaining. For Bennett et al 
(1994), a critical aspect of alliance bargaining is the two-level interaction between the 
external and domestic pressures faced by decision makers (Putnam, 1988).  In alliance 
bargaining, therefore, externally-induced pressures such as alliance dependence and 
concomitant demands on desired policy by the larger partner may be met with the 
dependent ally’s countervailing demands for a restraint on such, by citing various 
domestic constraints. Conversely, the larger partner’s threat of abandonment may be 
used by the political leadership of the dependent ally to leverage domestic support in line 
with the goals of the larger partner.  
Having applied their competing set of external (ie. “collective action”, “balance 
of threat”, and “alliance dependence”) and internal explanatory factors (ie. “state 
autonomy and domestic society” and “bureaucratic politics”) to the relevant cases, 
Bennett et al (1994) reach two  major conclusions. First, the foreign policy decision to 
participate (or not) in military coalitions is externally-driven, and variations in historical 
patterns of alliance dependence best accounts for the decision to participate or not in the 
military coalition. Compared to collective action and balance-of-threat hypothesis, of 
their five comparative cases, at least four (Japan, Germany, Egypt and Britain) are better 
explained by alliance dependence (Bennett et al, 1994: 40, 72, Table 3). Unlike France, 
each of these countries, it is pointed out, typified some degrees of alliance dependence 
on the coalition leader, the U.S., and thus reached policy decisions of participation in the 
military coalition. And second, the particular form of burden-sharing (ie. military 
contribution or financial contribution), is best explained by internally-driven hypotheses, 
such as state autonomy or bureaucratic politics (Bennett et al, 1994: 40, 73).  
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In light of Bennett et al’s main findings (1994), the alliance dependence thesis 
may be plausible. Nonetheless, there are reasons for suggesting a slightly different 
interpretation regarding the impact, as well as the role, of alliance dependence.    In fact, 
at least three inter-related issues present themselves for consideration: cognition, 
domestic politics, and non-compensatory loss. First, and as the foregoing suggests, much 
of the underlying assumption in the alliance dependence thesis implies that for 
dependent allies (non)participation decisions are usually dominated, at least in the early 
stages, by a “rational” calculation, such as the weighing of costs and risks of 
abandonment versus entrapment; such factors are then considered in relation to domestic 
pressures. But this type of utility-driven calculation is only a part of the answer, and 
ignores the more cognitive-based factors of the decision calculus used by most political 
leaders, especially in the initial decision stage of a crisis context. The second basis for a 
different interpretation of alliance dependence has to do with understanding the role of 
domestic constraints and external pressures. Though decision choices may be the 
product of an interaction between such domestic and external factors (Putnam, 1988), an 
alternative to the alliance dependence thesis suggests that the theoretical driver of the 
initial analysis may be internally-located, at the domestic level.  The final basis for re-
interpreting the role of alliance dependence brings together the first and second issues 
(ie. cognition and domestic politics) and considers the possibility that, unlike in the 
alliance dependence thesis, some types of “losses”, such as lack of public support for a 
policy, may not be easily offset nor compensated by other means. Notwithstanding this 
three-fold basis for a re-interpretation of the role of alliance dependence, a core 
argument of this study is that alliance dependence can nonetheless offer important 
insights into the dynamics of understanding military coalitions. Indeed, instead of being 
viewed as the primary explanation or the main theoretical “driver” in understanding 
military coalitions, alliance dependence may best be understood in the context of its role 




Based on the foregoing, this section presents the main hypotheses, and the main 
explanatory model. The model combines the distinctive strengths of both the 
poliheuristic theory and the alliance dependence thesis, for understanding 
(non)participation decisions and type of burden-sharing  in military coalitions.. Non-
compensatory, cognitive motivations (ie. avoidance of political loss) should affect the 
initial stage of weighing various policy options on (non)participation, to be followed by 
a more analytic, second stage. In consideration of this, the following three hypotheses 
are presented10:  
 
PH.H1: Decision to participate in international military coalition will be 
inversely related to the amount of perceived political loss. 
  
PH.H2: Breaching a non-compensatory level of perceived political loss is likely 
to lead to a decision to reject participation. 
 
PH.H3: The level of either participation or non-participation will be influenced 
by the amount of perceived political loss or gain.  
 
Analytic Second Stage and Alliance Dependence 
 An important goal of this study is to illustrate how the alliance dependence  
thesis can be incorporated into the larger poliheuristic theory. In this regard, then, the 
level of dependence on a dominant ally presents itself as a possible factor in the second, 
more analytic stage of the PH decision processing model. In other words, maintaining 
positive ties with a dominant ally with whom the potential coalition participant-state has 
various types of dependent relations, such as economic, military, security, diplomatic etc 
(Bennett et al, 1994), would likely be considered an aspect of the cost-benefit 




PH.H4:  If a non-compensatory level of political loss has been breached, alliance 
dependence may be positively associated with policy decisions on the level of 
non-participation, in the second stage of the decision making process.  
 
Thus, PH.H1 and PH.H3 address the general impact of perceived political loss on 
policy choices. More importantly, whereas PH.H1 and PH.H3 only indirectly infers the 
expected effects of non-compensatory political loss (ie. at progressively higher levels of 
political loss, the probability of breaching a non-compensatory level of such political 
loss is higher), PH.H2 and PH.H4 does so more explicit way. Further, between PH.H2 
and PH.H4, the latter hypothesis addresses the second-stage of poliheuristic decision 
processing in a much more direct way and does so by forecasting the likely final policy 
choice.   
Figure A-1 (Appendix A) represents the poliheuristic model of decision-making on 
military coalitions, and the causal decision paths. This may be considered a combined 
model, since important elements of the alliance dependence thesis is incorporated within 
the larger poliheuristic framework. The process begins, in the first stage, with political 
loss11. If there is no perceived non-compensatory political loss12, then the expected 
outcome is participation (ie. Outcome 1). But if there is perceived a non-compensatory 
level of such political loss, then any option that entails participation is rejected. With the 
surviving options, the process then moves on to the second, more analytic, stage. Among 
remaining options, the level of dependence on the dominant ally, and coalition leader, is 
assessed in terms of alliance dependence. The final decision choice is straightforward. A 
high level of alliance dependence leads to a high level of involvement among non-
participation options (ie. Outcome 2). Similarly, a low level of alliance dependence leads 





Multiple Method Approach (MMA)  
In investigating the two competing explanations (ie. poliheuristic theory versus 
alliance dependence thesis), the dissertation employs a multiple method approach, or 
“MMA” (Mintz, 2005; also Mintz, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Maoz et al, 
2004; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; Levy, 1998: 162; Levy, 2001; Elman and Elman, 1997; 
Schafer, 2003; George and Bennett, 2005: 3-16). Justification of a multiple method 
approach is based, in part, on its ability to better address various issues related to the 
method-of-analysis problem (Mintz, 2005; Russett, 2005), including the prevalence of 
disparate/contradictory findings (Levy, 1981; Weede, 1989; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Lalman, 1988; Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Waltz, 1979; Barbieri, 
1996; Polachek et al, 1999), lack of “consensual knowledge” and corollary inhibition of 
development of a scientific discipline (McDermott, 2000b; Kinder and Palfrey, 1993; 
Mintz, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002), and imprecise policy prescriptions in relevant 
topical areas across the field of international relations (Mintz, 2005). The selective 
incorporation of different methods may thus help rectify some of these negative 
manifestations that accrue from the method-of-analysis problem.  
Given the benefits of a multimethod approach, three complementary methods 
were chosen for investigating the principal research question of the dissertation: case 
study, experimental, and statistical. In most instances, the design phase of each method 
was driven by a need to satisfy five sequential and interrelated tasks: specification of 
problem and formulation of research objectives, specification of variables and 
hypotheses, case selection, describing the variance/operationalization in variables (ie. for 
statistical and experimental method), and formulation of data requirements (George and 
Bennett, 2005; also King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). These tasks are interdependent 
and interrelated, and their successful execution – as part of MMA – required reiteration 
and re-specification of each task (George and Bennett, 2005). Such a caveat also 
extended to the hypotheses, some of which needed refinement or modification, when 





1. An underlying argument of this study is that a cross-theoretical approach need not limit itself to an 
intra-subfield (eg. FPDM) comparison of competing theories; the comparison can be across levels, such as 
that between a grand theory and a mid-level theory. It is a truism that there are differences, some very 
significant, in the core assumptions of such theories. But a comparative analysis may still be appropriate as 
long as the main issue (ie. military coalition) under examination remains the same. For an overview of the 
different core assumptions between FPDM and neorealism, see Ripley (1993). 
 
2. Of course, this is by no means intended to dismiss nor ignore important single-case study findings  that 
can support or impugn established theories, a la Eckstein’s  (1975) “least likely” and “most likely” cases.  
 
3.  Morrow (2000) and Dingman (1979) make a distinction between alignments and alliances. But for 
these authors, the motivational basis of “alignments” seems to include situations where there are specific 
and immediate military goals (eg. first Gulf War), as well as situations where there are no such goals (eg. 
US-Israel relationship). In contrast, however, military coalitions are usually formed to achieve specific and 
immediate military goals (eg. Korean War, second Gulf War, etc). A second feature of alignments has to 
do with their low levels of formalization, if any, of the relationship between the involved states and 
absence of written agreements (Morrow, 2000). In contrast, however, military coalitions often entail 
written agreements on various aspects (eg. written commitments on size and type of contribution) of 
participation (eg. first and second Gulf War). Sometimes, these agreements are reached via inter-state 
bargaining (eg. US-Japan and US-Turkey in the first Gulf War).  
 
4. As an example of an encapsulated definition of “alliance”, the following may be given: “Two or more 
states form an alliance when they conclude a treaty that obliges them both to take certain actions in the 
event of war”. (Morrow, 2000: 63) 
 
5. Granted, there are some exceptions to this general line of critique (eg. Levy and Barnett, 1991; David, 
1991). But for the most part, these latter set of studies focus on elite legitimacy factors, or lack thereof, 
that often influence state decisions on coalitions among autocratic governments in the Third World. The 
argument put forth in this study, however, goes beyond this: domestic factors should influence state 
decisions on coalitions, irrespective of regime type.  
 
6. Morrow (2000: 73), for instance, argues that:  “The balance of power is the best-known theory of 
alliances, and neorealism is the version of that theory currently in the literature”.  
 
7. Among the multitude of studies in the alliance literature, Bennett et al (1994)  is the only study, of 
which we are aware, that seem to address the kinds of problematical issues (ie. dearth of studies on limited 
alliances, under-appreciation of domestic-level factors, etc) raised in the current study.  
 
8. An alternative to this model of asymmetric alliances is one that focuses on the autonomy versus security 
trade-off. See, for example, Bennett (1997) and Morrow (1991). 
 
9. This is the basis of the first hypothesis, introduced below. 
 
10. In this study, “level of participation” is equivalent to Bennett et al’s (1994) usage of the term “form  of 
contribution” (p.40  and p.73).  Both terms refer to burden-sharing, and this is different from the strictly 
participation (or contribution) versus non-participation (or no contribution) distinction. Moreover, in both 
this study and in Bennett et al (1994), by “participation” (or contribution) in the military coalition, it is 
meant the commitment of significant national resources, either in terms of lives or finances.  
 
11. There are different ways of operationalizing the “noncompensatory political loss” variable. These 
include: threat to a leader’s survival, drop in public support for a policy, drop in popularity, prospects of 
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electoral defeat, domestic opposition, threat to regime survival, intraparty rivalry and competition, internal 
or external challenge to the regime, potential collapse of the coalition, government, existence of veto 
players (eg. pivotal parties in parliamentary government)(Mintz,2004: 9).  Among these different 
operationalizations, perhaps the most common way, and the one used in this study, is public opinion via 
survey data. This operationalization is discussed in the research design section of  Chapter2.  
 
12. For simplified analysis, this model assumes that political loss is associated with a policy option that 
entails some type of participation in the military coalition. If the public is strongly opposed to such 
participation, this will likely be perceived by the political leadership as a non-compensatory level of such 































In relation to the research topic, therefore, in this chapter the goal is two-fold: (1) 
to extend the parameters (ie. different regions, different regime types, etc) in the 
applicability of the poliheuristic theory, and (2) to test the strength of the poliheuristic 
theory relative to the alliance dependence thesis for understanding participation 
decisions on military coalitions. Moreover, both of these goals speak to certain core 
strengths of the statistical method. These include: the relatively higher potential for 
generalizable findings compared to other methods (Jackman, 1985; Coppedge, 1999; 
Russett, 2005), a higher degree of external validity (Collier, 1991), and greater 
tractability over rival explanations (eg. diversionary theory, government type, ideology, 
etc), owing to inclusion of controls (Collier, 1991).   
This chapter begins with a reminder of the main hypotheses, for explaining and 
understanding cross-national patterns on military coalition participation decisions. The 
research design itself is structured around familiar components. These include an 
explanation of the main variables (dependent, independent, and controls), the sources 
and types of datasets used, and the testing procedure. Four setss of probit results are 
presented and analyzed. A few concluding points are also given regarding this chapter’s 
attempt at deriving generalizable findings that may hold cross-nationally.   
 
Research Design 
 Thirty countries are included in the database, drawn mostly from Western Europe 
and East/Central Europe (Appendix B). We are mainly interested in the differences in state 
response to coalition participation pressures in the period immediately preceding the 
beginning of the second Iraq War. Thus, the main period of investigation is confined to 
the crucial months preceding the start of the war – or approximately two months prior to 
the start of militarized conflict (March 20, 2003). The initial number of cases is thirty. 
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The relevant datasets include those found in Euro Gallup, World Factbook, European 
Journal of Political Research, Polity IV, and the Heritage Foundation (Appendix B) . Sources 
of datasets specifically related to “alliance dependence” include US Defense 
Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)(Appendix C). Initial inspection and cursory 
tests of relevant data sets revealed only very minor problems with non-normality; 
distribution points in the relevant variables were within the normal range. No data 
transformation was necessary. 
 
Model and Main Variables 
 The main aim of this study is to test the poliheuristic theory of military coalition 
participation and its type. Within this framework, it is assumed that alliance dependence 
thesis will offer additional important insights and contributions, though its role is 
explicitly secondary to the main theory.  The main independent variable is “political 
loss”, reflective of PH theory. The main dependent variable is “decision”. The set of 
control variables include: elections, economic factors, level of democratic development, 
government type and government ideology. For “alliance dependence”, the main 
variable  representing the alliance dependence thesis, it is included as either a control or 
an independent variable depending on the related statistical test and the stage of decision 
making in which it is invoked.   
 
DV: Decision. A dichotomous or an ordinal dependent variable is used, 
depending on the hypothesis examined. In the case of a dichotomous dependent 
outcome, the responses are collapsed into one of two categories: participation (ie. active 
military support or combat troops) versus non-participation (ie. no support, political 
support, or passive military support). A state decision to participate or not participate are 
coded as 0 or 1, respectively. In the case of an ordinal dependent outcome, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 
4 are used for no support of any kind, political support, passive military support, active 
military support, and combat troops, respectively; further each decision type represents 
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progressively higher level of participation in the military coalition. An important 
exception to this categorization and coding is in testing PH.H4, as explained below, in 
the testing procedure section.  
An affirmative participation decision by the political leader of the state can take 
two forms: contribution of combat troops and/or other type of active military support. A 
country’s decision response is categorized as “active military support” if it involves the 
deployment of military personnel short of them being involved in actual combat. Thus, 
this involves use of military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, etc.) and/or 
support troops (eg. support troops such as engineers, medical teams, chemical and/or 
biological teams) that entail only a very small probability of direct military engagement 
with Iraq. These types of responses – although different in several respects - are, 
nonetheless, considered as similar state decisions to participate in the international 
military coalition against Iraq. 
Non-participation decisions can also assume several forms: passive military 
support, political support only, or no support of any kind. “Passive military support” is 
when the leader of the state allows use of its airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports to other 
countries that choose to participate in the international military coalition – often these 
are related to the enactment of previous bilateral/multilateral treaty obligations, and 
hence difficult to deny on the part of the relevant country. Thus, in contrast to a decision 
to participate, non-participation does not involve deployment of the country’s military 
personnel in any significant capacity. One case (Norway) was coded as an instance of 
passive military support since its decision to send chemical warfare suits most closely 
fits this category. A state’s decision choice is categorized as “political support” if it 
makes an equivalent public statement to that effect in support of the U.S.-led military 
coalition against Iraq. A country’s response was coded as “no support of any kind” if it 
is not identified anywhere in the principal reference source for this variable.  
The main reference for information on this variable is the Heritage Foundation. 
Other sources of this information also exist (eg. The New York Times, CBC-online, 
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Washington Post, and USA Today), but the data provided by the Heritage Foundation is 
comparatively more reliable and systematic in coverage.  
 
IV:  Political Loss. The main independent variable is political loss. It is true that 
an analysis of public opinion prior to adoption of a particular policy does not exclusively 
establish a linkage – such as that delineated in the poliheuristic theory - between 
behavior of political leaders and the public (Holsti, 1992). Nonetheless, when it can be 
persuasively shown that a cross-national pattern exists in such a relationship, the claim 
of a valid and generalizable causal chain may be strengthened; this also represents a core 
contribution of the current study to existing research in FPDM. One of the ways, then, of 
operationalizing the perceived “political loss” variable is via public opinion which  
indicate the overall change in level of support or opposition to a particular issue or 
proposed course of government action (Mintz, 2003).  
The main data for this perceived political loss variable is based on Euro Gallup’s 
“International Crisis Survey”. The Euro Gallup data contains relevant information on 
public opinion for 30 countries of Western and Central/Eastern Europe on the question 
of his/her country’s participation in the international military coalition against Iraq. The 
survey contains public opinion for both support and opposition to participation in the 
military coalition against Iraq.  
The choice of one survey item over another (ie. support vs opposition) is 
informed by recognition that the core of the poliheuristic decision processing theory is 
premised on non-compensatory loss on the most important dimension – typically the 
political dimension. As an important logical corollary to this, then, political loss can 
occur if the leader’s adoption of a policy is contrary to public opinion – be it in support 
of or in opposition to a particular course of action. In short, although maintaining 
political support (ie. avoidance of political loss) is the crux of the non-compensatory 
rule, in operational terms, such support can be maintained by not going against public 
opinion writ large, or by not behaving in ways that are contrary to such public opinion. 
In consideration of this, the current study focuses on the level of public opposition to 
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participation in the military coalition. The Euro Gallup’s survey question item of interest 
is the following: “If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary 
decision of the United Nations, do you think that it would be justified or not that our 
country participate in a military intervention in Iraq?” The cross-national survey was 
conducted on thirty European countries on January 21, 2003 and January 27, 2003.  
 
Non-Compensatory Cognitive Demarcation Point  
Studies also suggest that public opinion exerts a certain amount of influence on 
policy when it reaches at least a “consensus” level, identified as between 60% - 69% of 
public opinion on a particular issue, with progressively greater amounts of policy impact 
with each higher levels of public opinion (Powlick, 1995: 439; McClosky, 1968; 
Graham, 1989; Holsti, 1992; Wilcox  et al, 1993; also Brulé and Mintz, 2006). 
Relatedly, it may be posited that, at progressively higher levels of public opinion, it 
becomes increasingly non-compensatory for political leaders to ignore or behave in ways 
contrary to such public opinion.  
In light of this, then, a sensitivity analysis was undertaken to “locate” the non-
compensatory level of political loss. Values ranging from 69% to 74% were tested, and 
the latter value was chosen and used in the relevant specified model. This value is only 
slightly higher than the upper limit (ie. 69%) found in previous studies on public opinion  
(Powlick, 1995: 439; McClosky, 1968; Graham, 1989; Holsti, 1992; Wilcox  et al, 1993; 
Brulé and Mintz, 2006), and so should not pose major methodological and theoretical 
problems. The value also allows for sufficient variation on the variable leading to more 
proper statistical estimates.   
In comparison to other similar datasets (eg. Gallup International), Euro Gallup’s 
concurrent period of survey coverage for all countries (Jan.21-27, 2003), use of same 
question item, and similar sample sizes, allows for a more systematic investigation and 
plausible comparisons of cross-national variances in state decisions on coalition 
(non)participation. And, depending on the hypothesis examined, an interval or a 
dichotomous political loss variable is used. 
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Alliance Dependence  
In accordance with Bennett et al (1994: 44-5), “alliance dependence” is measured 
in two ways: “economic ties” and “military ties”.  This variable  is included as either a 
control (ie. test of PH.H1, PH.H2, and PH.H3) or an independent variable (ie. test of 
PH.H4) depending on the hypothesis being examined and the stage of decision making 
in which it is invoked.   
Bennett et al (1994) make specific mention of the following components that 
comprise “alliance dependence” of a potential participant country in military coalition: 
number of active military personnel of coalition leader in potential participant country, 
arms transfers from coalition leader to potential participant country, military assistance 
by coalition leader to potential participant country, economic assistance by coalition 
leader to potential participant country, and number of active military installations of 
coalition leader in potential participant country. 
At least two possibilities present themselves in capturing the overall level of 
“alliance dependence”: composite index or an underlying common factor. Theoretical 
justification argues for the former, since it better reflects Bennett et al’s (1994) 
understanding of this concept. A composite index of “alliance dependence” is created 
composing of military personnel, arms transfers, military assistance, economic 
assistance, and military installations. Each component is given equal weight2. Also, since 
Bennett et al (1994) adhere closely to a historically-patterned understanding of “alliance 
dependence”, and this is reflected in their choice of comparative cases, this logic is 
followed.  
For creating an index of “alliance dependence”, two slightly different historical 
time-periods are used: 1992-2002, and 1999-2001. The rationale for choosing 1992 as 
the start point for the first time period is based on the fact that, reflective of system 
change attendant with the end of the Cold War, there exist structural breaks in the data 
for each of the components, beginning in that year. The advantage of using this time 
period is that it closely models the historicity of long-term patterns in “alliance 
dependence”. Thus, this time period hews closely to Bennett et al’s (1994) implicit 
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understanding of “alliance dependence” as a long-term historical development in the 
relationship between countries.  
On the other hand, a drawback to the use of this time period is the non-
availability of “personnel” data for the years 1992-1998, inclusive. This drawback, in 
turn, justifies the choice of the second time period, 1999-2001. Although this time period 
represents only three continuous time points, it contains all of the datasets for each of the 
five components of alliance dependence. Thus, unlike with the first time period, the 
second time period is more balanced, reducing thereby the possibility of spurious 
inferences. However, the choice of using both of these two time periods has its own 
distinct advantage: it neatly sidesteps a type of investigator-induced selection bias in the 
construction of this variable, thereby providing a more rigorous test of Bennett et al’s 
(1994) alliance dependence thesis. 
Although the data is cross-sectional, time-series, a panel design method need not 
be applied for constructing, or “predicting” the index, since alliance dependence is either 
a control variable or an independent explanatory element in understanding coalition 
participation and burden-sharing decisions; moreover, any such “predicted” alliance 
dependence scores would not be very meaningful in the application of this study. In 
obtaining the composite index score, therefore, for each country in each time period, 
three basic steps are taken. First, the average value of each component (ie. active 
military personnel, military assistance, economic assistance, active military installations, 
and arms transfers) is calculated for the respective time period. Second, since the scales 
and units of each component are different from each other, the average values are 
standardized via z-scores. And third, the obtained z-scores are once more standardized to 
arrive at a final alliance dependence score for each country for each time-period.  
The U.S. Department of Defense is the main source of data for “military 
personnel” and “active military installations”. Data on “military assistance” and 
“economic assistance” is from USAID. And data on “arms transfers” is from 
SIPRI(Appendix C).   
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Control Variables  
 It is expected that, in comparison to alliance dependence, variations in perceived 
political loss, the core of PH theory, will explain more of the cross-national differences 
in state response to military coalition participation pressure. However, the research 
design also incorporate various state-level controls into the decision processing model: 
elections, economic factors, level of democratic development, government type and 
government ideology. These additional factors are meant to reflect the frequently-used 
controls in the use of force literature (eg. US presidential use of force studies).  
 
Elections. Many previous studies have suggested a relationship between 
elections, the electoral cycle, and foreign policy (Volgy and Schwartz, 1991; Gaubatz,  
1991; Morgan and Anderson, 1999). At least one study, however, finds that the 
relationship has been exaggerated (Leeds and Davis, 1997). The preponderance of 
evidence, nonetheless, suggests that it may be relevant to consider election year as a 
control. Data for this control is based on the European Journal of Political Research. 
Election year is coded as 1, and as 0 if otherwise.  
 
Economic Factors. One line of research, based on theme of a diversionary use of 
force, suggests that political leaders may be more willing to use force abroad, such as 
part of a military coalition, when faced with negative domestic economic conditions 
(Russett, 1987, 1990; Fordham, 1998; Heldt, 1999; DeRouen, 2000). In accordance with 
Fordham (1998), who advocates a disaggregated approach to examining the effects of 
economic factors – but in contrast to others who often use aggregate measures of 
“economic misery” (eg. James and Oneal, 1991) - in light of their differential impact, we 
use two measures, most recent annual unemployment rate and inflation rate, to assess the 
influence of domestic economic factors in the use of force. Data for both unemployment 
and inflation (consumer price index)) is from the World Fact Book.  
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Level of Democracy. Compared to newly-transitioned democracies, political 
leaders in more established democracies may have a more nuanced view on what 
constitutes legitimate use of force against another sovereign state (Foyle, 2003). Thus, 
cross-national variation in state responses to coalition participation pressures may partly 
be a function of level of democratic development. For democracy scores, the most recent 
Polity IV dataset is used1.  
 
Government Type. Embedded within the democratic peace literature, at least one 
long-held argument suggests that, among democracies, majority governments are less 
constrained in interstate foreign relations than minority governments, since in such cases 
parliamentary rule equates with government rule (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Tsebelis, 
1995, 1999). A slightly different argument is given in another study which suggests that, 
since they tend to hold a larger number of seats than majority governments, coalition 
governments face less constraint in foreign policy, and thus are more likely to either 
reciprocate or initiate such militarized interstate-disputes and conflicts (Prins and 
Sprecher, 1999).  A more recent finding, however, implies that coalition and majority 
types of government are equally more likely to initiate conflict than minority 
governments. Equivalently stated, minority governments are less likely to use force, in 
large part because they face greater number of veto players (Ireland and Gartner, 2001).  
For government type, the focus is on the particular form of cabinet. Three main cabinet 
types are considered: coalition (either minimum winning coalition,  minority coalition, 
or oversized coalition), majority (single party majority), and minority (single party 
minority). Data for all countries is based on the European Journal of Political 
Research3. A set of three dummies are created for each government type (majority, 
minority, or coalition). Coding is 1 or 0.  
 
Government Ideology. An increasing trend in the FPDM literature, particularly 
in relation to various cognitive variants, such as role theory, image theory, operational 
code, (eg. Breuning, 1995; Walker, 1992, 2003, etc) has been the identification of 
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powerful ideas, political beliefs, and related ideational elements that more directly affect 
foreign policy decision making (Goldstein, 1988; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 5; 
Foyle, 1997; White, 1999; Kaarbo, 2003; Coates and Krieger, 2004; Ozekici-Taner, 
2006). In particular, and in relation to military coalitions, if there is shared ideological 
affinity between the political leader of the dominant state in the international military 
coalition and political leader of potential participant state, it may be more difficult for 
the latter to ignore participation pressures and active burden-sharing pressures.  
A related perspective is that in an evolving multi-polar world (Snyder, 1997) 
with no clear-cut definitions of security threats, a shared world-view, as afforded by 
ideological ties, may at times serve as a guide for state action by political leaders 
(Carlsnaes, 1986; Kim and Fording, 2002; Tsebelis, 1995, 1999; Cook, 2003; Kampfner, 
2003; Riddell, 2003; Coates and Krieger, 2004; Beckett and Hencke, 2005). Again, 
therefore, political beliefs and ideational elements, in the form of ideology, may 
sometimes act as another type of cognitive filter in making foreign policy decisions. But 
the cognitive impact of such on policy decisions may usually not be as strong as that 
exerted by perceived political loss, since the latter more directly impacts upon the 
position of the leader in the political system.  
For the “government ideology” variable, in the case of single party governments, 
we rely on Benoit and Laver’s (2004) expert survey data to derive government ideology. 
This score ranges from 0 (most left wing) to 20 (most right wing). In the case of 
coalition governments, lack of systematic data forces us to rely on a proxy method for 
generating this variable: the party affiliation of the head of government (HoG). The 
information on the HoG is combined with the expert survey on party ideology (Benoit 
and Laver, 2004) to arrive at the score for government ideology. This proxy method has 
been advocated by others (eg. Muller-Rommel, et al, 2004). This method also hews well 
with the current operationalization of this variable, since the aim is to infer the 
ideological leaning of the political leader of the potential coalition participant country.  
Sources of information on head of government are the European Journal of 
Political Research (various issues) and World Factbook. Government ideology is a 
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continuous variable ranging from 0 (most left-leaning) to 20 (most right-leaning). Note 
that for France, coding was done by the author based on a content analysis of the 
relevant information: two values were tested, and the lower value – which is a far more 
conservative estimate, in comparison to similar political profiles of the HoGs of other 
countries – was used.  
 
Testing Procedure 
To test PH.H1, an interval political loss variable (ie. level of public opposition to 
participation in military coalition), PLOSS, is used on two mutually exclusive categories 
of a dichotomous dependent variable, DECISION: participation versus non-
participation. The following are treated as being equivalent: no support, political 
support, and passive military support. These three are collapsed into “non-participation” 
dependent outcome, and are coded as 1. Similarly, the following are collapsed into 
“participation” dependent outcome: active military support and combat troops. The latter 
category is coded as 0 for participation4. In testing PH.H2, the same dichotomous 
dependent variable, DECISION, is used, as in PH.H1. But to capture the non-
compensatory effects of political loss, 74% as the cut-off point is used in creating a 
dichotomous independent variable, PLOSS. In other words, it is assumed that at 74% or 
above in public opposition to coalition participation, political loss becomes non-
compensatory for political leaders. When PLOSS is 74% or higher, it is coded as 1, 
when it falls below this level, it is coded as 0.  The expected direction for political loss 
(non-compensatory) is negative. Regression estimates will be based on a basic probit 
model. 
To test PH.H3, the effects of an interval PLOSS variable is examined along with 
an ordinal dependent variable that identifies the level of (non)participation. Here, all 
levels of (non)participation are examined. Again, however, the same corollary logic 
applies: at progressively higher levels of political loss, the probability of breaching the 
non-compensatory level becomes greater, and this will be reflected in the choice of 
particular level of (non)participation.  
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For all three hypotheses the expected direction for political loss is negative. 
Further, depending on the hypothesis, either a basic probit (PH.H1 and PH.H2) or an 
ordinal probit (PH.H3) is used in deriving the regression estimates.  
 
Selection Model and Analytic Second Stage 
For hypothesis PH.H4 a selection model is used to test its core claim. To recap, 
the poliheuristic theory stipulates that, in the first stage, a non-compensatory level of 
political loss triggers the rejection of certain outcomes. The non-compensatory level of 
political loss acts as an endogenous trigger or switching mechanism. This trigger leads to 
rejection of certain options. Moreover, this endogenous trigger affects only a subset of 
the cases under observation. In the second stage, remaining options are weighed in terms 
of utility maximization, such as alliance dependence. Thus the dynamics of the first 
stage and the second stage are connected; what happens in the first stage will affect 
outcomes in the second stage. These types of endogenous switching and sample 
selection issues are best dealt with in stage-based selection models, But weighing the 
needs for proper estimation with the limited sample size dictates that a binary outcome 
variable be constructed5. Two categories are created. In the first category are options that 
reflect high non-military form of involvement in the coalition. The option of “military 
assistance passive” and “political support” are in this category. In the second category is 
the option of “no support”.  This category thus reflects, at most, low non-military form 
of involvement in the coalition. As well, however, political leaders who self-selected out 
of non-participation are also put in this category. At an intuitive level, a high level of 
alliance dependence should create positive pressures for the option of “combat troops” 
or the option of “military assistance active”. But of course, this is contrary to what is 
forecasted in the second stage of the poliheuristic theory. Thus, this binary 
categorization also provides a more robust test of the impact of the endogenous non-
compensatory trigger and the analytic second stage. The first category is coded as 1, the 
second category is coded as 0. The estimation if based on a Heckman probit selection 
model (Gronau, 1974; Lewis, 1974; Heckman, 1976, 1979). 
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Results and Analysis 
 The estimates for PH.H1 and PHT.H3 are presented in Tables D-1 and D-2 
(Appendix D)
, each with two time-periods. In Table D-1, the model P1 shows the estimates 
for the period 1999-2001. To deal with collinearity issues, two separate estimates are 
given. The model P4 gives the estimates for the second time period.  
The baseline models P1 and P4 suggests that the sign of the main explanatory 
variable is in the predicted direction. In other words, in line with PH theory, perceived 
political loss generally effected a negative military coalition participation decision on the 
part of political leaders. More clearly, the greater the amount in such perceived political 
loss, the greater the likelihood of a decision choice not to participate in any substantive 
way in the coalition. Viewed in another way, theses results suggest that the greater the 
perceived political loss – or public opposition to coalition participation - the greater the 
possibility that such loss becomes non-compensatory with consequent impact on a 
negative participation decision. As a result, as the political leader faces increasingly 
greater levels of political loss, the optimal foreign policy choice might be not to give any 
type of support, voice only political support, or engage only in passive military 
participation in response to coalition participation pressures. In fact, this was the policy 
response for nearly two-thirds of the countries approached by the U.S. to participate in 
its international military coalition against Iraq. Only about one third (or eleven countries) 
responded with active military support or with the sending of combat troops. 
Interestingly, these estimates for the PH.H1 show that the ideology of the government 
(Head of Government) is also consistently significant - though at lower levels than that 
for political loss, but at higher levels in comparison to ADEP. The other controls do not 
suggest any significant effects. Model fit for both P1 and P4 is quite significant, as 
suggested by the p-value of the chi2.  
Results for the test of hypothesis PH.H3 are shown in Table D-2 (Appendix D). 
Models T1 and T3 show the estimates for the two different time periods. For both time-
periods, the coefficients for political loss are negative, as expected, and are significant. 
Another interesting finding, however, is the significant result for the control variable 
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ADEP. This seems to suggest that, contra Bennett et al (1994), alliance dependence is a 
significant factor in explaining the type of participation or burden-sharing. Nonetheless, 
as with results for PH.H1, across both sets of nested models, political loss seems 
consistently more significant than ADEP. The results thus suggest that as perceived 
political loss becomes progressively larger, as measured by public opposition to 
coalition participation, the probability of breaching a non-compensatory level in such 
loss becomes greater and it interacts with decision choices on the type of 
(non)participation policy options. This process is revealed in the negative direction for 
the political loss variable; progressively higher levels of perceived political loss is 
associated with a progressively lower level of (non)participation6. Findings for ideology 
is mixed across the nested models, and across the two time periods. As with the models 
for PH.H1, the fit for most of these models is noticeably good.  
 
Results for the NC Model 
The non-compensatory political loss effect on decision making is more ably 
demonstrated in Table D-3(Appendix D). Table D-3 presents the main test of the non-
compensatory political loss principle, and its impact on participation decisions on 
military coalitions. As with the previous models, operationalization of non-
compensatory political loss (NC Political Loss) is via level of public opposition to 
coalition participation7. Per hypothesis PH.H2, NC political loss is of the correct sign, 
and is consistently and strongly significant across the two different time-periods. 
Significance level of ideology also seems to be stable across the two time-periods and 
different specifications of the baseline model. Unemployment and level of democracy, 
however, seems to be equivocal across the two time-periods. The model fit seems 
noticeably better for the first time period compared to the second time-period. 
 The overall findings for this model thus suggests that when political leaders perceive a 
breach in the non-compensatory threshold of political loss – a level identified as 74% or 
higher in public opposition to the issue - they tend to reject substantive participation in 
the military coalition, such as active military participation or the sending of combat 
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troops. Instead, to avoid this high level of political loss, political leaders in such 
situations generally adopt a non-participation decision (ie. no support of any kind, only 
political support, or passive military support). This relationship between non-
compensatory political loss and participation is clearly conveyed by the negative sign of 
the coefficient.  
Another way to understand these implied findings is to illustrate the responses of  
countries whose political leaders did not perceive a non-compensatory level of political 
loss. In fact, the leaders of only six countries (ie. United Kingdom, Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) may not have perceived a non-compensatory 
level of political loss. Thus for such leaders, the level of public opposition did not reach 
a politically intolerable level – which is not to say that public opposition to coalition 
participation in such countries was muted. Compatible with poliheuristic theory, this 
situation allowed for a greater range of policy options being available in responding to 
coalition participation pressures, including participation in the military coalition. And, in 
each instance, the leaders in these countries chose to respond to such pressures by either 
sending combat troops, in the case of the U.K., or by some form of active military 
participation, such as deployment of military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, 
etc.) and/or support troops (eg. support troops such as engineers, medical teams, 
chemical/biological teams), in the case of the other five countries. Viewed in another 
way, having greater leverage over available policy options allowed such leaders to better 
market and frame, vis-à-vis the public, a particular policy option as the most desirable 
course of action (Brulé and Mintz, 2006; Jacobs and Page, 2005). 
 
Results for Selection Model and Analytic Second Stage  
However, a yet better way to illustrate the impact of non-compensatory political 
loss on decision making on military coalitions is to examine the particular policy choices 
of countries whose political leaders may in fact have (1) perceived a cognitive breach in 
the level of such loss, and (2) therefore chose not to participate. The subsequent behavior 
of such countries is especially relevant for understanding and demonstrating the second 
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stage of PH decision processing framework of FPDM. In the second stage, a more 
analytic decision strategy is adopted wherein cost-benefit calculations and utility-
maximization considerations, such as consequences of a policy choice on the nature of a 
state’s relationship with a dominant ally, often assume primacy (Mintz and Geva, 1997; 
Mintz, 1993, 2004). Thus, by way of a re-visitation:  
 
PH.H4:  If a non-compensatory level of political loss has been breached, alliance 
dependence may be positively associated with policy decisions on the level of 
non-participation, in the second stage of the decision making process.  
 
In other words, if a non-compensatory level of perceived political loss is 
breached, non-participation is expected. In turn, a high level of alliance dependence is 
expected to lead to the choice of high non-military involvement (ie. either “military 
support passive” or “political support”); a low level of alliance dependence is expected 
to lead to the choice of low non-military involvement (ie. “no support”).   
Table D-4 (Appendix D). presents the alliance dependence scores for two time 
periods, for thirty countries. Data sources for this measure are varied. Across both time 
periods, there is no extreme difference in terms of the ranking of each country’s alliance 
dependence relative to the other countries.  
Table D-5 (Appendix D). presents the estimates of the stage-based selection model. 
As before, two time periods are incorporated, 1999-2001 and 1992-2002, to avoid 
selection issues. The endogenous trigger is the non-compensatory level (ie. public 
opposition at 74% ). This is identified by the variable “NC” in the full equation. The 
binary dependent variable is “level”. This is identified in the selection equation.  As 
well, per the poliheuristic theory, in the selection equation, only alliance dependence is 
the independent explanatory variable (ie. “ADEP”).  As the estimates show, the sign of 
the coefficient conforms to expectation. In other words, a high level of alliance 
dependence is positively associated with the option of either “military assistance 
passive” or “political support”, instead of “no support”. Between the two time periods, 
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however, ADEP is shown to be statistically significant only for the 1992-2002 period. 
Moreover, although these results are strongly  suggestive, the relatively small number of 
cases implies caution against drawing conclusions with high confidence8.  
In all then, these tests of the various PH hypotheses suggest a few things. First, 
the level of perceived political loss has an impact on whether or not leaders choose to 
participate in international military coalitions. Second, the level of such political loss 
also influences the type of (non)participation decisions, such as passive versus active 
military involvement. Third, perception of a breach in the non-compensatory level of 
political loss has an impact on subsequent policy decision choices. And, fourth, this 
study’s cross-theoretical approach suggests that insights from AD thesis and PH theory 
may be fruitfully combined.   
 
Summary and Substantive Conclusions  
 This study represents a small attempt at a cross-national, statistical investigation 
of foreign policy decision-making on military coalitions, using the second Iraq war as 
the relevant focal case. Given this, a few of the more relevant findings of the study need 
be summarized, beginning with some of its more specific limitations. First, the ADEP 
(composite index of alliance dependence) variable, used in the analytic stage of PH 
decision theory (ie. selection model), is based on historical patterns of alliance 
relationships9. Relatedly, the non-compensatory level of perceived political loss (ie. 
74%) used to test PH.H2 may be deemed too high.  
 Despite these problems, however, the study does lend some important insights 
into the literature on alliances and foreign policy decisionmaking. For instance, despite 
the many important differences in the working assumptions between these two distinct 
lines of research (Ripley, 1993), there seem to be an increasing convergence on the 
recognized import of domestic politics. This common trend in turn seems to provide a 
reasonable basis for a comparative analysis of competing explanations – provided there 
is some theoretical basis and justification for seeking comparative insights on a shared 
research theme. In the case of the current study, this happened to involve state crisis 
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behavior with respect to participation and burden-sharing in limited alliances, the 
military coalition. Relatedly, a great contribution of this study to current understanding 
of foreign policy analysis is the design and application of an explicitly cross-national 
investigation to the question of: “what explains political leaders’ participation and 
burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions?”  
The alliance dependence thesis (Bennett et al, 1994), on the one hand, is found to 
have some statistical evidentiary support when applied to a more varied, cross-national, 
set of cases, in Iraq II. As well, the study’s findings also imply that the significance of 
alliance dependence may not be limited to the question of participation only but, rather, 
may be extended to the question of type of participation. Importantly, however, the 
significance of AD seems dependent on the time period used to construct the index 
since, for many of the models, the findings were equivocal across the two different time 
periods used (ie. 1992-2002, and 1999-2001).  
On the other hand, the main findings of this study is strongly suggestive of the 
cross-national, empirical evidence of the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision 
making (along with DeRouen and Sprecher, 2004). In fact, the results suggest that the 
poliheuristic theory offers a consistently more significant explanation than does alliance 
dependence thesis. Perhaps most importantly, from the poliheuristic perspective, the 
study also presented evidence strongly suggestive of the application of the 
noncompensatory principle as a likely decision heuristic in the two-stage decision 
making strategy for most leaders of democratic regimes in a comparative setting. In fact, 
a key finding of this study is that when approximately ¾ of the public oppose 
participation in military coalitions, their leaders are unlikely to commit combat forces or 
to render active military support to such coalitions. Such a finding is also largely in line 
with previous studies of the impact of public opinion on elite behavior (Powlick, 1995: 
439; McClosky, 1968; Graham, 1989; Holsti, 1992; Wilcox  et al, 1993; also Brulé and 
Mintz, 2006). Another important finding is that  alliance dependence enters into the 
calculus of decision making in the second stage of the poliheuristic theory, per the 
results of the selection model.  
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As regards the potential for wider generalizability, there are elements of this 
study that suggest the need for restraint as well as modest optimism.  On the one hand, 
the current study was a limited test of the poliheuristic theory, with a supporting role for 
alliance dependence thesis, for understanding decisions on participation and burden-
sharing in the military coalition of the second Gulf War. At a facile level, this implies 
the need to circumscribe any sweeping generalizations beyond this particular event. Yet 
on the other hand, when the main findings are viewed strictly from the perspective of a 
foreign policy decision making framework, the results may cautiously be extrapolated to 
any similar crisis contexts involving policy choice. In fact the robustness of the 
poliheuristic theory may allow it to be modeled into most situations – political or 
otherwise – as long as the core element remains that of making a choice (Mintz, 2004).  
Furthermore, and despite the contribution of this study to the PH research program on 
foreign policy decisionmaking, it nonetheless would be remiss to not mention additional 
considerations that may further enhance the plausibility of its main findings. For 
example, process-tracing techniques (George and Bennett, 2005) may be applied to well 
chosen most-likely cases, among the original dataset of countries. Such methods can be 
applied to either confirm or challenge what was only implicitly accepted in this study – 
the cognitive elements of poliheuristic decision making, such as political leaders’ 
perception of a non-compensatory level of domestic political loss. Previous poliheuristic 
studies using process-tracing techniques have provided strong case study evidence of the 
impact of such cognitive and perceptual factors in foreign policy decision making in 
other crisis contexts (eg. Mintz, 1993; De Rouen, Jr., 2002; Brulé, 2005). The research 
program may also benefit from more studies on ways to most efficiently identify the 
non-compensatory level, as well as more consciously comparative, cross-national 
investigations. Also, the incorporation of “ideational” elements (eg. ideology, world-
view, operational code, leadership style, etc), into PH theory (eg. James and Zhang, 
2006; Keller and Yang, 2008) may help in the understanding of potential outliers or 
anomalies – from the PH perspective - such as Prime Minister Blair’s (U.K.) decision on 
coalition participation (ie. sending combat troops). And, as seen in this limited attempt, 
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the combining of explanatory elements of different models, on a shared research theme, 





















































1.  Malta is left out from the case selection since Polity IV provides no score for this country, due to its 
small population size (ie. Less than 500,000).  
 
2. Bennett et al (1994) implicitly suggest that alliance dependence be understood as a “holistic” concept, 
and thus give no information as to whether any one component of such alliance dependence should be 
given greater weight than any other component.  
 
3. For Romania and Bulgaria, Electoral Studies (2003) was relied upon, since EJPR lacks information on 
these two cases. 
 
4. An important theoretical note here is that, in testing this hypothesis, it is not necessary to identify a 
priori a particular non-compensatory level of political loss; however, the possibility of reaching/breaching 
that non-compensatory level is likely to be higher, the greater the value on the political loss variable (ie. 
greater level of public opposition to coalition participation). Hence, this hypothesis implies that at 
progressively higher levels of political loss, political leaders will become increasingly inclined to reject 
participation in the military coalition.  
 
5.  The “sample selection model” (Miranda, Alfonso and Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, 2006) was used on an 
ordinal dependent outcome. However, the small sample size prevented proper estimation.  
 
6. This implied evidence of the impact of non-compensatory political loss on decision making is more 
directly addressed in the “non-compensatory” models.  
 
7. Again, per earlier explanation, the non-compensatory level of political loss was located via a sensitivity 
analysis of public opinion. When the level of public opposition to participation was 74% or higher, it was 
categorized as “non-compensatory political loss”. Regression estimates for other levels from this baseline 
showed insignificant results.  
 
8. On the other hand, the results on the relationship between alliance dependence and the analytic stage 
can be further explored via a simple bivariate model, with an ordinal dependent outcome (ie. “military 
assistance passive”, “political support”, or “no support”. Table D-6 shows the results of the bivariate 
model for the alternative test of PH.H4. One case was dropped due to absence of relevant scores. The 
coefficient for ADEP, or level of alliance dependence, is positive as expected. Although the level of 
significance for ADEP seems to differ depending on the time-period, the modeled relationship as a whole 
is still quite a significant fit with the data.  This seems to imply, in accordance with the logic of PH.H4, 
that higher levels of alliance dependence is positively associated with higher levels of non-military 
involvement in the coalition, within the parameters of the remaining set of non-participation policy 
options.  
In specific terms, among the countries included in the dataset, twenty-three countries registered a 
level of public opposition to coalition participation that may have breached a non-compensatory level of 
perceived political loss. And, in line with the poliheuristic decision processing perspective, in a large 
majority of such countries – seventeen out of twenty three - the political leaders chose not to participate in 
any substantive way in the military coalition. The seventeen countries were: Belgium, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Finland, France, Sweden, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, 
Turkey, Switzerland, and Norway. More clearly, depending on his/her country’s level of alliance 
dependence on the military coalition leader, such political leaders opted for one of three policy decisions:  
no support of any kind, only political support, or passive military support (ie. permission given to coalition 
forces for use of airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports).  
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9. Thus, incorporation of “real-time” offers of carrots and sticks (such as forgiveness of foreign loans 
versus cutting off of military transfers, etc) was not modeled. Lack of systematic data on this suggests the 































ERDOGAN CABINET AND THE IRAQ CRISIS: A CASE STUDY 
 
The previous chapter presented evidence on cross-national patterns on foreign 
policy decision making and participation in military coalitions. The evidence suggests 
strong support for the poliheuristic theory. But the veracity of the statistical findings can 
further be probed by another complementary scientific method, the case study. The 
advantages of the case study method are well-known. These include its higher levels of 
conceptual validity, possible derivation of new hypotheses or variables, greater attention 
to contextual factors, and better accommodation of complex causal relations (George 
and Bennett, 2005; Lijphart, 1971; Ragin, 1987; Sartori, 1991; Collier, 1993). In relation 
to the current topic, two such strengths are particularly relevant: conceptual validity and  
contextualized explanation. 
Drawing from the 30 countries of the Euro Gallup Iraq Crisis Survey, the  
Erdogan (or Gul-Erdogan) cabinet’s foreign policy decision making on the Iraq crisis 
represents the choice of case to be examined in this chapter. The import of the case 
choice is also informed by a recognition of its representation as a strong candidate for 
the “least-likely” case for the poliheuristic theory and a “most-likely” case for the 
expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis. The Erdogan cabinet’s crisis 
decisionmaking represents an ideal case for undertaking a “disciplined configurative” 
study (Eckstein, 1975: 99-104; George and Bennett, 2005; also Lijphart, 1971), since the 
main aim is to illustrate the veracity of the core claims of the poliheuristic theory (ie. 
satisficing, non-compensatory, stage-based, and non-holistic decisionmaking). 
According to Eckstein, “[c]ases that are extreme on pertinent measures can usually be 
regarded as crucial in the sense of being least-likely and most-likely cases” (1975: 119). 
Indeed, the intense levels of public and internal party opposition, in the context of huge 
material and non-material inducements does seem to speak to the “extreme” character of 
this crisis case. A detailed, analysis of the case should therefore yield more knowledge 
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about the strengths of the poliheuristic theory, relative to competing  explanations, such 
as the expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis1.  
 
Introduction  
When the AKP came to power in November of 2002, it was faced with the 
effects of two consecutive economic crises, the most recent of which occurred in the 
previous year. Long term economic mismanagement by previous governments led to 
run-away inflation and interest rates and extreme instability of the national currency. In 
the latest crisis, these events were accompanied by a general collapse of the financial 
markets, widespread bank failures and business bankruptcies, massive levels of 
unemployment, and a government debt nearly equal to the national GDP. Only by once 
again turning to the IMF for emergency loans, was further economic catastrophe staved 
off. But the new AKP government was still saddled with a combined foreign and 
domestic debt of nearly $95 billion (US), still dependent on continued IMF aid, still 
faced with shaky financial markets, and was seeing only the very rudimentary 
beginnings of an economic recovery. Thus by force of circumstance, the economy 
became one of the cabinet’s most important priorities (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, 
March 27, 2003; Heper and Toktas, 2003: 176; Park, 2005: 23; also Hale, 2007: 86-7). 
However, within weeks of the AKP’s electoral victory, the Bush administration 
contacted the newly-established Gul-Erdogan cabinet with requests for cooperation in its 
military planning against Iraq. In addition to its myriad national interests in northern Iraq 
and the region as a whole, such military action against Iraq threatened to scuttle 
Turkey’s nascent economic recovery, by severing the latter’s UN sanctions-compliant 
trade relations with Iraq. Critically, however, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was also 
presented by the Bush administration with an opportunity to significantly mitigate such 
economic losses. At offer was the prospect for billions of dollars in economic aid, as 
well as the invaluable opportunity to secure its long-term national interests in northern 
Iraq and to continue to exercise its strategic role vis-à-vis the US and the region as a 
whole.  
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Two days before the start of the second Iraq War, on March 18,  Erdogan’s 
cabinet reached its final decision on US request, officially presented three months 
earlier, for cooperation on a critical aspect of US strategic military planning vis-à-vis 
Iraq (Sarikaya, 2003a). The Erdogan cabinet decided to reject the original “Iraq bill”, 
and instead formulated a new bill authorizing access only to Turkish airspace for the US 
military, enroute to targets in Iraq. This decision came on the heels of the failed 
parliamentary ratification of the original “Iraq bill”, two and a half weeks prior, on 
March 1. And, just a few hours after the US-led coalition bombs started falling on 
Baghdad, on March 20, 2003, the AKP-dominated parliament passed the revised bill by 
a vote of 332 for and 202 against, with one abstention. In quick order, Turkey created an 
air corridor for US and, later, coalition planes. 
 The original US agenda, however, was the establishment of a northern military 
front via land access through Turkish territory. Thus, the Erdogan cabinet’s final 
decision fell quite short of initial high expectations publicly held by the Bush 
administration regarding Turkey’s cooperation. The disappointment evinced in 
Washington was all the more great since, historically, Turkey had been one of its closest 
regional allies. As a result of the final decision, however, Ankara willingly forfeited any 
significant participation in post-conflict political and economic restructuring of Iraq, 
heavily compromised its interests in the de facto autonomous Kurdish region of northern 
Iraq, and incurred major damage to the historically strong US-Turkey alliance.  
 But from the beginning of the Iraq crisis, in early December when Washington 
first broached the issue of cooperation, the Erdogan (or Gul-Erdogan) cabinet had a 
variety of policy options. Moreover, even in the aftermath of the March 1 parliamentary 
vote, the Erdogan cabinet did not immediately rule out any of the previous major policy 
alternatives, including its initial decision, on February 25, to submit the land access bill 
for parliamentary approval (eg. Alyatli, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on TGRT,  
March 6, 2003; Sarikaya, 2003b). So, why did Erdogan, in the end, choose to formulate 
a new bill that only authorized US access to Turkish airspace, despite vociferous 
objections from stakeholders within Turkey’s own foreign policy establishment?  
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The stylized answer has tended to focus on the role of public opinion (eg. Yavuz, 
2005; Park, 2004a; Hale, 2007; Robins, 2003).  In fact, an earlier study (Mintz, 2004) 
that analyzed the Turkish case from a poliheuristic theoretical perspective also largely 
emphasized the role of oppositional public opinion in affecting leadership behavior and  
policy choices. The current study extends the analysis one step further by taking into 
account other explanatory factors. As a first step, then, the current study implicitly 
incorporates a well-established view regarding the indirect impact of public opinion on 
elite political behavior2. This indirect impact of public opinion is coupled with an 
equally important emphasis of the intermediary role of legislative institutions and the 
need for viable  domestic coalitions on foreign policy (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Hagan, 
1993). According to one study: “[The] main role of the public in liberal democracies is 
to influence the coalition–building processes among elite groups…[There] is strong 
empirical evidence that domestic structures are the intervening variables between public 
opinion and foreign policy. Under given international conditions and despite relatively 
similar public attitudes across countries, variances in the interaction between the general 
public and elites in the foreign policy-making process can be explained by differences in 
domestic structures.”(Risse-Kappan, 1991: 510-511). The recognition, then, that public 
opinion often exerts an indirect impact on policy suggests a greater direct role for the 
dynamics of parliamentary politics on affecting policy outcomes. This recognition also 
sets the proper stage for more efficiently identifying the non-compensatory dimension of 
poliheuristic theorizing. In sum, then, the current study will attempt to demonstrate that 
for Turkey’s leader, a non-compensatory political loss manifested itself less so in terms 
of oppositional public opinion, and more so in terms of intra-party dynamics of the AKP. 
Critically, this included the potential collapse of the AKP government, in the absence of 
a viable intra-party consensus on policy3.  
 
Crisis Phase 1: Background and Alternatives  
In early December, 2002, the Bush administration made an official request for 
cooperation from Ankara on US military plans against Iraq. In their discussions with 
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AKP chairman, and official leader-in-waiting, Recep Tayyip Erdogan4 and the acting 
Prime Minister Gul, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Grossman, an 
adviser to Secretary of State Powell, presented a three-stage process5 for Turkey’s 
cooperation (Hurriyet, December 13, 2003). Shortly thereafter, an official White House 
visit by Erdogan underscored two things: implicit recognition of Erdogan as the de facto 
political leader of the Turkish government (Aydintasbas, 2002; Sontag, 2003; Robins, 
2003: 552), and the Bush administration’s reiterated need for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s 
cooperation in the three-stage preparatory plan for military action against Iraq. The 
different stages of the preparatory plan entailed incrementally higher levels of Turkish 
cooperation on US military planning6. The third and final stage required Ankara’s 
cooperation in the stationing of US air and land forces on Turkish territory, for their 
eventual transiting to northern Iraq. In effect, this “land access” stage represented the 
critical linchpin in US plans to open up a northern front for possible major military 
action against Iraq.  
 The Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s crisis response quickly shifted into gear in the latter 
half of December. The cabinet pursued two related tracks: US-Turkey negotiations over 
the terms of Turkish land access in the event of war, and diplomatic offensive to secure a 
peaceful solution that would obviate the need for war. The cabinet’s negotiations with 
Washington first began in mid-December and picked up pace in early February for the 
final round. In large part, these were aimed at addressing the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s 
multiple concerns and perceived national interests that would be negatively impacted 
from military action against Iraq. In return, Washington was to be given permission to 
use southeastern Turkey as a staging area for US air and land forces for launching 
operations into northern Iraq. The negotiations covered three principal issue areas: 
military, economic, and political. The most important military issue dealt with the size of 
US troop deployment on Turkish territory. Washington’s initial position was for a 
maximum of 120,000 troops to be temporarily stationed in Turkey for eventual transit to 
northern Iraq at start of conflict (Hurriyet, December 11, 2002; also Salmoni, 2003). On 
the issue of economic aid, Washington’s initial offer was for $4 billion, equal parts in 
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loans and grants (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003; Salmoni, 2003). 
Against this was the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s initial demand for aid of upwards to $92 
billion (Hale, 2007: 108; Bozarslan, 2005: 128; Colasan, 2003a). On political issues, the 
Gul-Erdogan cabinet sought explicit commitment from Washington to respect the 
territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, political representation of the Turcoman (minority 
ethnic Turks) in post-conflict northern Iraq, and maintenance of the neutrality of the oil-
rich centers of Kirkuk and Mosul (Park, 2004a: 82-3; Hale, 2007: 110; also, Yavuz, 
2005: 167-8).  
 The bilateral negotiations, by mid-February, however, remained deadlocked and 
incomplete in all three areas, especially economic. On the issue of economic aid, for 
instance, while Washington increased its offer to $6 billion in grants and $10 billion in 
long-term loan guarantees (Salmoni, 2003), the cabinet still sought between $26 billion 
to  $40 billion in grants and loans (Hurriyet, February 20, 2003; Salmoni, 2003; Hale, 
2007: 107-8). In addition, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet vigorously objected to Washington’s 
last minute demand for IMF-supervision of any economic aid (Excerpts of Erdogan 
Interview, February 26, 2003; Bila, 2003d; Sazak, 2003a; Park, 2004a: 84;  Colosan, 
2003b). Moreover, there was continued disagreement between the cabinet’s demands for 
written and signed Memoranda of Understanding, and the Bush administration’s 
insistence on only a verbal agreement (Tinc, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, 
February 19, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 21, 2003; Park, 2004a: 84; 
Bila, 2003a; Sazak, 2003a; Sontag, 2003). 
 The Gul-Erdogan cabinet also actively engaged in “multidimensional 
diplomacy”7 in the hopes of securing a peaceful solution to the on-going crisis, and 
thereby preventing war. This entailed a focus on regional and bilateral, as well as 
international efforts. Thus, in early January, the cabinet undertook a Middle East 
diplomatic initiative. The initiative aimed at putting region-wide political  pressure on 
Iraq to abide by UN resolutions on weapons inspections and to give full, transparent 
accounting of past efforts at acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (Kardas, 
2006; Park, 2004a; Salmoni, 2003; Robins, 2003). This culminated in the Istanbul 
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meeting, in late January, of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and Iran, and Turkey. The resultant Istanbul communiqué, however, merely reiterated 
the calls for Iraq’s cooperation, without any subsequent moves on the part of Iraq for 
more sincere efforts at cooperation with the UN.  
 A more direct, bilateral diplomatic initiative was also undertaken. In early 
February, meetings were held in Ankara between representatives of Saddam Hussein, 
including his chief deputy and foreign minister, and the Gul-Erdogan cabinet. At offer 
was the guarantee of safe sanctuary for the Iraqi leader if he chose to go  into exile, 
either in Turkey or another country (Murinson, 2006: 954; Hale, 2007: 105; Kardas, 
2006: 321; Sazak, 2003a; also Ergin, 2003). In fact, the offer of sanctuary was merely 
one of three peaceful solutions that were being actively considered by the cabinet; they 
also included allowing Hussein to retain power, in exchange for complying with UN 
resolutions and democratization of his country, and Hussein voluntarily giving up power 
though not necessarily going into foreign exile (Ergin, 2003; Excerpts of Arinc 
Interview, March 10, 2003). The cabinet’s diplomatic efforts were also supported by 
Erdogan’s meetings with Russia’s President Putin and China’s Communist Party 
Secretary General Hu and Prime Minister Zhu, wherein he continued to reiterate the 
need to peacefully resolve the Iraq crisis (Hurriyet, January 15, 2003). This emphasis on 
a peaceful solution was a consistent theme for much of the crisis. In Erdogan’s own 
words: “I am not one of those expecting a war. I am still banking on a peaceful 
solution…And we aim to continue these efforts” (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, 
“AKP Leader Erdogan Assesses Chances of Averting Iraq War”, February 9, 2003) and 
“We are doing our level best so that the Iraq issue ends peacefully.”(Excerpts of Erdogan 
Interview, February 19, 2003). 
 By late February, however, the already much delayed schedule and logistics of  
military planning forced the Bush administration to more aggressively push the Gul-
Erdogan cabinet to make a parliamentary submission of the anticipated land access bill 
(Sazak, 2003b; Kardas, 2006: 320). Despite this more aggressive stance on the part of 
Washington, the cabinet was met with a countervailing demand. This countervailing 
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demand, projected from influential circles both inside and outside of government, argued 
that such a bill would first have to be preceded by a UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolution that explicitly authorized the use of force against Iraq (Sarikaya, 2003a; 
Colasan, 2003a; Hale, 2007:104, 111; Transcripts of Ret. General Kemal Yavuz 
Interview, February 17, 2003; Sazak, 2003b; Cevik, 2003). As well, only through such 
UNSC resolution, it was argued, would the dispatch of Turkey’s own troops to northern 
Iraq meet the necessary constitutional requirements on external use of force (Excerpts of 
Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003). In fact, Erdogan also publicly acknowledged that 
such a UNSC resolution may be necessary (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 
2003; Hale, 2007: 111). Notwithstanding the debate over the possibility of a 
parliamentary submission of the land access bill, the cabinet also faced another issue: the 
type of voting procedure to be employed, in the event of a bill submission. In keeping 
with past “oligarchical” practices of most political parties in Turkey (Salmoni, 2003: 4; 
Robins, 2003: 560), some observers argued that a “group” vote8 would most likely be 
chosen over a free vote (Dundar, 2003). Similarly, in consideration of what was at stake 
for Turkey (ie. economic, political, military, and strategic interests), and to lessen the 
possibility of a rejection of any submitted bill, some expected the cabinet to impose strict 
party discipline on the vote (Rubin, 2005; Saglam, 2003; also Yavuz, 2005: 170). 
At this critical juncture of the crisis, then, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s most likely 
policy option set, on the land access bill, was the following:   
1.  Continue to push for peaceful solution (eg. Hussein’s cooperation, exile,   
 and/or stepping down from power, US giving up its war plans, etc) and reject          
 submission of bill.   
2.  Wait for UNSC resolution. 
3.  Submit bill for parliamentary approval after signed agreement and allow free  
     vote.  
4.  Submit bill for parliamentary approval after signed agreement and impose      
     group vote.   
5.  Submit bill for parliamentary approval before signed agreement and allow ree  
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      vote.  
6.  Submit bill for parliamentary approval before signed agreement and impose    
     group vote.   
 
Each option also entailed particular implications, along several dimensions. 
These dimensions are: domestic politics, external political (Northern Iraq), economic, 
military and strategic.  
The option of pursuing a peaceful solution and the option of waiting for a UNSC 
resolution implied non-cooperation, since they went against the Bush administration’s 
goal of an immediate near-term permission for land access for setting up a northern 
front9. The other four options, however, implied cooperation with US military planning 
since they were aimed at granting land access in the immediate near-term. It is unlikely 
that this set represents an exhaustive list of all possible policy alternatives that were 
considered by the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, as it neared its decision time point. But, the 
foregoing chronological process-tracing of the main events suggests that this policy 
option set may be a fairly accurate representation of the options that were considered at 
the time10. To explain the cabinet’s policy choice, the decisionmaking process of the 
poliheuristic perspective must be illustrated. This process is driven by a decision 
heuristic that initially focuses on the domestic political dimension. The focus on that 
particular dimension will in turn suggest that the Gul-Erdogan cabinet would have been 
able to quickly eliminate non-feasible alternatives from the above identified policy 
option set.  
 
Domestic Politics 
 A core decision heuristic of the poliheuristic theory stipulates that, in the first 
stage of decision-making, the set of policy alternatives or options are weighed against 
the most important dimension. This usually is the domestic political dimension (Mintz, 
1993, 2004). Perceived losses, either potential or real, along this dimension cannot be 
compensated by gains in other dimensions (eg. military, economic, strategic, etc). In 
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other words, for political leaders, losses along the domestic political dimension are non-
compensatory. Thus, policy options with perceived losses along the domestic political 
dimension are expected to be dropped from further consideration.  
  
Public Opposition. From the very outset, Washington’s request for US military 
land access created much national controversy and debate. In fact, in one of the earliest 
public opinion polls on the issue, the Pew Research Center found, in early December, 
that nearly 85% of Turkey’s public opposed their government’s authorizing US forces to 
use Turkey’s bases to attack Iraq (Jarreau, 2002). Similarly, at least one longitudinal 
polling also showed that between December and January, public opposition to US 
military intervention in Iraq had increased from approximately 87% to roughly 94% 
(Uslu et al, 2005: Tables 1 and 2). On the other hand, and not surprisingly, the public 
also indicated a strong preference for a “peaceful solution” to the Iraqi crisis, as reflected 
in 75% of the Turkish public’s support for diplomatic efforts such as those that were 
undertaken by Gul (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 29).  
Erdogan was fully aware of such public opposition. Yet, at the same time, he 
seemed to deliberately downgrade its import. His public statements suggested as much, 
as revealed in an interview, in mid-February of 2003:  
 
“ Erdogan: … Almost one hundred percent of Turks are saying ‘no’ to war.  
  Der Spiegel: [Then] why can you not bring yourself to an outright ‘no’ to US   
                      President George W. Bush, like Federal Chancellor Gerhard  
                      Schroeder [of Germany]? 
  Erdogan: Germany is in a very comfortable situation, as it has no common  
                  borders with Iraq. The two cases are totally different.” (Transcript of  
                 Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; also Bisrel, 2003).  
 
This short exchange thus suggests that while acknowledging Turkish public 
opposition to cooperation with US military action against Iraq, Erdogan did not seem 
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wholly convinced of the need to simply follow the dictates of such public opinion, 
however intense.   
 
Group versus Free Vote. In contrast to his apparent under-appreciation of 
oppositional public opinion, Erdogan was more fully cognizant of the intra-party 
ramifications of a “wrong” policy choice on more immediate political fortunes of the 
AKP and, by association, his own. Indeed, since he was the leader-in-waiting of a 
government whose mandate was but a few months old,Erdogan’s decision-making was 
driven by two related goals11: becoming the PM and preserving the governing mandate 
of the AKP (Salmoni, 2003: 5; Robins, 2003: 564). But such goals were complicated by 
a simple fact: in addition to the foundational Islamist roots of the AKP, the policy 
preferences of the deputies of its parliamentary group were, in no small measure, 
influenced and shaped by Turkey’s oppositional public opinion (Hale, 2007: 103; Yavuz, 
2005: 170; Kardas, 2006: 315-320).  
 Then, given the politico-situational context of Erdogan, a decision by simple fiat 
and expectation of “total allegiance”, typifying the form of most past Turkish political 
parties (Salmoni, 2003: 4), would have been very problematic. In other words, unlike 
with public opinion, intra-party opposition to the land access bill could be dismissed 
only at the risk of incurring serious political consequences for the AKP’s official leader-
in-waiting. Critical to Erdogan’s decision calculus, however, was the level of opposition 
within the AKP Parliamentary group, or the rank-and-file AKP deputies. According to 
an informed account, Erdogan expected only about forty AKP deputies to defect and cast 
“no” votes, in the event of a parliamentary submission of the land access bill12. 
However, since the Justice and Development Party controlled 363 out of 550 seats in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), this was still a very safe “margin of error” 
(Robins, 2003: 564; Hale, 2007). In fact, the number of excess parliamentary seats 
beyond an absolute majority for the AKP, in relation to the expected number of 
defections, was nearly two to one. Clearly, a parliamentary submission of the land access 
bill would not have been overly problematic, from the standpoint of preserving the 
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AKP’s governing mandate. Thus, the truly vexing dilemma for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet 
was not whether or not to submit the land access bill – as would be implied by a facile 
focus on oppositional public opinion alone. Rather, the dilemma was over the type of 
vote to be used in the event of such: a free vote versus a group vote.  
Erdogan was concerned that the use of a group vote, via the imposition of party 
discipline, would have met great resistance among the AKP deputies, and created serious 
rifts within the party, including its possible breakup (Sazak, 2003c; also Robins, 2003: 
564). An equally great danger was that the use of a group vote would have led to mass 
defections which, in turn, would have triggered a no-confidence motion by the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), the AKP’s main parliamentary opposition (Phillips, 
2004; Colasan, 2003a; Altayli, 2003; Bisrel, 2003). This threat was real, since the AKP 
Parliamentary Speaker Arinc, the leader of the Islamist faction of the AKP, had also 
publicly opposed the land access bill (Kardas, 2006: 317-22; Hale, 2007: 103, 111; 
Sontag, 2003; Sazak, 2003; Robins, 2003: 564; Kirisci, 2004: 43). True enough, as with 
the group vote, the use of a free vote also entailed the risk of parliamentary rejection of 
the bill. However, there still were three important advantages to the use of a free vote. 
Unlike with the group vote, for instance, a free vote would not have triggered a  no-
confidence motion, in the event that the land access bill, if submitted, failed to gain 
parliamentary passage. Thus, the use of a free vote largely mitigated the dangers of 
government dissolution, and allowed it to continue to exercise its governing mandate.  
Just as importantly, in relation to public opinion – whatever its discount - a free 
vote served two aims. First, it signaled to the public that its views were not being 
ignored, since a free vote allowed the public’s representatives to determine the fate of 
any submitted bill. And second, if a submitted land access bill obtained parliamentary 
passage, the use of a free vote would have afforded Erdogan a certain amount of 
“absolution”, in case of a public backlash against his future electoral fortunes (re: 
upcoming Siirt by-election). Erdogan was also keenly aware of such implications, as 
reflected in the following exchange: “‘Can you say that your are responsible before 
history in any decision that will be taken?’, asked Ali Kirca [interviewer] to Erdogan 
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who replied ‘if we take a group decision, yes’ ” (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, 
February 21, 2003 [brackets mine]). 
 
Options: Elimination and Retention 
The foregoing recount of the main events in this phase of the Iraqi crisis is thus 
suggestive of two things. First, oppositional public opinion exerted minimal direct 
impact on Erdogan’s decision calculus; its indirect impact on shaping the policy 
preferences of those within the AKP’s parliamentary group was greater.And second, the 
foremost concern for Erdogan, along the domestic political dimension, was the 
maintenance of the AKP’s governing mandate (Salmoni, 2003: 5; Robins, 2003: 564). 
Within the initial policy option set, certain options clearly posed a greater threat to such 
mandate than others. These are the two options that included a group vote component, 
such as the fourth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after a signed 
agreement, and impose a group vote), and the sixth option (ie. ie. submit bill for 
parliamentary approval before a signed agreement, and impose a group vote). 
According to the poliheuristic perspective, in the initial stage of decisionmaking, 
policy options that do not satisfy the requirements along the most important dimension 
(ie. domestic politics) must be dropped from further consideration. This, in effect, 
constituted Erdogan’s decision rule in the first stage of the decisionmaking process. 
Ergo, in keeping with the dictates of such decision rule, the fourth and the sixth options 
were eliminated from further consideration. From the original option set, then, what 
remained were two options that implied non-cooperation with the Bush administration’s 
goal of setting up a northern front: the first option (ie. continue to push for peaceful 
solution) and the second option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). The other two options 
implied cooperation: the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after a 
signed agreement, and allow free vote) and the fifth option (ie. ie. submit bill for 
parliamentary approval before a signed agreement, and allow free vote).  
 In order to identify the most optimal choice among the remaining policy options, 
in the second stage of the decision-making process, Erdogan undertook a more analytic 
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assessment of each option across a common set of relevant dimensions. Past studies in 
poliheuristic research suggest that military and strategic dimensions often represent 
principal concerns for decision makers in the second-stage of the decision making 
process (eg. Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 2002; Brulé, 2005). This is in line with Erdogan’s  
frequent citing of the various strategic implications (eg. alliance ties) as being a key 
factor in the cabinet’s approach to the crisis (eg. Erdogan, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan 
Interview, February 9, 2003;  Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 26, 2003). As 
well, military issues represented an explicit area of bilateral negotiations with the Bush 
administration. The two other issue areas of negotiation, economic and political (ie. 
northern Iraq) reflected the non-stylized nature of the crisis, and as such represented 
important and self-evident dimensions of the policy options for Erdogan. The remaining 
policy options are evaluated in terms of benefits relative to costs and probability of 
successfully effecting each option.  
 
Economic Dimension 
Given the crisis context of the Turkish economy, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was 
faced with a simple choice filled with major implications: cooperate or not cooperate 
with the Bush administration’s plans for setting up a northern front. “Cooperation” 
implied immediate near-term parliamentary submission for approval of the land access 
bill, whereas “non-cooperation” implied no such bill submission. The costs of non-
cooperation were rather stark. In the event of US military action against Iraq, the 
projected economic damage to Turkey from lost trade alone was estimated to be between 
$40 billion and $100 billion (US) (Transcripts of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; 
Robins, 2003: 560; Idiz, 2003; Baran, 2008; Kardas, 2006: 311; also Park, 2005: 27). 
Non-cooperation meant that avenues for redressing such expected economic losses 
would be few (Congar, 2003). Thus, options such as continuing to pursue a peaceful 
solution or waiting for a UNSC resolution entailed relatively greater near-term costs 
compared to benefits along the economic dimension. Further, such expected costs were 
generally higher for the first option, since it entailed very little possibility of cooperation, 
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unlike the second option which did not rule out such cooperation; it was only made 
conditional on a UNSC resolution. Moreover, in terms of probabilities of success, the 
first and second options were problematic. For instance, in one of his less-guarded 
moments, Erdogan admitted that all diplomatic efforts at peaceful resolution were 
exhausted (Excerpt of Erdogan Feast of Sacrifice Message, February 10, 2003; also 
Kardas, 2006: 320-1). Thus continued pursuit of such avenues as Hussein’s cooperation, 
exile, and/or stepping down from power, US giving up its war plans, etc were very 
unlikely to yield fruit. Similarly, despite his public calls for a more definitive UNSC 
resolution on the use of force against Iraq, most informed observers believed that such a 
resolution was unlikely to be forthcoming (eg. Transcripts of Ret. General Kemal Yavuz 
Interview, February 17, 2003; also Park, 2004a, 2005; Hale, 2007)  
On the other hand, considering the still on-going effects of the economic crisis in 
Turkey and the anticipated further economic losses that Turkey would have suffered in 
the event of conflict in Iraq, a decision to cooperate with the Bush administration held 
very tangible benefits along the economic dimension. For instance, even if, in return for 
its expected cooperation (ie. immediate near-term parliamentary submission of the land 
access bill), the lower limit of the Bush administration’s economic aid offer was 
immediately accepted, the subsequent bilateral agreement would have amounted to 
billions of dollars, in the form of grants and long-term, low interest loan guarantees. 
There were indirect benefits as well. These included a major injection of confidence in 
the financial markets, and anticipated positive US leverage on the upcoming fourth IMF 
loan review process (Saglam, 2003; Park, 2005: 24; Idiz, 2003). Further, cooperation 
with the US would have facilitated Turkey’s participation in post-conflict reconstruction 
projects, including the decisions over the major oil wells in Kirkuk and Mosul and the 
important Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline that extended into Turkey’s Mediterranean coast 
(Olson, 2005: 99; Park, 2005: 25; also Hale, 2007: 33). These, in effect, represented 
some of the expected benefits of the third option, and its requirement of an agreement 
before submission of the land access bill.  
 55
However, in the context of cooperation, the fifth option’s call for continued 
negotiations also held certain advantages. The key to such advantages was time. The 
calendar-sensitive logistics and operational requirements of military planning meant that 
the Bush administration was under time and budget pressures to conclude an agreement 
as soon as possible (Hale, 2007: 108). For the Bush administration, this also meant that a 
long drawn-out negotiation process was not in its own national interests. For the Gul-
Erdogan cabinet, however, the time pressures of the Bush administration had the 
opposite implications: if adroitly exploited, such pressures would lead to more 
concessions from the latter (Salmoni, 2003; Park, 2004a; Park, 2005; also Parris, 2003: 
2). Therefore, rather than immediately agreeing to the standing US offer on economic 
aid, the option of continuing negotiations held the realistic prospect of greater economic 
dividends. Overall, therefore, more benefits than costs attended with any decision to 
cooperate in US military plans for establishing a northern front, as reflected in the third 
option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after a signed agreement) and the fifth 
option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before a signed agreement). Moreover, 
though the third option represented more tangible immediate economic benefits, the fifth 
option held the very realistic prospect of greater final economic benefits.  
 Another critical difference between the third and fifth options concerned relative 
probabilities of success13. Much of this related to the timing of the parliamentary 
submission of the land access bill as well as the type (ie. verbal versus signed) of 
agreement sought14. For instance, it was Erdogan’s stated belief that a signed agreement, 
as opposed to merely a verbal agreement, would have afforded greater guarantees that 
the Bush administration would uphold its promises. Such a signed agreement would 
have allowed Turkey to avoid a replay of the “cheating” inflicted on it, and of the 
unfulfilled promises made to it, as in the first Gulf War (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, 
February 19, 2003; Bila, 2003a; Kardas, 2006: 312; Kapsis, 2005: 382; Rubin, 2005; 
Sever, 2003; also Park, 2004a: 84; Park, 2005: 26). Relatedly, Erdogan believed that the 
land access bill submitted for approval only after obtaining a signed bilateral agreement 
would have received more support among the AKP deputies  (Excerpts of Erdogan 
 56
Interview, February 19, 2003; Idiz, 2003; also, Akyol, 2003). This in turn would have 
increased the bill’s probability of successful parliamentary passage. Nonetheless, the 
Bush administration was opposed to any written commitments – at least in the 
immediate term - citing the setting of a negative precedent for the US in future crises 
(Tinc, Feb 23). Thus, in the short-term, the probability of actually obtaining such a 
signed agreement by the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was rather low. Moreover, given the 
deadlocked state of the bilateral negotiations and time-constraints  (eg. time required to 
draw up the document and vetting by relevant stakeholders), even if the Bush 
administration had decided to modify its position, a signed agreement would have taken 
longer to achieve. These factors, in effect, “nullified” the third option’s higher likelihood 
of successfully passing the land access bill in a timely manner. In contrast, the fifth 
option only required a parliamentary submission of the land access bill, and contained no 
such pre-requisite as an already obtained signed agreement; the signed agreement could 
come after the bill submission – but before the actual parliamentary vote. Indeed, this 
option was exactly in line with the original preferences of the Bush administration for 
much of the crisis (eg. Transcripts of Foreign Minister Yakis Interview, February 16, 
2003). Though this in turn meant a lower probability of parliamentary passage of the 
bill, the overall probability of success of this option was still higher than the third option.  
 
External-Political (Northern Iraq) Dimension 
In addition to economic aid, or “compensation”, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet also 
pursued certain political goals with respect to northern Iraq. In large part, these goals 
were intimately tied to long-standing Turkish policy regarding the region’s Kurds. For 
various reasons, including the potentially trans-regional unifying effect on its own 
restive Kurd population in the southeast, as well as possible irredentist designs, Turkey 
has long concerned itself with preventing the emergence of any independent Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006; Fuller, 2004: 61; Murinson, 2006: 954; 
Hale, 2007: 96; Park, 2004a: 83; Kirisci, 2004). The prevention of such a development 
represented a crucial “red line” in Turkish foreign policy that could not be crossed 
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(Bozarslan, 2005: 128; Park, 2005: 24; Hale, 2007: 96). In addition, as part of its efforts 
to dilute the Kurdish dominance in northern Iraq, beginning in 2001, Turkish foreign 
policy began to pointedly emphasize the political rights of the minority ethnic 
Turcomans, concentrated in and around Mosul and Kirkuk (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006: 
106; Park, 2005: 25; also Hale, 2007: 13, 76).  
 Relative to such interests along the external-political dimension, however, the 
consequences of a decision to reject cooperation with the Bush administration in its 
plans for creating a northern front against Iraq, as represented by the first option (ie. 
continue pursuit of peaceful solution) and the second option (ie. wait for UNSC 
resolution) were simple. Since these two options implied a rejection of the parliamentary 
submission of the land access bill, as a corollary they also necessarily precluded any type 
of bilateral agreement concerning Turkey’s interests in northern Iraq along the external-
political dimension. Thus by implication, the first option and the second option 
eliminated any opportunities for preserving the “red line” in northern Iraq and the 
political rights of the Turcoman (Park, 2004b: 499; also Kirisci, 2004: 44-5). Further, in 
addition to the low likelihood of a peaceful solution or a UNSC resolution, most 
channels (eg. media reports, statements by administration officials, etc) indicated a 
determination by the Bush administration to use military force to remove the Iraqi 
regime, irrespective of any continued efforts at a peaceful solution by the cabinet or an 
authoritative UNSC resolution (Hale, 2007; Park, 2004a, 2005; also Kardas, 2006: 327). 
These factors only reinforced the low probability of success of the first and second 
options. Thus, adoption of either the first or the second option meant not only a 
forfeiture of Turkey’s role in any post-conflict political settlement of Iraq, but also a 
forfeiture of its own specific political goals in northern Iraq (Transcript of Erdogan 
Interview, February 9, 2003). As with the economic dimension, such expected costs, 
along the external-political dimension, were generally higher for the first option, since it 
entailed very little possibility of cooperation, unlike the second option which did not rule 
out the possibility of such cooperation, under the right conditions (ie. a definitive UNSC 
authorization on use of force against Iraq).  
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 Decisions to cooperate (ie. third and fifth options), however, presented their own 
benefits and drawbacks. As part of its bilateral negotiations, the Gul-Erodogan cabinet 
made three political demands: respect for the territorial unity of Iraq, the political  
neutrality of northern Iraq’s two key cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, and political 
recognition of the Turcomans (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 12, 2003; Park, 
2004a: 82-83; Hale, 2007: 100;  Tinc, 2003). A bilateral agreement, if successfully 
concluded on the cabinet’s terms, was expected to give such political recognition to the 
Turcomans, with perhaps a meaningful role in a post-conflict Iraq, including its northern 
regions (Hale, 2007: 100; Park, 2004a: 82; Congar, 2003). As well, such an agreement 
would have given explicit guarantees to the territorial unity of Iraq, including the 
neutrality of Mosul and Kirkuk, and the necessary military tools to counter PKK activity 
(Congar, 2003; Park, 2005: 21-23; Robins, 2003: 560). These developments would have 
met the goal of preserving the “red line” in the Kurd-dominated northern Iraq. And 
lastly, both of these goals were expected to be confirmed in the form of signed, written 
commitments (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003). Thus, for both the 
third and fifth options, along the political dimension, the expected benefits of 
cooperation were clear. And again, the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary 
approval after obtaining a signed agreement) represented patently greater immediate 
benefits relative to the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before 
obtaining a signed agreement). 
But there existed temporal differences regarding the likelihood of obtaining such 
goals and their inclusion in a signed, written agreement. Part of this related to US 
military planning that was dependent on cooperation from not only the Turks, but also 
the Iraqi Kurds (Sever, 2003; Kapsis, 2005: 381). Thus, for instance, and despite the 
demands of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, the Bush administration was reluctant to give any 
guarantees on the territorial unity issue, for fear of alienating the two main Kurdish 
groups in the region, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP). In fact, these Kurdish groups had earlier publicly re-stated 
their right to self-government, as well as a right of secession from a post-conflict Iraq 
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(Hale, 2007: 109; Tinc, 2003), thus only complicating the position of the Bush 
administration. For similar reasons, it would seem, the administration also refused to 
recognize the political status of the Turcoman, as per the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s original 
demands (Bila, 2003d). Lastly, as with the economic issues, the Bush administration was 
opposed to a written agreement. These factors suggested that, in the immediate near-
term, obtaining a signed bilateral agreement that conformed with Turkey’s political 
interests was unlikely to occur before any parliamentary submission for approval of the 
land access bill. This, in turn, negatively affected the third option’s probability of 
success. On the other hand, the possibility of obtaining such concessions from the Bush 
administration would have been greater if the cabinet, in line with the fifth option, chose 
to first submit the land access bill for parliamentary approval, and continued to press its 
political interests on northern Iraq. When considered in conjunction with the time 
pressures faced by the Bush administration to reach an agreement, such display of 
cooperative behavior would have put the onus on the Bush administration to eventually 
reciprocate via written commitments on the political goals sought by the cabinet. Thus, 
in terms of the likelihood of success along the external-political dimension, the fifth 
option had higher probability of such in comparison to the third option.  
 
Military Dimension 
Ever since the first Gulf War, Turkey has continued to maintain a small-scale 
military presence in northern Iraq. But in the current context, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet 
sought a more robust military presence in the region. In part, this was justified on 
grounds of securing certain “benign” goals such as the prevention of a repeat of the 
refugee crisis of the first Gulf War, the securing of important pipelines, and elimination 
of terrorist “safe havens” in northern Iraq from which the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) had continually launched its operations into Turkey (Baran, 2008; Hale, 2007; 
100; Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006; Sever, 2003; Kapsis, 2005; Park, 2005: 25; Idiz, 2003). 
But much of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s rationale for a military presence in northern Iraq 
also had to do with important external-political goals, especially the preservation of the 
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“red line” against an independent Kurdish state. The military’s role, for instance, was 
deemed especially critical in the disarming of the various autonomous Kurdish groups, 
lest they forcefully agitated for greater autonomy or independence in a post-conflict 
situation. To accomplish this, the Turkish military had to be permitted to act 
independently and, if need be, to unilaterally intervene in parts of  northern Iraq (Kirisci, 
2004: 44; Kardas, 2006: 312-3; Park, 2005: 25). Further, a physical military presence in 
northern Iraq was deemed necessary if the neutrality of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul 
were to be assured and, as well, if Ankara wished to have long-term strategic influence 
resultant from any post-conflict political realignments (Clarke, 2004: 54; Bozarslan, 
2005: 23-4; Kapsis, 2005: 385).  
 In light of its goals in northern Iraq along the military dimension, the non-
cooperative options of continuing to pursue a peaceful solution or waiting for a UNSC 
resolution would have been very problematic for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet. Since these 
options precluded an immediate near-term submission of the land access bill, the cabinet 
would have forfeited the possibility of a Turkish military presence, along with any 
significant leverage against the Bush administration for securing its military interests in 
northern Iraq. In the consequent absence of a military presence in northern Iraq, then, the 
expected costs would have been reflected in such things as an increase in PKK activity 
and incursions into Turkey, moves to greater autonomy and statehood by the Iraqi 
Kurds, etc (eg. Hale, 2007: 124, 131-2; Kirisci, 2004: 42-5; Parris, 2005; Kapsis, 2005: 
385). Further, as with the economic and external-political dimensions, the non-
cooperative first and second options would have entailed relatively more expected losses 
than benefits, if any, along the military dimension (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, 
February 9, 2003). And such expected losses would have been greater for the first 
option, in comparison to the second option. As well, the probabilities of success of both 
options were low, owing to two related and earlier-identified factors: the low likelihood 
of success of the options themselves (ie. a peaceful solution or a UNSC resolution), and 
the expected US military action against Iraq irrespective of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s 
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choice of either continuing its pursuit of a peaceful solution or waiting for a UNSC 
resolution.  
 The benefits of cooperating with the Bush administration, however, were just as 
clear. In its bilateral negotiations with the Bush administration, the cabinet specifically 
sought to limit the size of the US troop deployment into northern Iraq (while trying to 
maximize the size of its own deployment), explicit guarantees on the re-collection of any 
heavy weaponry distributed to the Kurds by the US, and acceptance of a Turkish military 
command in northern Iraq that was independent and separate, though co-ordinating with 
the US command (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 26, 2003; Transcripts of Ret. 
General Kemal Yavuz Interview, February 17, 2003; Bila, 2003b; Hale, 2007: 112; 
Olson, 2005: 101; Park, 2004a: 83). Thus, an agreement, if favorably concluded on the 
cabinet’s terms, would have resulted in a robust, sizeable and largely independent 
Turkish military presence, disarmed Kurdish militias, and a contained PKK. Such a 
military situation, in turn, would have afforded much support to the cabinet’s political 
goals in northern Iraq, particularly as regards the “red line” against an independent 
Kurdish state and curtailing of PKK activity. Therefore, for both the third and fifth 
options, along the military dimension, the expected benefits of cooperation outweighed 
the costs, if any. As with the previous dimensions, such expected benefits were higher 
for the option third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after obtaining a 
signed agreement) compared to the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary 
approval before obtaining a signed agreement). 
 But, there existed differences between the third and fifth options, as regards their 
relative probabilities of success. And, as with the external-political dimension, part of 
this related to the Bush administration’s need for cooperation from both Ankara and the 
Iraqi Kurds, in setting up its northern front. But such cooperation was complicated by 
the Iraqi Kurds’ intense opposition to a Turkish military entry into northern Iraq, and the 
KDP’s threats of military clashes between Turkish forces and its own militias if such 
entry occurred (Hale, 2007: 108-9; also Park, 2004a: 82). Moreover, even if the Bush 
administration were to accede to the cabinet’s demand for a sizeable Turkish military 
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entry into northern Iraq, it was still opposed to a written agreement. Thus, 
notwithstanding the demands of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, along the military dimension, 
the likelihood of obtaining a signed agreement before a parliamentary submission for 
approval of the land access bill was low. This in turn implied  negative implications for 
the third option’s probability of success. Conversely, however, a higher probability of 
success obtained if, in line with the fifth option, the land access bill was first submitted 
for parliamentary approval, followed up with continued negotiations on the military 
issues. As with the external-political dimension, the higher probability of success of this 
fifth option along the military dimension, would have owed to two factors: time 
pressures faced by the Bush administration, and the onus to reciprocate on a positive 
demonstration of cooperation by the Gul-Erdogan cabinet.    
 
Strategic Dimension  
In addition to the economic, external-political, and military implications, the Gul-
Erdogan cabinet had to weigh, per the demands of the poliheuristic theory, the strategic 
implications of its second-stage options. Among Turkey’s various strategic relationships, 
the one with the US had always been most prioritized. In part, this owed to a path 
dependent aversion (eg. ascription of Arab “betrayal” for the demise of the Ottoman 
empire) to any type of serious engagement with its Arab and Muslim neighbors (eg. Iran, 
Syria, and Iraq) in the region (Fuller, 2004; Park, 2004b). Thus, perhaps as a natural 
outcome, Turkey’s geo-strategic Cold War foreign policy interests converged with those 
of the US in containing Arab-supported Soviet expansionism in the region, and finding 
common cause with Washington’s other close regional ally, Israel, in countering the 
Arab proxies of the Soviet Union. As testified by Turkey’s participation in various US-
led operations (eg. first Gulf War, peacekeeping in Kosovo, Afghanistan etc), continued 
close military cooperation (eg. transfer and sale of equipment and technology), and 
defense ties (eg. US use of Turkey’s airbases to constrain post-1991 Iraq) etc, this 
“strategic partnership” with the US largely held even with the demise of the Soviet threat 
(Parris, 2003; Kapsis, 2005).  
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Given Turkey’s strategic legacy, and in light of its still large import (Erdogan 
Address at Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2002; Transcript 
of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003), the drawbacks of non-cooperation in US 
military plans for establishing a northern front, as represented by the first option (ie. 
continued pursuit of peaceful solution) and the second option (ie. wait for a UNSC 
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq) were many. As one obvious 
expected cost, for example, the historical “strategic partnership” with the US would have 
been compromised, perhaps not irreparably, but certainly with consequential 
reevaluation and inevitable readjustment by Washington. At a minimum, a refusal by the 
cabinet to make positive moves (ie. parliamentary submission of bill) in granting 
immediate near-term land access to US forces would most likely have been rejoined by 
the Bush administration’s subsequent and eventual downgrading of Turkey’s strategic 
utility for the US (Park, 2004b: 505; also Kardas, 2006: 321). At a material level, this 
would likely have been reflected in such developments as decreases in  military aid, 
sales, and technology transfers, either bilaterally or via Washington’s proxy, Israel 
(Parris, 2005; Fuller, 2003; Cakirozer, 2003). The scrapping or indefinite delay of 
certain key joint defense projects (eg. AH-1Z attack helicopters and airborne early-
warning and control aircraft) would have been the likely outcome (Cakirozer, 2003). At 
a policy level, the strategic down grade would similarly have led to the Bush 
administration’s decreased enthusiasm for Turkey’s own key foreign policy goals, 
including EU accession and membership. As well, with respect to northern Iraq, the 
cabinet’s choice to refuse cooperation would likely have induced greater reliance on the 
Iraqi Kurds by the Bush administration (Sever, 2003; Rubin, 2005), with an inevitable 
increase in the PUK and KDP’s strategic profile and attendant interests, such as greater 
autonomy and self-governance in perhaps a post-Hussein federal structure. From a 
slightly longer-term perspective, the evolution of a more assured and  de facto 
independent Kurdish state would also have had the potential to greatly complicate 
Turkey’s historically distant relationships with its regional neighbors, such as Syria and 
Iran. Thus Turkey would likely have been forced to face an uncertain and unwelcome 
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strategic re-orientation, in an effort to deal with what all three countries share in 
common – the existence of sizeable Kurdish populations within their territories15 who 
would likely  be drawn to an independent Kurdish state and thus agitate regional 
instability (Park, 2005: 22). Thus along the strategic dimension, the overall expected 
costs of non-cooperation, such as the pursuit of a peaceful solution or waiting for a 
UNSC resolution, clearly outweighed the benefits of such, and they would have been 
greater for first option (ie. pursue peaceful solution) compared to the second solution (ie. 
wait for UNSC resolution). In addition, these options reflected low probabilities of 
success, as per previously noted reasons, including the very high likelihood of US 
military action against Iraq, irrespective of whether the cabinet chose to continue its 
exploration of peaceful solutions or wait for a more definitive UNSC resolution.  
On the other hand, for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, a decision to cooperate, as 
reflected in the third (ie. parliamentary submission for approval of bill after a signed 
agreement) and fifth (ie. parliamentary submission for approval of bill before a signed 
agreement) options, would have yielded substantial benefits along the strategic 
dimension. In large measure, these benefits related to the most salient strategic issues of 
concern, such as the status of the Iraqi Kurds and alliance relationship with the US. The 
positive implications of cooperation were also, in part, the converse of the negative 
implications of no cooperation. For instance, since the Bush administration’s aim of 
opening up a northern front via Turkey owed in large part to its perceived tactical 
advantages (eg. quicker end to conflict, fewer casualties, etc)(Transcripts of Ret. General 
Kemal Yavuz Interview, February 17, 2003; also Rubin, 2005: 8), a meaningful move on 
the part of the cabinet to facilitate such goal would have been in keeping with Turkey’s 
historical “strategic partnership” and thus enhance what Erdogan often described as a 
“natural alliance” between the two countries (eg. Erdogan Address at Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan 
Interview, February 9, 2003). A decision that continued to prioritize the bilateral alliance 
ties also had positive strategic implications in other ways, including its contribution to 
continued military aid, sales, and technology transfers, either bilaterally or via 
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Washington’s proxy, Israel, thus helping to maintain Turkey’s formidable long-term 
military-strategic advantage in the region, vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, and others (eg. 
Greece). As well, on other aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda, such as EU 
accession and membership, the Bush administration’s continued long-term support 
would have been assured, notwithstanding the Copenhagen meeting of the previous 
December. Further, since cooperation with the Bush administration would entail Turkish 
military presence in northern Iraq, it would imply an active Turkish role in “regional 
restructuring” and the filling of any “power vacuum” on its borders (Excerpts of 
Erdogan Interview, February 21, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 12, 
2003; also Bisrel, 2003). Thus a decision to cooperate with the Bush administration, 
whilst undercutting the strategic utility of the Iraqi Kurds, would have allowed the Gul-
Erdogan cabinet to more credibly pursue its goal of preserving the “red line” against the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The continued securing of 
its “red line” would in turn imply less need for a strategic re-orientation with respect to 
other states in the region. Overall, then, the expected benefits along the strategic 
dimension of a decision to actively cooperate with the Bush administration’s goal of 
obtaining military access to Turkish territory clearly outweighed the costs, if any. Such 
benefits would have also been higher for the third option, compared to the fifth option. 
As well, the benefits of the third and fifth options were in clear contrast to the to the net 
strategic losses entailed by either the first or second option. 
However, it is patently obvious that these various implications along the strategic 
dimension fell outside of the purview of any type of bilateral negotiation. Thus, even 
more so than with the military, economic, and external-political dimensions, the relative 
overall probability of success of the third option and the fifth option along the strategic 
dimension could only be inferred with respect to the temporal probability of obtaining a 
signed agreement. As before, the Bush administration was opposed to granting any 
written, signed commitments, for fear of setting negative precedents in future crisis 
negotiations. Thus the likelihood of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet obtaining a signed 
agreement before its bill submission was low. On the other hand, if the cabinet made a 
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positive demonstration of its efforts at cooperation (ie. immediate near-term submission 
of land access bill for parliamentary approval) and continued to press for a signed 
agreement, the pressures of time would likely have forced the Bush administration to 
make the necessary concessions. These factors implied that, overall, and despite the 
greater strategic benefits of the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval 
after obtaining a signed agreement) relative to the fifth option (ie. submit bill for 
parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement), the probability of success 
of the fifth option was higher than the third option, along the strategic dimension. 
The foregoing poliheuristic analysis thus illustrates the likely steps taken and 
factors considered by Erdogan, in arriving at the decision, on February 25, to submit the 
land access bill for parliamentary approval, and to do so before obtaining a signed 
agreement from the Bush administration. The Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s decision reflects 
the final outcome of a decisionmaking process that was driven in large measure by an 
established decision rule. This non-compensatory decision rule was in turn driven by the 
basic goal of preserving the AKP’s continued governing mandate. But an important 
question remains: Was this decision really non-compensatory?  
 
Discussion: Decision Rule and February 25th Decision 
Table E-1(Appendix E) shows the original option set. Each option is also 
disaggregated along the four relevant dimensions (ie. domestic political, external-
political [northern Iraq], military, and strategic). The additive total score for each option 
is shown in the last column16. The total score for an option is based on the sum of the 
adjusted scores across the five dimensions of the option. For each dimension of a policy 
option, the adjusted score is calculated by taking into account the comparative baseline 
score, the probability of success of the option, and the weight of the dimension.  
  First, based on a reading of the relevant primary and secondary sources of 
information, regarding the net benefits versus costs of each option, a comparative 
baseline score is assigned to each of the options, across a common dimension. The 
baseline score of each option is determined through a comparison with each of the other 
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options, across the common dimension. The higher the baseline score, the higher the net 
benefits (and the lower the costs) compared to the other options.  Second, each baseline 
score is multiplied by the probability of success of the related option. The product of the 
baseline score and the probability value is the “initial score”. And third, the initial score 
is in turn multiplied by the weight of the common dimension; the dimension weight is 
determined through a subjective assessment of the relative importance of each dimension 
relative other dimensions. The subjective assessment is based on interpretation of both 
primary and secondary sources of information. The product of the initial score and the 
dimension weight is the “adjusted score”. The final score for an option is then based on 
an additive summation of the five adjusted scores across the five dimensions. 
 Since the fourth and sixth options were dropped in the first stage from further 
consideration, in the second stage of the decision process, Erdogan had to carefully 
weigh the relative benefits, costs, and probability of success of the remaining options: 
the first option (ie. continue peaceful solution), the second option (ie. wait until UNSC 
announces decision), the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after 
obtaining a signed agreement, and imposing a free vote), and the fifth option (ie. (ie. 
submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement, and 
imposing a free vote). Among these remaining policy alternatives, then, the poliheuristic 
perspective suggests that the option with the highest score is chosen. Compared to the 
first option, the second option, and the third option, the fifth option has the highest score. 
The fact that Erdogan also chose the fifth option as his preferred policy does seem to 
converge with this assessment.    
However, the table also indicates that in comparison to all of the other options in 
the initial set, the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining 
a signed agreement, and allow a free vote) has the highest total score. Does this imply 
that the cabinet’s February 25th decision was compensatory?  
 The fact that Erdogan eliminated those options that posed a threat to the 
governing mandate of the AKP, such as the fourth (ie. Submit bill for parliamentary 
approval after signed agreement and impose group vote) and sixth option (ie. Submit bill 
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for parliamentary approval before signed agreement and impose group vote) that entailed 
a group vote, clearly shows that Erdogan did in fact follow a non-compensatory decision 
rule17. In other words, for Erdogan, the potential political collapse of the AKP 
government that would attend with any attempt at imposing a group vote was deemed 
too costly, whatever its mitigation along other dimensions. Thus, a pre-determined non-
compensatory decision rule was in effect exercised by Erodgan.  
A core strength of the poliheuristic theory is its applicability in crisis contexts 
wherein pressures of limited time and limited information necessitate decision shortcuts 
(Mintz, 1993; Mintz et al, 1997). Just as important however, is correctly identifying the 
particular parameters of the non-compensatory decision rule. In this vein, explanations 
that focus solely or mostly on oppositional public opinion have difficulty in explaining 
Erdogan’s February 25th decision. If Erdogan’s non-compensatory decision rule had  
indeed revolved around oppositional public opinion, then he should have rejected any 
option that entailed cooperating with the Bush administration in its quest for land access 
in northern Turkey. This would have entailed the quick elimination of options three to 
six, including Erdogan’s final decision (ie. fifth option). On the other hand, if the 
analytic focus is adjusted whereby a potential non-compensatory political loss is 
recognized for Erdogan along the lines of an enforced group vote, then the resultant 
outcome (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement, 
and allow a free vote) falls squarely within the poliheuristic explanatory framework.  
 
March 1 Vote 
On March 1, the same day as the parliamentary vote, but after the voting had 
begun, the Bush administration and the Gul-Erdogan cabinet exchanged three written 
and signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). As regards the main military issues, 
the MOU permitted a maximum of 62,000 US troops to be allowed to transit to northern 
Iraq. As well, the US was permitted the use of use of Turkish airbases, in Incirlik, 
Diyarbakir, and Batman. In return, Turkey was allowed a buffer zone between itself and 
northern Iraq, permitted to send a roughly equal number of its own troops to the region, 
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and was given guarantees on the re-collection of heavy weaponry from the Kurds. Also, 
the MOU stipulated that while the two military forces would coordinate their operations, 
they would do so under separate commands. On the main political issues, the territorial 
unity of Iraq were guaranteed, the neutrality of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul were 
respected, and the Turcoman were recognized as a “foundational element” of the Iraqi 
nation. And on the main economic issue, the MOU stipulated that Washington would 
provide $6 billion in grants and $24 billion in long-term, low interest loans to Turkey 
(Hale, 2007: 110; Hurriyet, February 21/26, 2003; Park, 2005; Robins, 2003: 564; 
Kapsis, 2005: 385; Clarke, 2004: 54). Approximately $2 billion of the $6 billion grant 
was also intended to be in the form of military aid (Sarikaya, 2003e; Cakirozer, 2003).  
The parliamentary vote itself was held in a closed session, and without the 
imposition of a “group decision” (ie. party discipline) on the AKP deputies. A total of 
264 votes were cast in support of the motion, 250 votes against, and 19 abstentions. 
Since a successful passage required a majority of the total number of all parliamentary 
deputies, the bill was defeated by four votes18.  Within the AKP parliamentary group, 99 
deputies voted against the bill, chose abstentions, or were absent for the vote (Hale, 
2007: 113; Idiz, 2003; Sazak, 2003d). The number of votes cast against the motion by 
the AKP deputies was thus far in excess of that originally estimated (ie. about forty) by 
Erdogan. Not surprisingly, in light of his strong belief that the bill would pass, the vote 
result shocked Erdogan (Kapsis, 2005: 383). In fact, perhaps to mitigate the unavoidable 
recriminations with the Bush administration, Gul himself gave personal assurances to 
US Ambassador Pearson on a resubmission of the bill (Hurriyet, March 2, 2003). 
Despite the March 1 vote failure, the signed MOUs made clear the undeniably  
large benefits (eg. economic aid, “strategic partnership”, “red lines”, etc) of cooperating 
with the Bush administration’s goal of establishing a northern military front. Thus, 
notwithstanding the identification of new and alternative options, many thought that the 
cabinet would, in the end, maintain the original choice of cooperating with the Bush 
administration and (re)submit a bill for the creation of such (Idiz, 2003). It was the 
opinion of most observers, in fact, that the original bill would be resubmitted, if not 
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immediately, certainly after the March 9 Siirt by-election, in which Erodgan was a 
candidate (Berkan, 2003; Alyatli, 2003b; Birand, 2003b). This convergent opinion was 
attributed in part to a more vocal (re)positioning on the issue by  powerful constituents 
and stake-holders among Turkey’s elite foreign policy establishment, including the 
MGK (Joint Chiefs of Staff)(Bayramoglu, 2003; Cemal, 2003), President Sezer, and the 
Foreign Ministry. Each of them voiced their support for the original bill and urged its 
resubmission (Sarikaya, 2003e; Birand, 2003b; Cemal, 2003).  
But despite such pressures, both domestic and external (ie. Bush administration), 
the Erdogan cabinet, on March 18, chose to submit for parliamentary passage a new bill 
that only authorized US air force access to Turkish airspace for sortie missions into Iraq. 
The bill was subsequently passed by parliament. The obvious question  therefore, is: 
Why did the presumptive-PM Erdogan choose to reject cooperation with the Bush 
administration’s goal of establishing a northern military front against Iraq  – one with 
tremendous “payoffs”, and not necessarily limited to economic ones - and instead choose 
to submit a new bill that only granted access to Turkey’s airspace for the US?  Just as 
importantly, why did the Erdogan cabinet adopt air space access as its final crisis 
decision, on March 18, despite contrary signals from the public? Indeed, from the 
perspective of previous studies, the latter question may be even more relevant.  
 The answer must necessarily begin with an examination of the options that were 
available to the Erdogan cabinet, in relation to the Bush administration’s demands, in 
this latter phase of the Iraqi crisis.   
 
Crisis Phase 2: Post-March 1 Vote and Alternatives 
 Shortly after his Sirrt by-election victory of March 9, the now-presumptive Prime 
Minister Erdogan indicated that continued efforts at cooperation with the Bush 
administration was not ruled out. This implied that a resubmission of the land access bill 
was still being considered. He also felt more confident about its parliamentary passage. 
In his own words: “The authorization bill keeps its place on the agenda. As for the date, 
the voting atmosphere prevailing last Saturday [March 1] should disappear. I feel it is 
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disappearing, because some of my colleagues have sent letters to tell me that they will 
now vote positively” (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003; 
also Excerpts of Yakis Interview, March 9, 2003 and Hale, 2007: 114). In support of 
Erdogan, the AKP parliamentary group chairman, Celik, also made positive indications 
on the resubmission of the original bill – one that would now put more emphasis on the 
bill’s “humanitarian aims”19. Thus there were some signs that the level of internal 
opposition was being attenuated, perhaps moved by a re-positioning on the land access 
issue by the aforementioned stakeholders in Turkey’s foreign policy establishment.  
There were strong indications that the cabinet was also considering other 
cooperative options, including the possibility of making a parliamentary submission of a  
modified bill. In fact, media op-ed pieces indicated that at least two modified bills were 
under serious consideration by the cabinet. In the first, the bill would allow airlifting of 
US combat troops through Turkey – without touching Turkish soil - to northern Iraq, 
while permitting terrestrial passage of heavy weaponry and military equipment. In the 
second, terrestrial deployment for the US military would be permitted only for support 
troops, while combat troops would again be allowed to be airlifted to northern Iraq. 
Thus, despite the slight variation between the two, both modified options involved the 
opening of Turkish airspace to the US for the transport of its combat troops with the 
ultimate aim of establishing a northern military front against Iraq (Bila, 2003e). 
Moreover, both options still involved granting land access to some aspects of US 
military planning.  
Thus, Erdogan did not dismiss the possibility of a resubmission of the land 
access bill, neither in its original nor modified form. On the other hand, Erdogan was 
also careful to emphasize that certain issues had yet to be  resolved before further moves 
on cooperation could be made. Notably left out of the MOU, for instance, was any 
explicit reference to the political representation of the Turcoman in a post-conflict 
political structure of the Kurd-dominated northern Iraq (Bila, 2003d). Moreover, the 
Bush administration not only still insisted on IMF supervision of the economic aid, it 
now also claimed that such aid was subject to final Congressional approval (Bila, 2003d; 
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Kardas, 2006: 324; Milliyet, March 9, 2003).  However, as was the case before the 
parliamentary vote, Erdogan continued to indicate that an amelioration of the anti-land 
access mood within the AKP could not be achieved if the Bush administration refused to 
address such outstanding issues. (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 
11, 2003; Milliyet, March 9, 2003; also Bila, 2003c/d/e). At other times, however, 
Erdogan also conveyed the impression that a  second UNSC resolution was needed. As  
prior to the March 1 parliamentary vote, Erdogan continued to state that a follow-up to 
UNSC resolution 1441, one that more explicitly authorized military action against Iraq 
was required, before his cabinet could make further moves on cooperation with the Bush 
administration. In his own words: “It will be beneficial for us to see the United Nations 
Security Council resolution. We will determine our steps after we see all these”(Excerpts 
of Erdogan Interview on TGRT, March 6, 2003; Milliyet, March 14, 2003).  
By mid-March, or approximately two weeks after the cabinet’s failure to secure a 
parliamentary passage of the original land access bill, the Bush administration sent 
Erdogan what is now referred to as the “Second Johnson letter”, or a thinly veiled 
ultimatum against backtracking on cooperation. Moreover, in addition to a demand for a  
resubmission of the original land access bill, the Bush administration now also sought 
Turkish permission for use of its air space, to allow a dedicated corridor for US combat 
sorties into targets in Iraq (Sarikya, 2003c). In fact, in an earlier related development, 
informed sources in the Turkish media suggested that a bill that only permitted airspace 
access for the US military could represent a replacement for the land access request - a 
possibility that was neither confirmed nor denied by the cabinet (eg. Excerpts of Yakis 
Interview, March 9, 2003).  
In this latter phase of the crisis negotiations with the Bush administration, 
therefore, the following represents the likely options that were available to the Erdogan 
cabinet, formed on March 14:  
 1. Resubmit the original bill.  
2. Resubmit the original bill with agreement on outstanding issues. 
3. Submit a modified bill.  
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4. Submit a bill only for airspace access. 
5. Wait for UNSC resolution. (ie. let stand the March 1 vote, and do nothing)   
 
As before, this option set is unlikely to be wholly exhaustive20. But since it does 
reflect the range of options that were most probably under consideration, the set is fairly 
representative of the Erdogan cabinet’s options in the latter phase of the Iraq crisis. The 
first (ie. resubmit original bill), the second (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on 
outstanding issues), and the third option (ie. submit a modified bill) represents a decision 
to continue cooperation since each was aimed at facilitating the Bush administration’s 
goal of establishing a northern military front against Iraq. The fourth option (ie. submit a 
bill only for airspace access) and the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution) 
represent a decision against cooperation, since neither entailed an immediate near-term 
submission of a bill that would lead to the creation of a northern front, per the demands 
of the Bush administration and its military planning time. To understand how Erdogan 
arrived at the final option, it is necessary again, to first turn to the domestic political 
situation, per the dictates of the poliheuristic theory. 
 
Domestic Politics 
Among the possibly salient factors, along the domestic political dimension, that 
are thought to influence decisionmaking by leaders, at least two are well-illustrated in 
the second phase of the cabinet’s Iraq crisis: election and “pivotal coalition” (Mintz, 
2004). According to the poliheuristic perspective, the expected impact of a leader’s 
decisions on future elections can often influence the choices made on such decisions. 
This is in line with a well-established literature on electoral punishment by the public of 
leaders for unpopular policies (Trumbore 1998;  Aldrich et al, 2007; Baum and Potter, 
2008). The key event in this regard was the upcoming Siirt by-election, on March 9, in 
which Erdogan, stood as one of the three AKP candidates.  
Indeed, some interpreted the March 1 vote defeat as a sign of the collapse of the 
AKP government and Erdogan’s own popularity and public approval (eg. Colasan, 
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2003c). This view went hand and hand with a widely-held opinion that continued efforts 
at cooperation (ie. submission of a bill for the creation of a northern US military front 
against Iraq), so soon after the March 1 defeat, would have had fatal consequences for 
Erdogan’s electoral fortunes in the by-election (eg. Robins, 2003). To be sure, 
oppositional public opinion was a likely factor in this. In the immediate aftermath of the 
March 1 parliamentary vote on the land access bill, according to one opinion poll, 67% 
of the Turkish public supported the actions of the parliament21 (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 
38). A slightly larger figure, 75%, also opposed any second US attempts to seek such 
land access22 (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 43). Furthermore, the same poll also showed that 
69.7% of the Turkish public opposed the opening of Turkish air space to the US air 
force23 (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 40).  
 Thus between March 1 and the by-election of March 9, there was a marked lull in 
cabinet activities related to the land access bill. The shadow of a future election, 
therefore, helps explain Erdogan’s delayed response to the initial vote outcome of March 
1, despite the Bush administration’s pressures for renewed efforts at cooperation. Yet, on 
the other hand, that “delay” should have been quickly rectified after Erdogan’s by-
election victory, since the possibility of electoral punishment by the public was now 
moot. So, what explains Erdogan’s post-March 9 decisionmaking process and his 
cabinet’s final decision on March 18? Was oppositional public opinion as critical to 
Erdogan’s post-March 9 decision calculus, as has been presumed heretofore? (eg. 
Yavuz, 2005; Park, 2004a; Hale, 2007; Robins, 2003; Mintz, 2004)  
Despite his Sirrt by-election victory and his new status as the presumptive leader 
of the next government, Erdogan’s domestic political position was not wholly 
unassailable. In particular, his government still had to obtain a formal parliamentary vote 
of confidence, scheduled for March 23. It is in connection to such vote, that the need for 
a “pivotal coalition”24 well-serves the poliheuristic explanation of Erdogan’s stage-based 
decisionmaking, in the post-March 9 domestic political environment. In fact, even 
compared to its Turkish contemporaries, the AKP was less than a coherent, singularly-
moved entity, being guided neither by a unifying ideology nor a consistent, common 
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policy agenda. This was in part a reflection of the circumstances of its creation. 
Originally one of the successors of the banned pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah), it was 
hurriedly cobbled together, by Erdogan, only a year prior to the general elections which 
brought it to power in November 2002. As a result, the AKP represented a broad mixture 
of various groups, ranging from nationalists, Kurdish-region deputies (from southeastern 
Turkey), center-right conservatives, and unreformed Islamists25. The AKP was indeed a 
“broad coalition” of very diverse groups and factions (Kardas, 2006: 322-26;  Salmoni, 
2003; also Hale, 2007: 87-8). The fact that the AKP managed to hold together, despite 
the disparateness of its parts, owed mostly to the mass popular appeal of its leader, 
Erdogan. But, of course, the subsequent Iraq crisis put to severe strain Erdogan’s hold 
over the party.  
Within the party’s parliamentary group, in the first phase of the Iraq crisis (ie. 
run-up to the March 1 vote), Erdogan’s center-right faction represented the main internal 
impetus for cooperation with the Bush administration on the land access bill. For various 
reasons, the majority of the deputies in the other factions opposed such cooperation. 
Such opposition to cooperation by these groups had not changed with Erdogan’s new 
found status as the presumptive Prime Minister. For instance, a few days after Erdogan’s 
by-election victory, AKP Deputy Sirin, one of the leaders of the original “rebel” group, 
gave clear warnings of greater number of defections, or even a party “split”, in the event 
of continued attempts at cooperation with US military planning. (Milliyet, March 11, 
2003; Dilipak, 2003; Sarikaya, 2003d; Gorvett, May 2003). The intensity of such 
opposition was particularly pronounced within the unreformed Islamist faction. 
Unofficially led by the AKP Parliamentary Speaker Arinc (Salmoni, 2003; Kardas, 
2006: 323; Excerpts of Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003), the unreformed Islamist group 
represented about 30% of the AKP parliamentary group, or about 110 AKP deputies 
(Salmoni, 2003). In fact, Arinc, a former deputy of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party, 
played a significant role in influencing the votes of the unreformed Islamists in defeating 
the original bill (Sazak, 2003d; also Yavuz, 2005: 170). Reinforcing Deputy Sirin’s 
warnings were Arinc’s own role and statements, which added a new and important 
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dimension to the issue. For instance, in a rare interview, Arinc not only reiterated his 
original position, but also began now to publicly emphasize his long-term  relationship 
to Erbakan, the former leader of the Welfare Pary and now presumptive leader of the 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)(Excerpts of Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003). What is 
instructive about Arinc’s public statements is their timing; they were made the day after 
Erdogan publicly mooted26 the possibility of continued efforts at cooperation (ie. a 
resubmission of the original land access bill) (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN 
Turk, March 11, 2003), and a few days after confirmed reports of Erbakan’s active 
efforts at recruiting the “rebel” deputies (mostly unreformed Islamists) into his own 
Felicity Party (Karakus, 2003; also Sarikaya, 2003d). By implication then, continued 
attempts at cooperating with the Bush administration’s plans for establishing a northern 
military front carried with it the very real threat of mass defections – perhaps led by 
Arinc - of the unreformed Islamist AKP deputies to Erbakan’s Felicity Party. Such an 
outcome would have effectively cut short AKP’s majority status in the parliament27 and, 
in turn, would have greatly complicated  Erdogan’s goal of obtaining a parliamentary 
vote of confidence in his new government (Arcayurek, 2003).  
Thus, the Erdogan cabinet’s crisis decision making was faced with two possible 
set of influences: (1) a Turkish public that continued to signal its opposition to 
cooperation with US military planning (ie. land access) as well as non-military 
involvement (ie. airspace access), and (2) intra-party divisions and potential collapse of 
the AKP government. An insight into the relative import of these two contrasting set of 
influences is revealed by Erdogan himself, in his recalling of the conversation he had 
with Bush, in the days after the March 1 parliamentary vote. By his own account, a key 
statement made to Bush was the following: “Currently a negative atmosphere prevails. 
We cannot take a third motion [of the land access bill] to the parliament under such 
circumstances.”(Anatolia, March 27, 2003). When viewed in the context of the Erdogan 
cabinet’s final crisis decision, on March 18, this statement is strongly suggestive of the 
larger influence of the potential collapse of AKP government, relative to an oppositional 
public opinion, in his decision calculation28.  
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Given his initial goal of securing a by-election victory, and the later – and more 
important - goal of obtaining a parliamentary vote of confidence, then, Erdogan would 
have been hard-pressed to adopt a policy option that entailed continued efforts at 
cooperation (ie. aid in the creation of a US northern military front against Iraq) with the 
Bush administration. In particular, the need to maintain the faction-filled “pivotal 
coalition” within the AKP to assure a timely parliamentary vote of confidence in his 
newly-established government implied that, along the domestic political dimension, any 
option that entailed such cooperation would have been non-compensatory. This in turn 
suggested the non-viability of the first option (ie. resubmission of the original land 
access bill), second option (ie. submission of a modified bill), and the third option (ie. 
resubmit the land access bill with agreement on outstanding issues). Eliminating these 
three options thus left only two options for further consideration: submit a bill only for 
airspace access or wait for a UNSC resolution. These two remaining options reflected 
non-cooperation, since they entailed no immediate near-term submission of a bill that 
would advance the Bush administration’s goal of creating a northern front. Based on the 
poliheuristic theory of decisionmaking, the relative attractiveness of the two remaining 
options were assessed in terms of their costs and benefits along the economic, external-
political (northern Iraq), military, and strategic dimension 
 
Economic Dimension 
Considering the finalized, signed agreement and associated MOUs outlining the 
Bush administration’s guarantees on most – though not all - of the economic, external-
political, and military issues deemed critical to the Erdogan cabinet, a decision against 
cooperation entailed major costs. For instance, along the economic dimension, a decision 
against cooperation (ie. wait for UNSC resolution or submit bill only for airspace access) 
obviously meant the forfeiting of nearly $30 billion of economic aid, in the form of 
direct grant and long-term loans. But a decision against cooperating with the Bush 
administration’s attempts to set up a northern front against Iraq also had further corollary 
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economic implications, in the areas of government budget, financial markets, and 
negotiations with the IMF.  
Indeed, the withdrawal of such major US economic aid would have made it 
exceedingly difficult to compensate for the expected economic losses flowing from the 
expected military actions against Iraq. The resultant strain on Turkey’s state budget, for 
2003, would have inevitably implied the need for increases in various types of taxes (eg. 
transportation and property) to make up for the expected budgetary shortfalls (Excerpts 
of Gul Interview, March 11, 2003; Sarikaya, 2003d). As well, the withdrawal  of US 
economic aid would have predictably led to negative financial market reaction, further 
undermining investor sentiment, both foreign and domestic. In fact, the Erdogan cabinet 
was so concerned about the possibility of such development that, when it had received 
early negative signals from the market after the March 1 vote, it falsely reported that the 
US economic aid was still on track – despite the fact that this was very much in doubt at 
the time (Milliyet, March 20, 2003; also Sarikaya, 2003e). Lastly, a decision to either 
submit an airspace access bill or wait for a more definitive UNSC resolution, and thus 
make void the economic aid, would have complicated Turkey’s on-going negotiations 
with the IMF. In fact, an early indication of this was the IMF’s initial reaction to the 
state budget. Apparently dissatisfied, the IMF demanded the inclusion of more austerity 
measures, including an end to most state subsidies to Turkey’s agricultural sector 
(Cevik, 2003). In light of this, a final decision to reject cooperation would likely have 
led to more such demands by the IMF. But for the AKP, the prospect of greater and 
deeper austerity measures would have been very problematic, since much of its electoral 
success was attributed to successfully appealing to the urban poor and rural farmers, 
with a message of social justice and alleviation of poverty. In all, then, along the 
economic dimension, the two remaining options on non-cooperation (ie. either 
submitting a bill only for airspace access or waiting for a UNSC resolution) would have 
been very costly in terms of Turkey’s economic recovery and retaining the support of a 
core sector of the AKP’s  constituency.   
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However, a critical and obvious difference between the option of waiting for a 
UNSC resolution and the option of submitting a bill only for airspace access was that the 
former option, in effect, entailed doing nothing. On the other hand, the latter option 
entailed a positive move, on the part of the Erdogan cabinet, in contributing to the 
success of the Bush administration’s military planning and operation. Thus, despite 
anticipated loss of the major economic aid package, there was expectation, within the 
cabinet, that Turkey would still be offered some type of economic aid29, in the event that 
airspace access was granted (Sarikaya, 2003e). This feeling was also apparently shared 
by those outside of the cabinet, including leaders of key international financial ratings 
institutions (eg. Urey, 2003).  
 
External-Political (n. Iraq) Dimension 
Unlike with the economic dimension, for the external-political dimension, the 
Erdogan cabinet faced a more clear cut set of costs and incentives with respect to the two 
non-cooperation options. Unlike its new position on the previously-agreed to economic 
aid package (ie. March 1), for instance, the Bush administration was willing to honor its 
previously negotiated MOU on political issues related to northern Iraq, in the event of 
parliamentary approval of the bill authorizing airspace access for US combat sorties 
(Sarikaya, 2003e; also Hale, 2007: 125). This meant that most of the major external-
political goals of the cabinet concerning northern Iraq would be supported, including a 
guarantee of the territorial unity of Iraq, the neutrality of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, 
and recognition of the ethnic Turcoman as a “foundational element” of the Iraqi nation. 
Such guarantees would have, in turn, furthered Ankara’s long-term policy of preventing 
the development of an independent Kurdish state in the region, as per Turkey’s “red 
line”. On the other hand, however, as pointed out by Erdogan, the MOU of March 1 left 
out any explicit reference to the political representation of the Turcoman in a post-
conflict political structure of the Kurd-dominated northern Iraq (Excerpts of Erdogan 
Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003; Milliyet, March 9, 2003; also Bila, 2003c/d/e). 
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Therefore, a decision to submit an airspace access bill would still have incurred a cost in 
terms achieving this outstanding goal.  
In contrast, however, for the Erdogan cabinet, the option of waiting for a UNSC 
resolution would have yielded neither the preservation of previously negotiated gains 
along the external-political dimension, nor any new similar gains. This option, therefore, 
would have meant no guarantees on the continued territorial unity of Iraq nor the 
neutrality of key cities in northern Iraq, and even less certainty regarding the political 
status of the Turcoman. All of these foregone gains would in turn have meant that the 
continued maintenance of the “red line” against an independent Kurd-dominated state in 
northern Iraq would have been severely weakened. Thus, for the Erdogan cabinet, the 
“opportunity costs”, along the external-political dimension, of waiting for a UNSC 
resolution were indeed large. In an overall comparison with the option of waiting for a 
UNSC resolution, then, the option of submitting a bill granting airspace access to the US 
airforce would have resulted in far greater gains for the cabinet,  relative to costs, along 
this dimension.  
 
Military Dimension 
Along the military dimension, the two non-cooperation options entailed mostly 
costly implications for the Erdogan cabinet. These were in relation to at least two key 
military issues covered in the March 1 Memorandum of Understanding, including an 
agreement for Turkey to deploy upto 60,000 troops in northern Iraq, as well as 
guarantees on a re-collection of heavy weaponry from the Kurds. Along with the 
creation of a buffer zone, these provisions would have aided in the prevention of a 
refugee crisis and terrorist infiltrations. The Turkish forces were also expected to 
safeguard the region’s oil pipelines, and to prevent any Kurdish entry into Mosul and 
Kirkuk, thereby ensuring its neutrality. For the greater part, however, the MOU’s 
provisions on military issues were aimed at supporting Ankara’s long-held political goal 
of maintaining the “red line” against an independent Kurdish state. Indeed, as part of 
their deployment mission, the Turkish troops were expected to be given a mandate to 
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actively pursue and disarm not only the approximately 5,000 members of PKK terrorist 
group, but also the armed militias (ie. peshmerga) attached to the PUK and the KDP, the 
two main political groups in northern Iraq (eg. Olson, 2005: 108 and Kirisci, 2004: 43). 
However, since the two non-cooperation options (ie. submit a bill only for 
airspace access or wait for UNSC resolution) precluded any land access for the US 
military, such options would have effectively undercut the Erdogan cabinet’s equivalent  
claim for making a large Turkish force projection into northern Iraq. Indeed, the Bush 
administration indicated as much (Hale, 2007: 115; Milliyet, March 22, 2003). The 
absence of a credible Turkish threat or application of force in northern Iraq, then, would 
have greatly handicapped the cabinet’s goal of curtailing PKK activities and preventing 
a repeat of the earlier refugee crisis. Moreover, the absence of a formidable Turkish 
military deterrent  would likely have invited Kurdish incursions and possible takeover of 
the key regional cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, and their surrounding oilfields, thereby 
further enhancing the group’s march toward greater autonomy, and possible claims to 
independent statehood (eg. Bozarslan, 2005: 129; Hale, 2007: 125; Gorvett, May 2003).   
Yet, on the other hand, the option of submitting a bill only for airspace access 
would still afford a certain amount of comparative advantage to the Erdogan cabinet, 
along the military dimension. The Bush administration’s need for such airspace access, 
for instance, was actively leveraged by the cabinet to persuade it to either accept or 
acquiesce to a smaller Turkish force (eg. special forces units) entry into northern Iraq30. 
Such a force would likely have been relatively small compared to what the Bush 
administration had originally agreed to in the March 1 MOU. But as a supplement to the 
pre-existing small-scale Turkish military presence in northern Iraq, such units would still 
be helpful in mitigating the expected losses along the military dimension31 . In contrast, 
the option of waiting for a requisite UNSC resolution would have yielded no such 
leverage on entry of Turkish troops, since the option would have contributed very little 





As with the military dimension, many obvious costs attended with the two non-
cooperation options, along the strategic dimension. For the Erdogan cabinet, many of 
these expected costs were largely a revisiting of the ones that it had faced in the run-up 
to its February 25 decision (ie. submit land access bill for parliamentary approval before 
obtaining a signed agreement, and allow a free vote). At a broad, generic level, such  
expected costs included a deterioration of the “strategic partnership” with the US (Park, 
2004b: 505; also Kardas, 2006: 321; Parris, 2005; Fuller, 2003), less consistent US 
support for Turkey’s EU accession and membership goals, an increase in the strategic 
profile of the Iraqi Kurds and their interests, a disintegration of the “red line” (ie. greater 
autonomy and independence for the Iraqi Kurds), etc. 
Beyond such rough estimations of expected costs, however, there were certain 
nuanced differences between the two options, along the strategic dimension. For 
instance, a decision to wait for requisite UNSC resolution on use of force against Iraq (if 
any) would have been in line with the dominant EU thinking and foreign policy line, 
especially as led by France and Germany. This had relevancy as regards Turkey’s long-
sought foreign policy goal of EU membership. An important reason for the EU’s refusal 
to grant Turkey an accession date in the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, for 
example, was the Bush administration’s quid pro quo application of pressure on EU 
leaders in anticipation of active Turkish cooperation in US efforts at creating a northern 
front (Robins, 2003: 556; also Clarke, 2004: 53). Given this background, if the Erdogan 
cabinet were to defy final expectations and choose, in the end, not to cooperate with US 
military planning, and instead decided to wait for a UNSC resolution, then the cabinet’s 
actions would have been accord with the need for “international legitimacy”. Critically 
as well, such a decision would have also have made difficult Turkey’s unilateral military 
entry into northern Iraq, and thereby attenuate the potential for large-scale repression of 
the region’s Kurdish population. Thus, by default, a decision to wait for requisite UNSC 
resolution, however likely or unlikely, would have led Turkey to uphold the EU’s 
Copenhagen criteria which demands, in part, that a state’s policies be in accord with 
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such principles as the peaceful settling of conflicts, rule of law, and respect for human 
rights (Durmuslar, 2007; Robins, 2003; Kirisci, 2004). Considering the highly salient 
nature of the Iraqi crisis, it is unlikely that EU leaders would have ignored Turkey’s final 
decision. This in turn would have had positive impact on the aim of acquiring an  
accession date with the EU, a still-highly prioritized goal on the AKP foreign policy 
agenda32 (Park, 2004b: 500-1; Muftler-Bac, 2004: 436).  
Such important potential gain of the fifth option aside, however, the Erdogan 
cabinet was also cognizant of the increasing “inevitability” of US military action against 
Iraq, and Turkey’s dilemma therein (eg. Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, 
March 11, 2003). For the cabinet, such dilemma began with an understanding of the 
likely regional strategic consequences of a choice against cooperating with the Bush 
administration in establishing a northern front. The elimination of such option, from the 
outset, was likely to lead to an increase in Kurdish moves to independence, owing in part 
to the Bush administration’s consequent greater reliance on the group for the successful 
execution of its own military operation. To counter the possibility of such greater 
Kurdish independence in a post-conflict regional context, the cabinet would have to seek 
closer ties with Syria and Iran, however uncertain and unfamiliar the resulting fruits 
(Parris, 2005a). Combined with this, the removal of a hostile regime in Iraq would imply 
decreased strategic utility of Turkey for the US. To counter Turkey’s deprioritized place 
in US strategic calculation, then, Turkey would have had to seek better ties with other 
major power centers, such as the EU (Kardas, 2006: 319-20; Parris, 2005a). In effect, 
therefore, non-cooperation would set in motion a chain of events that would dovetail 
with a rising and influential force in the newly-established Erdogan cabinet’s thinking on 
strategic matters – “strategic depth”33. However, a quick, transparent and open move 
towards “strategic depth” would have created its own set of problems, not the least of 
which pertained to Turkey’s historically strong alliance ties to the US, a la “strategic 
partnership”. Thus, in addition to properly understanding and anticipating the likely 
impact of non-cooperation, there was also recognition for the need to balance the 
expected negative strategic fallout of non-cooperation (ie. refusal to aid in the 
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establishment of a northern front) with the need to honor certain implicit bilateral 
obligations in light of historically strong “natural alliance” ties with the US (eg. 
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, Address at Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
December 10, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003). Compared to 
waiting for a UNSC resolution, a positive move towards granting airspace access would 
have obviously better met such a balancing act, however imperfect. In sum, therefore, 
compared to the fifth option, the fourth option (ie. submit bill only for airspace access) 
would have better allowed the cabinet to meet the minimum requirements of unstated 
alliance commitments with the US and would have allowed it to more effectively pursue 
a re-oriented, forward-looking, “multidimensional” long-term strategy in the region, a 
strategy that did not prioritize any one particular power center (Kardas, 2006: 316-20; 
also Parris, 2004a).  
 As with the earlier phase of the crisis, the foregoing poliheuristic analysis  
illustrates the likely steps taken and factors considered by Erdogan, in arriving at the 
final crisis decision, on March 18, to make a parliamentary submission of a bill only for 
airspace access. The Erdogan cabinet’s final crisis decision also reflects a 
decisionmaking process that was driven in large measure by an established decision rule 
that prioritized the domestic political criterion: maintaining the pivotal coalition within 
the AKP. Policy options that violated this decision rule were dropped from further 
consideration. These included the first option (ie. submit original bill), second option (ie. 
submit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues), and the third option (ie. 
submit a modified bill). What remained were the fourth option (ie. submit a bill only for 
airspace access) and the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). A relative 
assessement of the costs and benefits of the two remaining options were then 
undertaken. Considering its ability to better satisfy the economic, external-political, 
military and strategic criteria, the Erdogan cabinet chose the fourth option over the fifth 
option. But regarding the final decision to make a parliamentary submission of the bill 
only for airspace access, was it compensatory or non-compensatory?  
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Discussion: Non-Compensatory Decision 
According to other well known theories on decisionmaking, such as expected 
utility (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984) and cybernetic 
theory (Ostrom and Job, 1986), patterns of leaders’ decision making often reflect an 
additive or compensatory outcome. From the perspective of these theories, then, the 
Erdogan cabinet should have chosen as its final policy decision, the option that 
represented the highest total benefits relative to costs. But was this the case?  
Among the cooperation options, and summing across the four different 
dimensions, the second option (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding 
issues) represented the greatest expected net benefits relative to costs. This owed in large 
part to the fact that, if the agreement entailed therein was successfully obtained from the 
Bush administration, it would have addressed the remaining issues, along the external-
political and economic dimensions, that the Erdogan cabinet believed to be problematic 
from the standpoint of Turkey’s various national interests. These included guarantees on 
the political status of Turcoman and further guarantees on the agreed-to economic aid in 
the event of Congressional opposition. Between the remaining cooperation options, the 
first option (ie. resubmit original bill) represented slightly higher expected net benefits, 
across the different dimension, compared to the third option (ie. submit modified bill). 
This is because the latter option might have required a re-negotiation with the Bush 
administration, and thus would have provided less guarantees on the originally agreed to 
MOUs, on economic, external-political, and military issues.  
Between the two non-cooperation options, the fourth option (ie. submit bill only 
for airspace access), on balance, represented greater expected net benefits relative to 
costs, compared to the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). This difference in net 
benefits between the two options holds constant across each of the four different 
dimensions. But the critical difference in all this is the relative probability of success, not 
only between the cooperative and non-cooperative options, but also options within each 
of the two categories.  
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Indeed, in addition to the different relative costs and benefits of the fourth option 
(ie. submit bill only for airspace access) and fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution), 
the two remaining non-cooperative options reflected different relative probabilities of 
success34. Notwithstanding the issue of anticipated Bush administration’s military action, 
irrespective of UNSC resolution, the likelihood of success of the option of waiting for a 
UNSC resolution, for example, was problematic on two counts: continued deferral as an 
official UNSC agenda item and threat of veto by other UNSC members. First, though the 
UN weapons inspection team  had finalized its report to the UN, the Security Council 
could not agree, even by mid-March, on whether or not to bring up the Iraq issue for 
Council debate. Thus, a UNSC resolution authorizing military action against Iraq would 
have taken too long, if at all, and therefore would have conflicted with the Bush 
administration’s time-table for military planning. Related to this was the second factor. 
In fact, part of the reason for the UNSC’s indecisiveness related to a very vocalized 
intent on the part of France and Russia, to veto any such resolution, should it be brought 
up for Council debate and vote (eg. Sazak, 2003f).  
In contrast, a higher probability of success attended with the option of submitting 
a bill for parliamentary approval only for airspace access. This owed mainly to the fact 
that the Bush administration’s request for airspace access was, at most, a relatively low 
level of cooperation, in so far as it did not directly contribute to the creation of a 
northern front. Thus, the likelihood of opposition by the AKP parliamentary group was 
low. In addition however, another key factor that enhanced the probability of 
parliamentary approval of the airspace access bill was the assurance that Turkey’s 
political goals concerning northern Iraq would be respected and the strong possibility of 
attaching a rider to the bill that also authorized entry of Turkish troops into northern 
Iraq, albeit with the ostensible aim of preventing another refugee crisis and curtailing 
PKK terrorist activities (eg. Park, 2004: 85; Sarikaya, 2003e).  
Thus, in addition to its greater net benefits relative to costs, the fourth option (ie. 
submit bill only for airspace access) represented a higher probabilty of success compared 
to the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). On the other hand, the cooperation 
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options (ie. resubmit original bill, resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding 
issues, and submit a modified bill), generally reflected the same low level of probable 
success.  Of course, this relatively lower level of probable success owes in large part to 
the fact that each of these three options entails cooperation with the Bush administration 
in creating a northern front. This in turn suggests the high likelihood of parliamentary 
rejection of these options, via a replay of the original March 1 vote.  
 These results are summarized in Table E-2(Appendix E). The table shows the initial 
option set in the second stage of the Iraq crisis. As in Table E-1, each option is also 
disaggregated along the five relevant dimensions (ie. domestic political, economic, 
external-political [northern Iraq], military, and strategic). The additive total score for 
each option is presented in the last column35. As shown, however, the option with the 
highest total additive score is the second option (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement 
on outstanding issues). This is the option that would have been predicted by the expected 
utility and cybernetic theories. But the Erdogan cabinet’s final decision, reached on 
March 18, was the fifth option (ie. submit a bill only for airspace access), an option 
whose total additive score is less than the first option (ie. resubmit original bill) and the 
second option (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues). The 
results on Table E-2 thus suggest strong evidence of the stage-based, satisficing, non-
holistic, non-compensatory decision rule of the poliheuristic theory.  
The basic outline of the argument put forth in this study is illustrated in Figure E-
1(Appendix E). The Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet’s Iraq crisis occurred in two phases: from 
mid-December, 2002 to March 1, 2003 and from March 1, 2003 to March 21, 2003. In 
both phases, public opinion had a large – though not complete - influence on the 
preferences of the AKP deputies. This in turn led to an internal division among the latter 
group.  
In the initial phase of the Iraq crisis, this intra-party division led to the first 
decision rule: a group vote, along the domestic political dimension, was viewed as non-
compensatory. This non-compensatory decision rule meant that although a group vote 
could not be used, it could still allow a parliamentary submission of the bill for land 
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access to US forces. Previous studies that have focused merely on the oppositional 
public opinion have difficulty in explaining the cabinet’s decision on February 25 to 
make such parliamentary submission.  
In the second phase of the Iraq crisis,  from March 1 to March 21, 2003, the 
second decision rule took form, wherein continued cooperation was perceived as being 
non-compensatory. Thus, a resubmission of the original or a revised land access bill was 
ruled out. On the other hand, this same non-compensatory rule did not rule out the 
submission of bill for airspace access, despite opposition to it by the Turkish public. 
Again, a facile focus on oppositional public opinion would have difficulty in explaining 
this outcome, while a focus on intra-party dynamics would encounter fewer difficulties.  
 
Conclusion 
Public opinion, in most instances, can ill afford to be ignored by political leaders. 
However, it is also often the case that public opinion has not a direct, but an indirect 
impact on political leaders’ decisions and policy choices. Equally, a more direct impact 
may be levied at “domestic structures” (Risse-Kippen, 1991; Hagan, 1993), including 
the dynamics of parliamentary politics, that mediate between public opinion and elite 
decision and policy choices. Such was the case with the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) 
cabinet’s experience during the Iraq crisis. This study attempted to illustrate that for the 
Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet, the demand for intra-party cohesion in face of potential 
collapse of its governing mandate better explains the outcome than does oppositional 
public opinion.  
This examination of the Erdogan cabinet’s foreign policy decisionmaking over 
the US land access issue is also meaningful in a few other ways. First, on the issue of 
conceptual validity, case study evidence is strongly suggestive of the impact of cognitive 
subjectivity in the perception on non-compensatory political loss. This is implied in 
Erdogan’s decision strategy that downplayed the impact of public opinion – despite his 
own admission that nearly 100% of Turks were opposed to cooperation with the Bush 
administration - in the run-up to the March 1 parliamentary vote. Only when such public 
 89
opinion was seen as being connected to his own electoral fortunes, was it perceived as a 
non-compensatory level of political loss and a concomitant threat to his own position. 
Second, the case study illustrates the role of parliamentary politics, a la “pivotal 
coalitions”, in Erdogan’s decision calculus and as another way to infer political loss. 
Third, the results of the detailed, step-by-step process-tracing method suggest stronger 
support for the poliheuristic theory relative to competing explanations, such as the 
expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis. The results for the main theory are all 
the more impressive considering the different operationalizations of “political loss” and 
the extreme measurement parameters that makes Erdogan’s crisis decision context a 
“least likely” case for the poliheuristic theory, and a “most-likely” case for the expected 
utility-based alliance dependence thesis.  
These findings need also be put in comparative perspective, as related to the  
earlier chapter on cross-national patterns. At one level, there is clear convergence in 
main  findings. For instance, both the case study method and the correlational method 
have demonstrated the primacy of domestic politics and the desire to avoid major 
political loss along such dimension, on the part of most political leaders. This is in line 
with much of the core assumptions of the poliheuristic theory. Both methods have 
together also illustrated the robustness of PH theory under different operationalizations 
of “political loss”.  Yet, on another level, there is an obvious divergence regarding the 
directionality in the impact of public opinion. In the correlational method, public opinion 
was shown to have statistically significant direct impact on decisionmaking and policy 
choices of leaders. But the  findings of the current case study should not be viewed as a 
negation of such.  Indeed, in as much as it represents a “least likely” case, Turkey in 
many respects also represents an “outlier” case36. Turkey’s outlier status undoubtedly 
influenced Erdogan’s decision calculus, including his discounting of oppositional public 
opinion37. Moreover, the outlier status also speaks to the uniqueness of Turkey and the 
Erdogan cabinet’s foreign policymaking decision context – the outcome of which should 
pose as a cautious caveat, but not necessarily a rejection of the cross-national, 




1. A single case study design usually lacks sufficient variance on the dependent and  independent 
variables. Thus, explicit hypotheses-testing is difficult. However, a rigorous process-tracing method can 
reveal the underlying causal mechanism that can either refute or support a particular theory, if such 
method can eliminate all other theories or explanations. See, for example, George and Bennett, 2005: 75.  
 
2. Granted, such a nuanced view of the impact of public opinion often gets glossed over in correlational 
type of investigations, owing in part to the need for categorizations. Nonetheless, this claim of an indirect 
impact is in line with much of the established research on mass-level public opinion on foreign policy. For 
a recent overview of the indirect impact of public opinion, see Baum and Potter (2007).  
 
3. Further, adjusting the analytic focus in this manner may also reveal insights regarding the comparatively 
different policy choices of Blair (U.K.) and Erdogan (Turkey). In both instances, the leaders faced high 
levels of oppositional public opinion to their policy preferences. Yet, whereas Erdogan was forced to 
compromise, Blair did not. A focus on whether or not both leaders faced similar levels of non-
compensatory political loss (ie. intra-party rivalry or potential collapse of government) should add to our 
understanding of the different outcomes.  
 
4. As a member of the Welfare Party, Erdogan was convicted and sentenced, in 1998, to 10 months in 
prison for his pro-Islamist political activities, under Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code. The conviction 
meant that, under Article 76 of the Turkish Constitution, and Article 11/f.3 of the MP Election Law, 
Erdogan also faced a lifetime ban from political activities. The situation was only rectified on Dec 11 
when, using its majority status in the TBMM, the AKP was able to pass the necessary motions that deleted 
or amended the relevant provisions in Article 76 of the Constitution and Article 11/f.3 of the MP Election 
Law. See also: Hale, p. 87-89; Hurriyet, Dec. 11, 2002; Milliyet, Dec 3 and Dec 28, 2002.     
 
5. The details were released to the media about a week after the initial meetings. See Hurriyet, Dec 13, 
2002.    
 
6. The first stage involved initial site inspections of ports, bases, and other facilities; executive permission 
for such was given on Dec 18, 2002. This was to be followed, in the second stage, by site preparation that 
included necessary upgrades to and construction of facilities to meet requirements of military operations. 
In a 318 to 193 vote, with 16 abstentions, Turkey’s parliament  authorized the second stage of the US plan, 
on Feb 6, 2003. See Huseyin and Ergan, Feb 2.    
 
7. Erdogan made a distinction between “multidimensional diplomacy” and the separate US-Turkey 
bilateral negotiations. See Anatolia, Jan. 21, 2003.     
 
8.  This is akin to the imposition of  party discipline on a vote.    
 
9. By “cooperation”,  the Bush administration understood it to mean Ankara’s help in establishing a 
northern military front. This understanding of “cooperation” is therefore also used in this study. The 
option of pursuing a peaceful solution and the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution implied non-
cooperation, since they went against the Bush administration’s goal of an immediate near-term permission 
for land access for setting up a northern front.     
 
10. These are omitted options:  
A. Submit with UNSC resolution but without complete and signed agreement + free vote.   
     (In effect, this can be with partial or no agreement on any issues) 
B. Submit with UNSC resolution but without complete and signed agreement + group vote.      
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These options entail a bill submission that is accompanied by a UNSC resolution. But such a UNSC 
resolution was beyond the control of the cabinet. Thus, their omission from cabinet’s original option set.  
 
11. During this phase of the crisis, however, Erdogan conveyed a greater appreciation for the need to 
preserve the latter goal than concern about his upcoming by-election in Siirt  (Transcript of Erdogan 
Interview, February 9, 2003; Robins, 2003: 564). This made prima facie sense since, in the absence of 
AKP’s continued governing mandate, his goal of securing the premiership and establishing his own 
government would have been that much less certain.  
 
12. This is based on a published account given by Fikreet Bila, an influential columnist with regular access 
to Turkey’s political establishment.. See Hale’s (2007) footnote #93, in page 120.     
 
13.  Since – as with the other second-stage options – both the third and fifth options had similar probability 
levels in preserving the AKP’s governing mandate, the concern here is with the probability of successfully 
achieving the aims of the option under consideration (eg. a peaceful solution, a second UNSC resolution, a 
signed agreement, a verbal agreement, parliamentary passage of the land access bill, etc) 
 
14. The possibility of reaching no agreement was very unlikely, since implementation of the land access 
permission, if granted, was predicated on a bilateral agreement that addressed the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s 
political, military, and economic concerns. The land access permission was thus conditioned on a bilateral 
agreement, irrespective of whether such agreement was reached before or after the parliamentary 
submission of the relevant bill. 
 
15. There are approximately 3,5000,000 Kurds in northern Iraq. If those in Syria, Iran, and Turkey are 
added, the total estimated population of Kurds in the region exceeds 20,000,000.  
 
16. This is based on adding up the adjusted score of each option across each of the four dimensions. The 
adjusted score is calculated in the following way: 
Assignment of baseline score (ie. net benefits versus costs). 
Baseline score is multiplied by the probability of the success of the option, along the particular dimension. 
This is the initial “score”. (Note that for the domestic-political dimension, a probability value of 0.6 
indicates likely retention of the related option, whereas a value of 0.4 indicates likely elimination. Also, 
options 3 and 4 each have two probability values, to reflect the two requirements contained within each 
option).  
The “score” is multiplied by the weight of the dimension, to arrive at “adjusted score”.  
The adjusted score for each of the five dimensions is added to arrive at final score for the option.  
 
17. Though this fact may be masked when one focuses merely on the scores.  
 
18. The total number of all elected deputies to the parliament was 533. A simple majority of this is 267.  
 
19. Such as the prevention of bloodshed and conflict amongst the different ethnic groups in northern Iraq, 
including the Turcoman. Doing so, it was hoped, would attenuate some of the opposition to the land access 
bill. (Milliyet, Mar 9). This humanitarian dimension was again considered in the summer of 2003, upon 
US request for Turkish troops (see Kirisci, 2004: 44).  
 
20. The distinction between a group vote and a free vote is also unnecessary in this option set, since there 
was no indication that the Erdogan cabinet even considered a group vote. This is not surprising given the 
March 1 vote outcome.  
 
21. The survey question item read as follows: ““What do you think about the TGNA’s rejection of the 
AKP government’s decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq and the settlement of the US troops in 
Turkey?”  
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Among the respondents, 66.9% chose “Positive” as their answer.  
 
22. The survey question item read as follows: “If the US wants to settle its troops in Turkey again, should 
Turkey accept this demand?” Among the respondents, 75% chose “No” as their answer. 
  
23. The survey question item read as follows: “What do you think about the Turkish government’s 
decision to open the Turkish air space to the US air force?” Among the respondents, 69.7% chose 
“Negative” as their answer.  
 
24. Mintz (2004) actually uses the term  “pivotal parties”, which in turn seems to be based on the role of 
Tsebelis’s  (1995, 1999) “veto players” in coalition governments. My usage of the concept of “pivotal 
coalitions” is slightly closer to the latter usage, in so far as it takes into account the role of internal party 
groups or factions whose behavior may be equivalently consequential as those of formal political parties in 
a governing coalition.  
 
25. According to Salmoni (2003), these unreformed Islamists represented “the unreconstructed Refah 
hardcore from 1995-1998”, and were led by Arinc.  
 
26. Erdogan’s actual interview with CNN Turk was held on March 9. Excerpts of the interview were 
published two days later, in Milliyet.  
 
27. Were the Arinc-led faction of unreformed Islamist to join Erbakan’s Felicity Party, the AKP would 
have lost approximately 110 deputies, leaving it with only about 253 deputies. This would have been less 
than the minimum 275 seats required to maintain a parliamentary majority.  In the event of defection by 
Arinc’s faction, the possibility of Erdogan creating a stable coalition government with the main opposition 
party, Republican People’s Party, was unlikely, since the latter was ideologically center-left.   
 
28. Further, “atmosphere” is an idiomatic expression that he used on past occasions to refer to intra-party 
dynamics (eg. Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003). When combined with the 
fact that he was generally under-appreciative of public opinion, one can infer that the reference to 
“negative atmosphere” was an intimation regarding expected intra-party opposition among many rank-
and-file deputies of the AKP parliamentary group.  
 
29. In fact, soon after the Erdogan cabinet’s final decision of March 18, the Bush administration pushed 
through Congress a measure for providing $1 billion in direct grants, with the option of it being converted 
to $8.5 billion in long-term loans. See: Hale, 2007: 125;  Park, 2004: 85;  Parris, 2005a: 4;  Gorvett, June 
2003.  
 
30. In fact, in conversations with Powell after the cabinet had reached its final decision, Erdogan made this 
very point. See Milliyet, March 22, 2003. A bilateral agreement for such was later confirmed by Erdogan. 
See Transcripts of Erdogan Interview, Newsweek, March 31, 2003.  
 
31. In fact, subsequent events suggested that the Bush administration did acquiesce to the entry of a 
limited number of Turkish troops into northern Iraq, as evinced by Gul’s statement:” There is no 
outstanding disagreement with the United States. Turkish troops will enter northern Iraq” (Milliyet, March 
22, 2003; also Park, 2005: 27).  Soon after his statement, a force of 1,000 Turkish special-ops commandos 
entered northern Iraq.   
 
32. Despite the EU’s December 2002 decision to post-pone the decision on such accession, this still 
remained a vital foreign policy goal for the cabinet. See, for example, Transcript of Erdogan Interview, 
“AKP Leader Erdogan Assesses Chances of Averting Iraq War”, Der Spiegel, February 9, 2003. 
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33. Davutoglu was the main architect of this new strategic thinking in Turkey’s foreign policy, and was 
the chief foreign policy advisor to Erdogan. His “strategic depth” centered around the need for a 
“multidimensional” foreign policy, one that, in part, sought to reconcile Turkey’s geographical depth (eg. 
geographical location, size, population, etc), historical depth (eg. inheritance of the Ottoman legacy), and 
cultural depth (eg. Islamic identity), with the demands of globalization and increasingly diversified set of 
strategic challenges, including Iraq. In practice, ‘strategic depth” also implied the need to re-evaluate the 
largely unidimensional approach to Turkey’s foreign policy and strategic thinking, and a need to de-
prioritize traditional ties to single power center, including the one with the US, in favor of links with 
multiple power centers (eg. EU). Murionson (2006) offers a concise interpretation of  Davutoglu’s 
“strategic depth”.  
 
34. For the option set in the run-up to the March 1 vote, the probability of success of each option was 
affected in part by the possibility of obtaining a separate agreement for each of the economic issue area, 
political-external issue area, and the military issue area. In the second phase of the Iraq crisis, this situation  
no longer exists. Thus, it is more plausible to infer one common probability value for the likelihood of 
success of an option across all of its different dimensions.  
 
35. This is based on adding up the adjusted score of each option across each of the four dimensions. The 
adjusted score is calculated in the following way: 
Assignment of baseline score (ie. net benefits versus costs). 
Baseline score is multiplied by the probability of the success of the option, along the particular dimension. 
This is the initial “score”. (Note that for the domestic-political dimension, a probability value of 0.6 
indicates likely retention of the related option, whereas a value of 0.4 indicates likely elimination.) 
The “score” is multiplied by the weight of the dimension, to arrive at “adjusted score”.  
The adjusted score for each of the five dimensions is added to arrive at final score for the option.  
 
 
36. With respect to alliance dependence, for instance, among the thirty countries, the standardized score 
for Turkey was by far the highest (followed by Germany) for 1992-2002. More critically, Turkey was the 
only country that was dealing with a major economic and financial crisis, and was the only country that 
was offered major material and non-material inducements in return for cooperation with US military 
planning. In all these aspects, Turkey’s position was extreme, in comparison to the other twenty nine 
countries.  
 
37. For instance, in a speech given to the AKP parliamentary group, in the run-up to the March 1 vote, 
Erdogan urged the deputies to ignore – just as much as he had done - oppositional public opinion, in light 
of the greater interests at stake (ie. the need to maintain alliance ties with the US, the need to overcome the 
on-going economic and financial crisis, etc):  “Support the motion, this is our motion. Those who tell ‘no 
war’ forget that when they can’t get their salaries for three days”, quoted in Kardas (2006: 321).  The “no 
war” slogan was a common cry of the vocal public that was opposed to military action against Iraq. In 
fact, in early February, at his appearance in a football match,  Prime Minister Gul himself was met with 









POLIHEURISTIC THEORY AND MILITARY COALITIONS: AN 
EXPERIMENT 
 
To better illustrate the strength of the poliheuristic theory (Mintz et al, 1997; 
Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 2005; Mintz, 2004) for understanding patterns of 
participation and burden-sharing decisions in military coalitions, and to demonstrate the 
usefulness of alliance dependence (Bennett et al, 1994) within the larger explanatory 
framework, a limited experiment can be undertaken.  
It is well understood that various methodological approaches each have their own 
obvious strengths. The previous methods of statistical analysis and case study, for 
instance, have broader claims to generalizability and greater in-depth understanding of a 
phenomenon, respectively. However, the acknowledged forte of the experimental 
method is in locating causality, through control and manipulation of variables. Indeed, a 
well-designed, controlled, and carefully executed experiment can yield results that more 
directly enable the inferring of causality as regards the underlying process and outcome 
of decisionmaking. In relation to poliheuristic theory, moreover, an experiment may 
yield greater leverage over the specific cognitive and analytic processes, at the individual 
level, of the non-holistic, non-compensatory, dimension-based decisionmaking process 
and final decision outcome on military coalitions.  
 
Main Hypotheses 
 Among the original hypotheses, the main ones of interest examined in this 
chapter are the following:  
 
H1. The greater the level of perceived political loss (PL) from participation, the 
more likely the support for non-participation1. 
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By way of a re-visitation, H1 was derived from alliance dependence thesis for 
understanding coalition participation decisions (Bennett et al, 1994). Hypotheses H2 is 
based on the poliheuristic theory ((Mintz et al, 1997; Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 
2005; Mintz, 2004). As well, an interaction effect should also exist between political loss 
and alliance dependence. This holds especially so in regards to the particular policy 
option chosen. The final policy choice should be reflective of this, such that:   
 
H2: If the perceived PL from participation is high and AD is high, the final 
policy choice should represent the highest level of cooperation with the military 




H3: If the perceived PL from participation is high and AD is low, the final policy 
choice should represent the lowest level of cooperation with the military 
coalition.  
 
H4: If the perceived PL from participation is low and AD is high, the final policy 
choice should reflect greatest benefits relative to costs among the initial option 
set. 
 
H5: If PL is low and AD is low, then all options from the initial set are equally 
likely to be supported.  
 
H1 to H5 are mainly focused on outcomes. However, in addition to such 
outcome-oriented competing hypotheses, a more process-oriented set of hypotheses can 
be derived2. Alliance dependence thesis (Bennett et al, 1994), for instance, posits that 
important foreign policy decisions, such as those involving military coalitions, are often 
based on an  assessment of a country’s multifaceted alliance ties (eg. military, economic, 
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security, etc) to another country. Further, the alliance dependence thesis is implicitly 
grounded in a holistic approach to understanding the overall level of dependence, such 
that lows (highs) in one area of dependence (eg. military) can be offset by highs (lows) 
in another area of dependence (eg. economic). This holistic or compensatory approach 
should also extend to understanding the ramifications of policy choices. In fact, a 
greater/lesser tendency to adopt such a compensatory approach should be related to the 
level of existing alliance dependence. A decisionmaker who faces a possible major loss 
along some dimension of his/her country’s existing alliance dependence is more likely to 
look for ways to offset such losses, as compared to a decisionmaker who does not face 
such possible loss. Therefore,   
 
H6. There is greater tendency to adopt a compensatory strategy when the existing 
alliance dependence level is high, as compared to when such dependence is low.  
 
On the other hand, a core assumption of poliheuristic theory is that various 
constraints of crisis decision contexts, such as limited information and limited time, 
demand the use of decision heuristics, or shortcuts. One such important decision 
heuristic is the noncompensatory information search strategy (Mintz et al, 1997; Mintz, 
2004; Brulé, 2005). In other words, in order to deal with the constraints of crisis 
contexts, and to arrive at the most optimal choice, and do so most efficiently, 
decisionmakers attempt to focus on the most important and common dimension(s) 
among a range of options. A focus on such dimension(s) is important since possible 
losses cannot be compensated by gains in other dimensions. Moreover, since the 
cognitive demands placed on a decisionmaker is greater when he/she faces a potential 
political threat to his/her position, there is a greater tendency to  adopt such a simplifying 
decision heuristic in such situations. Therefore,  
 
 97
H7. There is greater tendency to adopt a noncompensatory strategy when the 




 This section outlines the relevant aspects of the research design. This includes an 
explanation of the type of study participants used in a factorial design. As well, the 
experimental treatment, the main instrument of measure, and actual laboratory 
procedures are outlined.  
 
Study Participants 
The use of  “unrepresentative subjects”, such as students, has frequently been 
questioned (eg. Sears, 1986). Much of the associated concern relates to the issue of  
“generalizability”, or external validity of such subjects to decision making by political 
leaders. This is an important issue that cannot easily be ignored. In relation to this, the 
most obvious way of alleviating such validity concerns is through the use of actual or 
former political leaders (McDermott, 2002a). Thus, the current chapter should be seen as 
a first step in establishing the general plausibility of the main hypotheses, before 
additional experiments are undertaken with actual or former individuals in political 
leadership positions3. Doing so may also yield additional insights into the differences 
between the use of different subject pools and external validity, as well as 
generalizability of findings (eg. Mintz and Redd, 2007).  
With the foregoing caveat, in the current study, subject-participants were 80 
volunteer undergraduate students4. All participants were recruited from introductory and 
advanced political science courses. In return for participation, subjects received either a 




Since the study investigates two main variables, or factors, a basic 2 x 2 between-
group5 design was used (Keppel, 1991; Kirk, 1982). As shown in Table F-1(Appendix F), the 
between group factors were political loss and alliance dependence. Each factor had two 
levels. For the alliance dependence factor, this level was either high or low. For the 
political loss factor, this was either a non-compensatory level or a low level. The two 
factors are reflective of the two competing explanations, alliance dependence (Bennett et 
al, 1993) and poliheuristic theory (Mintz et al, 1997; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 2005; Mintz, 
2004), for understanding patterns of participation and burden-sharing decisions.  
 
Treatment/Stimulus 
 There were two experimental treatments: perceived political loss (ie. non-
compensatory level of political loss versus low level of political loss) and alliance 
dependence (ie. high level versus low level of alliance dependence). For political loss, a 
perceived non-compensatory level was induced in the subject via exposure to 
background scenario information that indicated a very high level of domestic public 
opposition within the country to participation in a military coalition. The domestic public 
opposition was conveyed in the form of opinion polls and widespread public 
demonstrations and protests against participation. A low level of perceived political loss 
was manipulated via opinion polls that indicated that the majority of the domestic public 
was either moderately opposed or indifferent to our country’s participation in a military 
coalition.  
 Similarly, for alliance dependence, the perception of a high level of such was 
stimulated in the subject through exposure to information that indicated dependence of 
our country on the allied country in the areas of energy, finance, and military 
technology6. And exposure to information indicating only low levels of dependence on 
the ally country in the three areas was used to manipulate a low level of alliance 
dependence (Appendix G).  
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Instrument and Dependent Measure  
The main experimental instrument is the Decision Board. This is an interactive, 
computer-based, process-tracing program that has been used in previous experimental 
studies of decision making (eg. Mintz et al, 1997; Redd, 2002). The unique capabilities 
of the Decision Board, shown in Figure F-1(Appendix F) , Table F-1(Appendix F)  and Appendix 
H,  also make it a particularly superior instrument for comparing the strengths of the two 
competing explanations for decisions on military coalitions.  
There are two main components to the Decision Board: a hypothetical scenario 
and a decision matrix. The hypothetical scenario provides the necessary background 
context and the particular decision task cues for the subject. The related decision matrix 
contains columns of available policy options, and rows of relevant dimensions of such 
options. At the center of the decision matrix is a set of boxes. Each box contains 
information that explains the implication(s) of each policy option along the relevant 
dimension. For this study, four options (ie. send combat troops, send military resources 
and/or support troops, permission for use of airspace, airports and/or sea ports, and do 
nothing) and four relevant dimensions were used (ie. domestic-political, energy, 
financial, and military technology). As well, for simplified decision analysis, each of the 
four dimensions were assigned equal weight.  
Since the Decision Board is a computer-based, interactive decision-making 
program, all aspects of information search are recorded, including the order of search, 
search time (eg. time spent on examining each policy, each dimension of a policy, etc), 
search frequency (eg. number of times a particular policy or dimension has been 
examined), and decision on final policy option. The process-tracing capabilities of the 
Decision Board thus makes it particularly well-suited as an experimental instrument in 
investigating not only the relative strength of the alliance dependence explanation, but 
also the multifold aspects of the poliheuristic theory, including its core assumptions that 
decision making is driven by a stage-based, non-compensatory, non-holistic process.  
The dependent measures are three: participation, policy option, and CSI. With 
regards to “decision”, the subject-participants were asked to support one of four possible 
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policy options: (1) send combat troops, (2) contribute military resources (eg. fighter 
planes and/or naval ships) and and/or support units (eg. engineers, medical teams, 
biological teams, or chemical teams), (3) give permission for use of airspace, airports, or 
sea ports, or (4) do nothing. This specific decision task was a constant for all four 
experimental conditions, and was also built into the Decision Board. “Decision” was the 
dependent measure for investigating H3 to H6. The four policy options also related to a 
second dependent measure, “participation”. Options 1 and 2 were categorized as 
participation. Options 3 and 4 were categorized as non-participation. The categorization 
and coding was done by the principal investigator after the experiment. “Participation” 
was the dependent measure for investigating H1 and H2. The last dependent measure, 
“CSI” refers to the consistency-selectivity index (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). 
This index has been used in previous experimental studies of poliheuristic theory (Redd, 
2002, Astorino-Courtois, 2000) to unravel the conditions under which compensatory 
versus non-compensatory decision processing strategy should take place. The index is 
expressed as the following:  
 
CSalt=1/2   for all y  z  | n ayn -  n azn |,  
                                               n=1           n=1     
                       
where n is the number of alternatives in the option set, a represents the number of 
information/implication boxes accessed per alternative, y, z, etc.  Scores for the index 
range from 0 (complete compensatory process) to 16 (complete non-compensatory 
process)7. The CSI is the measure used to assess the veracity of hypotheses H7 and H8.  
 
Laboratory Procedure 
Upon arrival in the computer laboratory, subjects were given written information 
that described the use of the Decision Board as part of an investigation into political 
decisionmaking. Each subject was then placed in front of a computer monitor with the 
opening page of the Decision Board on-line website. Instructions were given to the 
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subjects to refrain from attempting to access the Decision Board program itself until 
permitted to do so by the principal investigator. Each subject was randomly assigned to 
one of four experimental conditions (ie. A, B, C or D).  
 Prior to the start of the experiment, an overhead illustration of the two main 
components (ie. background scenario and decision matrix) of the  Decision Board was 
presented. This was accompanied by an explanation that the background scenario 
contained the necessary cues as to the particular decision task demanded of the subject. 
It was further explained that the decision matrix specified the four relevant dimensions 
common to each of the four available policy options, and that each option had a specific 
implication along a relevant dimension. Subjects were also told that the information bit 
contained in each implication “box” was to be used to help them decide on what they 
thought to be the most appropriate policy option. They were also instructed to click at 
least one of the implication boxes (ie. access, read, and understand the information 
contents therein) before making a final policy decision.  
Next, each subject was given a card containing the ID number of one of four 
scenarios. Each subject was also instructed to input a user id and password of their own 
choosing. Once the hypothetical background scenario appeared, subjects were instructed 
to start the experiment by reading the scenario. The average time to reach a final policy 
decision varied from subject to subject. The Decision Board recorded each subject’s 
information search pattern as well as the total amount of time expended to reach a final 
decision. To preclude the potential for experimenter bias8, the principal investigator left 
the room once the experiment began.  
 At the end of the experiment, each subject was given a five-item survey 
questionnaire to complete(Appendix I). This self-report was done to assess the relative 
effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, and the related motivational orientation 
of each subject. Once all subjects had completed the experiment and had completed the 
post-manipulation check, a debriefing was given to the group as a whole. This debriefing 
indicated the principal goals of the experiment. Each subject was also then compensated 
for his/her participation.   
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Results and Discussion 
 Results of two-way analysis of variance9 are presented in Table J-1(Appendix J).  
The dependent measure is participation. Of interest are the F-statistics for the main and 
interaction effects of the two investigated factors, alliance dependence and political loss.  
Alliance dependence (AD) is shown to have a statistically significant main effect, with 
F(1, 65) = 9.203; p < 0.001. The results thus suggest that across its two manipulated 
levels (ie. high and low alliance dependence), there is a significant difference between 
the two levels of alliance dependence, when it comes to participation decisions on 
military coalitions. A closer look at the marginal means, in Table J-2(Appendix J) confirms 
that, in comparison to a low level of AD, a high level of AD leads to a higher propensity 
to choose participation. This result seems to support H1. In other words, a high level of 
alliance dependence is more likely to lead to a choice to support either the first option 
(ie. contribute combat troops) or the second option (ie. contribute military resources 
and/or support units) towards the military coalition. Conversely, a low level alliance 
dependence is likely to lead to a decision to reject any such participation. Again, the 
values of the marginal means seem to confirm this.  
 The results of Table J-1 also show a significant main effect for political loss 
(PL), with F(1, 65) = 14.271; p < 0.01. Consistent with expectation, there is a 
meaningful difference between the two levels of PL. When there is a high level of 
potential political loss, there is a less likelihood of choosing participation and noticeably 
greater likelihood of choosing non-participation. Thus, in cases of high political loss, 
there is a greater tendency to support either the third option (ie. give permission for use 
of airspace, airports, and/or sea ports) or option four (ie. do nothing). In contrast, when 
the level of political loss is low, there is a greater tendency to choose either the first 
option (ie. send combat troops) or second option (ie. contribute military resources and/or 
support units). Again, this difference in the overall pattern of non-participation is 
confirmed by the marginal means, in Table J-2: among the subjects in the high political 
loss condition, 84% chose either option three or option four. In comparison, among 
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subjects in the low political loss condition, 41.5% chose either option three or four. 
These results thus seem to lend support to the first hypothesis10, H1. 
 To assess the veracity of hypotheses H2 through H5, another omnibus test was 
undertaken to measure the dependent variable, “decision”. The results are presented in 
Table J-3(Appendix J). Again, as in the previous dependent measure, “participation”, in the 
measure for  “decision” a significant main effect is shown for both AD and PL, with F(1, 
65) = 7.071; p < 0.01,  and F(1, 65) = 8.094; p < 0.01, respectively. However, though 
interesting these results are, the main aim was to assess and find a statistically significant 
interaction effect between the two factors, AD and PL. But the F-statistic shows that no 
such significant  interaction exists. Much of this may owe to research design. 
 The previous results mainly dealt with the outcome-related hypotheses of H1 
through H5. However, as earlier noted, there should also be notable difference between 
the alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory regarding the conditions under 
which a compensatory versus a non-compensatory decision processing strategy should 
dominate. Table J-4(Appendix J) presents the ANOVA results for the dependent measure 
“CSI”. Results for AD (alliance dependence) show that there is no significant difference 
between a high level of AD and a low level of AD. In neither situation does one 
particular strategy dominate the decision making process. This result thus goes against 
the hypothesized expectation of H6. On the other hand, the F-statistic for PL (political 
loss) suggests that the PL factor may be close to significance, with a p-value of nearly 
0.1. It may cautiously be claimed, therefore, that between a high PL and a low PL, there 
is a greater tendency to choose a non-compensatory decision strategy when there is the 
potential for a high level of political loss. As shown in Table J-5(Appendix J), the marginal 
means for PL seem suggestive of this impact of PL across its two different levels. Based 
on the Consistency/Selectivity Index, a noticeably greater percentage of subjects 
exhibited a noncompensatory decision strategy (87.5%) when placed in the condition of 
a high level of political loss, compared to those subjects who were placed in the 
condition of a low level of political loss. Thus, though inconclusive, there does seem 
some support, albeit weak, for H7.  
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Conclusion 
 Overall, when it comes to understanding the choice to participate or not 
participate in a military coalition, both political loss and alliance dependence seem to 
find some experimental support in this study. Results of F-tests for analysis of variance 
on the dependent measure “participation” lend support to both the alliance dependence 
thesis and the poliheuristic theory. An important way to resolve the equivocal findings 
would have been through an examination of the interaction between the two factors, 
alliance dependence and political loss, through the dependent measure “decision” that 
would have revealed specific policy decision choices on military coalitions (ie. option 
one, two, three, or four). But in the current study, no significant interaction was found. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the actual decision making processes, a comparison 
between alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory suggests that the latter may 
provide a more accurate understanding of the situations under which a compensatory 






















1. For simplified analysis, a high level of political loss is assumed to be functionally equivalent to a non-
compensatory level of political loss.  In this study, this level is represented by a combination of possible 
electoral threat and oppositional public opinion.  
 
2. It is important to keep in mind that since alliance dependence is, strictly speaking, not a foreign policy 
decision making model, its implicit processes can only be inferred.  
 
3. A plausible way to further test the various hypotheses of this study,  as well as to extend the robustness 
of the poliheuristic theory is with additional experiments with actual/former Provincial legislative 
members in Canada. In terms of access, this may be easier with former legislative members. 
  
4. There are different ways of estimating the required minimum sample size (and power), including 
various statistical software (eg. Statistical Power Analysis, Ganova 4 – Power Computation, and STAT 
POWER). For the purposes of this study, however, the following standard formula was used:  
 
Ø2effect   =   (no. obsn) [  (dev.)2]     
                        (dfeffect +1)(2error) 
 
where (no. obsn)   =   the number of observations. 
 
              (dev.)2   =  the sum of the squared population deviations.  
 
                 dfeffect   =    the degree of freedom associated with the treatment effects. 
 
                  
2
error   =   the population error variance (ie. average of group variances)  
  
 
Hypothesized (or ideal) estimates were used for the following: standard deviation, group variance, and 
error variance.  
 
5. Within-group designs have well-known merits, including greater number of controls, need for fewer 
subjects, and greater validity of results due to smaller error variances (Keppel, 1991: 18-9; Keppel, 2004). 
But such designs also have a common methodological problem: the possibility of “learning” on the part of 
subject-participants from exposure to previous, albeit different, level of manipulation – thus compromising 
validity of findings. Thus, for my purposes, a between-group design seems most appropriate.  
 
6. The choice of dimensions to include that would have properly captured “alliance dependence” was 
constrained by the simple fact of using American citizens, undergraduate or otherwise. As citizens of the 
world’s sole superpower, it is generally difficult to induce or stimulate a perception of the US as being 
“dependent” on any other county. Moreover, another dimension,” grand strategy” was dropped from the 
stimulus for “alliance dependence”. It was feared that the inclusion of such would have made it even more 
difficult to detect treatment effects and/or necessitated a far larger sample size than feasible. 
  
Grand strategic dependence: 
Among major powers, our country is unrivalled in its ability to pursue its various geo-strategic 
interests around the world. However, critical to this ability is the existence of forward-stationed 
military bases and installations throughout the world. Such bases play a supporting role in our 
grand strategy by allowing for a quick projection of our military power to most parts of the world. 
Of our country’s many overseas military bases, the three largest and geo-strategically important 
ones are hosted by Waenland. These three bases currently host nearly 80,000 US soldiers and two 
 106
carrier-groups. Since they are irreplaceable, the possible loss of such bases would have a major 
negative impact on the continued pursuit of our strategic interests around the world. The current 
lease on all three bases are set to expire very shortly. However, due to budgetary constraints of 
the on-going economic crisis, our country has not been able to meet the financial obligations 
necessary for a renewal of the lease on the bases.  
 
7. Scores from 0 to 7 are categorized as compensatory. Scores from 8 to 16 are categorized as 
noncompensatory. For an illustrated example of the steps involved in the calculation of this value, see 
Redd (2002: 347-8).  Also note: CSIndex mainly counts the number of separate implication/information 
boxes accessed by a subject per alternative. However, since the subjects in this experiment were allowed 
to access the same implication/information box more than once, an adjustment had to be made. In light of 
this, a “double-count” was allowed in some cases.  Of the total number of cases, there were a number of 
such cases. However, regardless of whether or not a double-count was allowed or not allowed, this did not 
greatly alter the data. The double counting led to code changes (ie. classification as either “compensatory” 
or “noncompensatory”) in only four cases.  
 
8. To a certain extent, this type of bias, such as expectancy effects and demand characteristics among 
subjects, can be mitigated through random assignment of experimental condition  (McDermott, 2002b; 
Aronson et al, 1998; Keppel, 1991: 14-15). But the physical removal of the investigator from the 
laboratory during the experiment may also further eliminate any additional bias.   
 
9. All ANOVA analyses and related significance tests were done using SPSS 17.0. Also, note that since 
the cell sizes were different, a least-squares means was used in the calculations (Keppel and Wickens, 
2004). 
 
10. Note that there is no significant interaction between AD and PL for this dependent measure. Since 
there was no a priori specified hypothesis regarding the interaction effect between AD and PL on this 





















This dissertation was undertaken to answer a simple question: what explains 
political leaders’ participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions? In 
tackling the question, two distinct lines of research were brought together; the one based 
on alliances, the other based on foreign policy decision making. Based on the two lines 
of research, two explanatory frameworks were introduced: alliance dependence thesis 
and poliheuristic theory.  
Based on a reading of the relevant literature and the main explanatory 
frameworks,  a set of hypotheses was derived and tested. Amultimethod approach 
(Mintz, 2005; also Mintz, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Maoz et al, 2004; Bueno 
de Mesquita, 2002; Levy, 1998: 162; Levy, 2001; Elman and Elman, 1997; Schafer, 
2003; George and Bennett, 2005: 3-16) was employed utilizing statistical, case study, 
and experimental methods. The choice of such methods was informed, in part, by a 
recognition that each method exhibits both strengths and weaknesses regarding scientific 
inferences. However, when they were integrated and brought together to bear on 
examining a common research topic, such as the military coalition, the individual 
strengths were highlighted and weaknesses attenuated by companion methods.  
For instance, in investigating cross-national patterns, concomitant with the 
application of probit models to a relevant data set of public opinion polls, it was found 
that statistically significant patterns of (non)participation could persuasively be 
explained by poliheuristic theory, with a supporting role of alliance dependence  at 
critical junctures of the decisionmaking process. This held particularly in illustrating the 
analytic second stage of decision making, per the poliheuristic theory. In broad terms, 
therefore, the use of the statistical method allowed development of findings that seem to 
hold some claim to a wider generalizability, on the  topic of (non)participation and 
burden-sharing in military coalitions. But a problem with the statistical method is that 
causal inferences are mostly a function of mathematical probabilities and correlations. 
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Moreover, there can sometimes occur internal validity problems with key concepts, such 
as “political loss”.  
To address these types of problems, an in-depth examination of the Erdogan 
(Gul-Erdogan) cabinet’s foreign policy decision making vis-à-vis the Bush 
administration during the Iraq crisis was also undertaken. Drawing from both primary 
and secondary sources of information, the case study of the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) 
cabinet was driven by a process-tracing method. This method dictated a step-by-step re-
counting and interpretation of relevant events, and cross-referenced by the views of key 
decision makers of the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet at critical time points. Results of 
the case study showed that the process-tracing method is a particularly illuminating tool 
for illustrating some of the core assumptions of the poliheuristic theory, including the 
claim that decision making is largely characterized by a satisficing, non-holistic, non-
compensatory, dimension-based, and stage-based process. The study of the Erdogan 
(Gul-Erdogan) cabinet’s decision making also highlighted the various ways by which 
non-compensatory political loss can be viewed. In sum, when applied to explaining both 
the initial decision (February 25) and the final decision (March 18), the poliheuristic 
theory provided a  persuasive account, with a supporting role of  the alliance dependence 
thesis (Bennett et al, 1994). As well, the poliheuristic theory was better able to explain 
the cabinet’s final policy choice than either expected utility theory (Bueno de Mesquita 
and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984) or cybernetic theory (Ostrom and Job, 
1986).  
To gain more definitive traction over the causal process, an experiment was also 
undertaken to put to limited test the two competing explanations for understanding 
(non)participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions. Indeed, as a 
complement to the statistical and case study findings, an experiment was expected to 
yield more convincing evidence as regards the relative causal strength of alliance 
dependence and non-compensatory political loss. In the event, the results were largely 
equivocal on the issue of (non)participation: though the poliheuristic theory offered 
statistically significant explanatory outcome in the first stage of decision making, such as 
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participation versus non-participation, the lack of interaction with alliancea dependence 
in the second stage compromised causal inferences in the second stage of the 
poliheuristic decision processing. Much of this had to do with research design issues and 
less than clear operationalization of the non-compensatory principle. On the issue of 
decision making process, however, the experiment found some plausible support for the 
conditions under which non-compensatory decision strategy should prevail, per the 
poliheuristic theory - though this was measured only indirectly.  
Overall, the results of applying the multimethod approach is generally suggestive 
of the strength of the poliheuristic theory, with a supporting – but critical – role of the 
alliance dependence thesis, in understanding participation and burden-sharing decisions 
on military coalitions. Moreover, though in large part the second Iraq War (2003 -) was 
used as the reference for the statistical and the case study method, an implicit underlying 
claim of the current research is that the findings may be extended to any broad context 
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LR Chi Square 





                P1_________                    
-0.250 ***     -0.281 ***        
(0.112)          (0.122)           
0.540  **         0.508 **       
(0.263)          (0.253)           
0.143               0.086            
(0.160)          (0.138)           
-0.052            -0.016            
(0.120)          (0.076)          
0.274               0.282           
(0.938)          (0.967)          
0.534               0.376           
(0.575)          (0.524)          
 0.883  *         1.008 *         
(0.557)          (0.567)        
                     - 1.427           
                     (2.367)         
3.196                                 
(4.081)                              
0.562                                 
(3.713)                              
                              
                                          
22.36            21.36            
0.0078        0.0062            
0.5809        0.5549            
1992-2002 
                   P4___________                                
-0.232 ***     -0.232 ***      
(0.93)            (0.111)           
0.451 **          0.337  *        
(0.226)          (0.197)           
0.193              0.140             
(0.139)          (0.124)           
-0.030             0.032            
(0.096)          (0.098)          
0.250               0.121              
(0.904)          (0.912)                     
0.498              0.333            
(0.527)          (0.499)          
0.195             -0.542           
(1.419)          (1.495)         
                      -0.159          
                     (2.547)                    
3.071                                 
(3.403)                               
0.466                                 
(2.647)                              
                                       
                                          
19.60                  17.71          
0.0205              0.0235         
0.5092              0.4600         
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for PLOSS  variable based on one-
tailed tests of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.  
Dependent: Dichotomous (ie. Participation/Non-participation)  
N= 29 
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                             Table D-2. Type of Participation or Non-Participation  
 
 

























LR Chi Square 
p-value of Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
p-value of LH 
1999-2001  
                   T1____________                             
  -0.159  ***     -0.131  ***   
(0.056)            (0.047)            
  0.179  *            0.109           
(0.109)            (0.090)            
  0.027              -0.015            
(0.082)            (0.074)            
 -0.059              -0.054           
(0.038)            (0.038)           
 -0.299              -0.605          
(0.755)            (0.711)          
  0.044               -0.127         
(0.364)             (0.338)         
  0.751  *            0.656  *  
(0.285)             (0.266)        
                           1.475  *                                   
                        (0.893)                                     
 -0.431                                       
(1.196)                                     
-1.846  *                                   
(0.994)                                     
                                         
   27.84              25.85                          
0.0010            0.0011             
0.3493            0.3243             
1992-2002 
T3___________                              
 -0.148  ***      -0.128  ***          
(0.052)             (0.046)            
  0.106                0.052            
(0.094)             (0.080)                  
  0.042                0.006            
(0.076)             (0.069)                
 -0.069  *           -0.060          
(0.041)             (0.040)          
 -0.346               -0.631         
(0.738)             (0.697)         
 -0.079               -0.213        
(0.346)             (0.328)        
 0.466               0.338           
(0.315)             (0.299)       
         1.128                           
        (0.879)                 
 -0.085                                    
(1.217)                              
 -1.267                                        
(0.930)                             
    
22.39                 20.76                      
0.0077                0.0078         
0.2810                0.2605              
 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for PLOSS variable 
based on one-tailed tests of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.  






                     Table D-3. Non-Compensatory Model 
 
 (PH.H2)  
 





















LR Chi Square 
p-value of Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
1999-2001 
-17.433  **     -12.179  **      -16.114   
** 
(10.087)          (7.130)           (10.233) 
  2.604    *         1.893   *          2.358   * 
(1.417)            (1.059)             (1.405) 
   0.240   *         0.231               0.188 
(0.153)            (0.155)            (0.160) 
  0.215               0.016             0.0832  
(0.177)            (0.068)            (0.214) 
   0.293               0.099              0.267 
(1.117)            (1.022)            (1.132)  
   2.788  *           2.075  *         2.403   * 
(1.486)            (1.191)           (1.439) 
  3.440   *         2.397             3.226   
(2.115)            (1.540)            (2.131) 
 -7.694 
(5.463)  
                        1.752 
                      (9.392)      
                                               0.646 
                                             (2.489)        
 
25.89             24.65               24.32 
0.0011           0.0018           0.0020  
0.6724           0.6402           0.6318 
1992-2002 
 -5.265   **       -4.374   ** 
(2.795)            (2.180) 
  0.802   *          0.568  * 
(0478)             (0.326) 
  0.246   *          0.174 
(0.140)            (0.114) 
  0.026               0.066 
(0.078)            (0.092) 
 -0.150              -0.343 
(0.880)            (0.857) 
  1.010               0.708 
(0.698)             (0.565)   
  0.397              -0.358 
(1.165)            (1.177) 
                         -0.880 
                        (2.206) 
  4.071 
(4.015) 
  1.768 
(2.734) 
 
  19.23               17.77 
0.0233              0.0231 
0.4995             0.4615                                                                                     
 
 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for NC PLOSS are based on 
one-tailed test of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.  
Dependent: Dichotomous (ie. Participation/Non-participation)  





                                      Table D-4. Alliance Dependence Scores 
 
                                                      1999-2001                       1992-2002  
 
Belgium   -.05623459     -0.4121974 
Denmark   - 0.7522184     -0.5153552 
Germany     3.620924      3.233591 
Greece    -0.0326252      1.258464 
Spain    -0.1960236    -0.1917951 
   
Ireland     0.0447576    -0.0972079 
Italy     0.2896742     0.0864427 
Luxembourg    -0.8503787    -0.582877 
Netherlands    -0.220437    -0.2981577 
Austria    -0.8688707    -0.5769306 
   
Portugal    -0.6228593    -0.1136437 
Finland    -0.5995104    -0.5166467 
France    -0.7243115    -0.4770781 
Sweden    -0.8238307    -0.5403725 
U.K.      1.492435     1.124737 
   
Bulgaria      1.518335     0.0980295 
Cyprus    -0.5300915   -0.3669604 
Czech Republic      0.0530031   -0.4634993 
Estonia    -0.2737082   -0.5398928 
Hungary     0.0690978   -0.3779131 
   
Latvia    -0.2884468   -0.5148546 
Lithuania    -0.1870446   -0.3320209 
Malta    -0.6794709   -0.5848472 
Poland     0.7748648    0.2413338 
Romania     1.823757    0.162675 
   
Slovakia   -0.0631509   -0.39794 
Slovenia   -0.4748717   -0.5589945 
Turkey    0.6782268    3.317909 
Switzerland   -0.8710744  -0.5773682 
Norway   -0.7438055  -0.4866296 









                   ADEP 
 
                Constant 
 
NC 
                    ADEP 
 
       Ideology (HoG) 
 
       Unemployment 
 
                  Inflation 
  
              Democracy 
 
       Majority Gov’t 
 
       Minority Gov’t 
 






      SM1____________SM2________  SM3                     
 
 0.620 ***                  0.741 *                0.743  *         
 (0.128)                     (0.566)               (0.525) 
 -0.553 **                  -0.487                  -0.463    
 (0.263)                     (0.353)                (0.361) 
 
0.771                           0.050                 0.173 
(1.121)                       (0.352)              (0.399) 
 0.366 **                      0.231 *              0.262 ** 
(0.174)                       (0.129)               (0.132) 
-0.114                         -0.104                -0.170 
(0.086)                       (0.104)               (0.122)    
0.041                           0.020                 0.054              
(0.083)                       (0.065)                (0.82) 
1.035                            0.334                 0.445  
(1.060)                        (0.665)              (0.613) 
-2.521 
(2.245) 
                                    -0.194   
                                   (0.353) 
                                                              0.173   





   SM4      
     
0.250 
(0.267) 















1.751   
(1.496) 
1.798  ** 
(0.790) 
* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for Level variable based on one-
tailed tests of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.  



















LR Chi Square 




    2.099  *** 















* p < 0.10    ** p < 0.05    *** p < 0.01 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for Level of ADEP based on one-tailed test of 
significance. 






















ERDOGAN CABINET AND POLICY CHOICES 
 















(weight: w= 0.25) 
Total 
   
1:  Continue 
peaceful sol’n 
Baseline: 6 




Baseline: 1  
Prob: p=0.1 
Score = 0.1 
Adj score=0.02 
Baseline: 1  
Prob: p=0.1 




Baseline: 1  
Prob: p=0.1 
Score = 0.1 
Adj score=0.025 
Baseline: 1  
Prob: p=0.1 










Prob: p= 0.6   
score = 3 
Adj score= 0.45 
Baseline: 2 
Prob: 0.1 

























Prob: p= 0.6   

































Prob: p= 0.4 
score = 0.8 
Adj score= 0.12  
Baseline: 5 
P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24  
score = 1.2 
Adj score= 0.24 
Baseline: 5 
P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24  
score = 1.2 
Adj score= 0.18 
Baseline: 5 
P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24  




















Prob: p= 0.6   





























agreement  + 
group  
Baseline: 1 
Prob: p= 0.4 
score = 0.4 
Adj score=0.06 
Baseline: 3 
Prob: p= 0.4 
score = 1.2 
Adj score= 0.24 
Baseline: 3 
Prob: p= 0.4 
score = 1.2 
Adj score=0.18 
Baseline: 3 
Prob: p= 0.4 
score = 1.2 
Adj score= 0.3 
Baseline: 5 
Prob: p= 0.4 


































   




































Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 2.0 
adj score= 0.4 
Baseline: 5 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 2.0 
adj score= 0.3 
Baseline: 5 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 2.0 
adj score=  0.5 
Baseline: 4 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 1.6 














Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 1.2 
adj score= 0.24 
Baseline: 3 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 1.2 
adj score= 0.18 
Baseline:  3 
Prob: p=  0.4            
score= 1.2 
adj score= 0.3 
Baseline: 3 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 1.2 
adj score= 0.3 
1.2 












Prob: p=  0.6           
score=  1.2 
adj score=  0.24 
Baseline: 2 
Prob: p=  0.6           
score=  1.2 
adj score= 0.18 
Baseline: 2 
Prob: p=  0.6           
score=  1.2 
adj score= 0.3  
Baseline: 2 
Prob: p=  0.6            
score=  1.2 
adj score= 0.3 
1.38 
5. Wait for 
UNSC 
resolution 
(ie. let stand 









Prob: p= 0.4            
score= 0.4 
adj score= 0.08 
Baseline: 1 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 0.4 
adj score= 0.06 
Baseline: 1 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 0.4 
adj score= 0.1 
Baseline: 1 
Prob: p=  0.4           
score= 0.4 















































Initial Phase (run-up to March 1 parliamentary vote):  
Oppositional public opinion  Preferences of AKP deputies  Decision Rule        Policy Decision (Feb25) 
(Opposed to land access)          (Internal division)                      (Group vote is NC)      (Submit bill for land     
                                                                                                                                           access + allow free vote) 
 
                                                   
Latter Phase (run-up to Mar 21 parliamentary vote):  
Oppositional public opinion   Preferences of AKP deputies   Decision Rule        Policy Decision (Mar 18) 
(1. Opposed to land access)        (Internal division)                      (Land access is NC)      (Submit bill for  




 Note: The Erdogan cabinet’s Iraq crisis can be broken down into two phases. 
          The first phase ran from mid-December 2002 to March 1, 2003. 
          The second phase ran from March 1, 2003 to March  21, 2003. 






































 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Dimension  1 Implication Implication Implication Implication 
Dimension  2 Implication Implication Implication Implication 
Dimension  3 Implication Implication Implication Implication 
Dimension  4 Implication Implication Implication Implication 
Dimension  5 Implication Implication Implication Implication 
                     




    Alliance Dependence 
 
 
     Non-compensatory 
 
 
                    Low 
      High           Low 
      
        A                   B 
 
  
       C                   D              
 
Hypothetical scenario 
Final Choice             0                    0                      0                         0          
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APPENDIX G 
SCENARIOS FOR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
 
 
Baseline Scenario (i.e. condition A) 
 
Our nation is currently faced with a foreign policy crisis. Our country has recently been asked by the 
diplomatic representatives of Waenland to join in an immediate military action in Vanutia. Vanutia is a 
large country located in the South Pacific and has little economic or military ties to our country.  
  
According to the diplomatic representatives of Waenland, the target country, Vanutia, is currently 
experiencing a civil war between the Saavli-dominated government forces and Kinu-dominated rebel 
forces. Both the Saavli and the Kinu represent the two main ethnic groups in Vanutia.  
 
Though the conflict had been simmering for some time, reports indicate that in recent weeks, the conflict 
has become noticeably more violent. There are reports of massive and indiscriminate killings on both 
sides. Further, since both sides of the conflict have ethnic brethren in nearby countries, the conflict has the 
real potential to spread and create  instability in the region. Moreover, according to Waenland,  since both 
sides of the conflict are heavily armed, only a large military ground operation will be able to subdue both 
sides of the ethnic conflict.  
 
However, the Saavli-led government of Vanutia has made clear indications that any “outsider” 
intervention will be resisted. Despite this threat, Waenland has made urgent requests for 50,000 combat 
troops. If that it not possible, Waenland will accept a contribution of military resources and/or various 
types of support units from our country. It is not certain whether Waenland has made requests for 
participation from any other country.  
 
Our country must choose one of the following set of policy options: (A) contribute combat troops to the 
military operation, (B) contribute military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, etc.) and/or support 
units (eg. engineers, medical teams, chemical and/or biological teams) to the military operation, (C) grant 
permission for use of our country’s airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports to the military operation or (D) do 
nothing. Options A and B are different types of participation. Options C and  D are different types of non-
participation. Each policy option requires an equal amount of time to implement. However, each policy 
option entails a different set of implications in the areas of domestic politics, energy, finance, and military 
technology. Each policy option also entails varying levels of cost to our country in terms of national 
resources. 
 
Though leaning towards making a positive response to Waenland’s request (ie. choose 
either option A or option B), our leader is wavering and still uncertain. Thus, under an 
executive order, the leader of our country has quickly established a consortium of our 
country’s most innovative foreign policy think tanks. They have been tasked in an 
advisory role in the formulation of the appropriate response to Waenland’s request. As 
an individual of a select group of the informed and educated public, you have been asked 
to participate as a visiting (temporary) member in one such foreign policy think tank. As 
a visiting member, your  duties and responsibilities are limited. However, your opinion 
on the appropriate policy response to Waenland is no less important.  A carefully 
thought out and timely opinion on this crisis issue may lead to more opportunities for 
you within the think tank. 
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As you consider the various policy options, you must keep in mind that, as typical of leaders in a 
democracy, the leader of our country is concerned foremost with maintaining his/her political position. 
Your suggested policy choice will have either negative or positive impact on this long-term goal of our 
country’s leader.   
 
[I ]  As a first term president, our country’s current leader wishes to be re-elected for another term. The 
presidential election is set to take place in less than four weeks. But, given the leader’s vacillation over the 
crisis, a re-election is not at all certain. With respect to the general sentiment of the public, for instance, 
two organizations, Gallup International and Reuters/AP, conducted the most recent round of national 
opinion polls. The results suggest that at the national level, public support for our country’s active 
participation in a military operation (ie. sending of combat troops, contributing military resources, and/or 
support units) against Vanutia is  less than 20 percent.  Moreover, the same polls also suggest that a 
significant majority of the national public (more than 70%) is against participation (eg. Option 1 [ie. 
combat troops] or Option 2 [ie. military resources and/or support units]) in the military operation. This 
opposition to participation is even more pronounced in a majority of the key “swing” states. In fact, in 
such key states, the public’s opposition to participation is nearly 75%. Further, such states have 
traditionally had a disproportionately high amount of impact in deciding the outcome of presidential 
elections. Recent news reports have also highlighted widespread anti-operation demonstrations in such key 
states, and throughout other parts of our country. News reports indicate that much of the public’s 
opposition to participation is grounded in a fear of foreign entanglements in the absence of any perceived 
national interests in such a military operation 
 
Against this domestic political backdrop, two things must be considered. First, the diplomatic 
representatives of Waenland require an immediate response to their request. And second, the relations 
between our country and Waenland must also be taken into account.   
  
As the world’s sole superpower, our country is dominant in most aspects of our relationship with other 
countries. [II] However, in certain key areas, such as energy, finance, and military technology, this 
situation is less so.  
 
For instance, compared to most other countries, our country is relatively blessed with many natural 
resources (eg. coal, oil, natural gas) that help to fuel our economy.  However, when it comes to oil, the 
single most important energy source, [III] our country meets approximately 35% of its annual needs via 
imports from Waenland. A disruption in the supply of such would therefore cause major difficulties to the 
growth of our economy.   
 
As well, in terms of absolute size (eg. GDP), our country still represents the world’s biggest economy.        
[IV]  But, for over two decades now, our country has also been a net debtor nation. In recent year, this 
situation has only worsened. Moreover, of our country’s current total outstanding sovereign debt, 
approximately  40% is held by Waenland, mostly in the form of Treasury Bonds. This is by far the greatest 
amount of our debt held by any single foreign country. Without Waenland’s willingness to continue to 
purchase our country’s Treasury Bonds, it will be very difficult to finance our attempts at economic 
recovery and overcome our country’s current economic crisis.  
 
Also, as the world’s sole superpower, our military strength is unrivalled. However, the maintenance of our 
military dominance requires continual investment in research and development. The need for such 
investment holds especially so regarding the next generation of fighter planes, tanks, and surface warships. 
[V] However, due to budgetary constraints of the on-going financial crisis and a need to defray the 
substantial costs involved, our country has recently entered into key joint development projects with 
Waenland in all three areas. In return for sharing the research, Waenland has agreed to shoulder 
approximately 60% of all costs associated with the development of next generation fighter planes, tanks, 
and warships. A refusal by Waenland to continue its joint development projects would pose a serious  
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problem for our military-technological interests.  
 











Relevant Changes in Various Scenarios 
 
In condition B, the shaded section were substituted by the following: 
 
 [II]   This holds true in the areas of energy, finance, and military technology.   
  [III]  our country meets approximately 10% of its annual needs via imports from Waenland. A disruption in the supply of such, however, 
would pose only minor problems for our economy.   
[IV]  Moreover, though our country does have a sizeable amount of sovereign debt, only 10% is held by Waenland., mostly in the form of 
Treasury Bonds. Should Waenland refuse to continue its purchase our country’s Treasury Bonds, this will have only minimal impact on our 
sovereign debt and financial situation. 
 [V] However, our country has recently entered into key joint development projects with Waenland in all three areas. In return for sharing the 
research, Waenland has agreed to shoulder approximately 10% of all costs associated with the development of next generation fighter planes, 
tanks, and warships. However, a refusal by Waenland to continue its joint development projects would not pose a serious problem for our 
military-technological interests.   
 
In condition C, the shaded section were substituted by the following:  
[I] ]  As a first term president, our country’s current leader wishes to be re-elected for another term. The presidential election is set to take 
place in less than four weeks. Two organizations, Gallup International and Reuters/AP, conducted the most recent round of national opinion 
polls. The results suggest that at the national level, public support for our country’s active participation in a military operation (ie. sending of 
combat troops, contributing military resources, and/or support troops) against Vanutia  is mixed. The same polls suggest that while about 30 
percent of the public express support for such action, about the same percentage of the public, or 30 percent, do not support such action, and 
40 percent of the public have no opinion on the issue.  
 
In condition D, the shaded section were substituted by the following: 
[I] ]  As a first term president, our country’s current leader wishes to be re-elected for another term. The presidential election is set to take 
place in less than four weeks. Two organizations, Gallup International and Reuters/AP, conducted the most recent round of national opinion 
polls. The results suggest that at the national level, public support for our country’s active participation in a military operation (ie. sending of 
combat troops, contributing military resources, and/or support troops) against Vanutia mixed. The same polls suggest that while about 30 
percent of the public express support for such action, about the same percentage of the public, or 30 percent, do not support such action, and 
40 percent of the public have no opinion on the issue.  
[II]   This holds true in the areas of energy, finance, and military technology.   
  [III]  our country meets approximately 10% of its annual needs via imports from Waenland. A disruption in the supply of such, however, 
would pose only minor problems for our economy.   
[IV]  Moreover, though our country does have a sizeable amount of sovereign debt, only 10% is held by Waenland., mostly in the form of 
Treasury Bonds. Should Waenland refuse to continue its purchase our country’s Treasury Bonds, this will have only minimal impact on our 
sovereign debt and financial situation. 
 [V] However, our country has recently entered into key joint development projects with Waenland in all three areas. In return for sharing the 
research, Waenland has agreed to shoulder approximately 10% of all costs associated with the development of next generation fighter planes, 
tanks, and warships. However, a refusal by Waenland to continue its joint development projects would not pose a serious problem for our 





DECISION MATRIX AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Contribute combat troops 
to the military operation.  
Contribute military 
resources (eg. naval crafts, 
fighter planes, etc.) and/or 
support units (eg. 
engineers, medical teams, 
chemical and/or biological 
teams).  
Grant permission for 
use of our country’s 
airspace, air bases, 
and/or sea ports to the 
military operation.  
Do nothing.  
Domestic 
Political 
If the majority of the 
public is opposed to 
participation, this option 
will pose a threat to the 
continued political position 
of our country’s leader.   
 
If the majority of the 
public is opposed to 
participation, this option 
will pose a threat to the 
continued political position 
of our country’s leader.   
 
This option will not 
pose a threat to the 
domestic political 
position of our 
country’s leader. 
This option will not 
pose a threat to the 
domestic political 
position of our 
country’s leader. 
Energy This option will have the 
most positive impact on 
Waenland’s willingness to 
continue to supply our 
country with its oil. 
In  terms of cost, this 
option will be the most 
costly.  
This option will have some 
positive impact on 
Waenland’s willingness to 
continue to supply our 
country with its oil. In  
terms of cost, this option 
will be somewhat costly. 
This option will have 
some negative impact 
on Waenland’s 
willingness to continue 
to supply our country 
with its oil. 
In  terms of cost, this 
option will be less 
costly. 
This option will 
have the most  
negative impact on 
Waenland’s 
willingness to 
continue to supply 
our country with its 
oil.  In  terms of 
cost, this option will 
be the least costly. 
Finance This option will have the 
most positive impact on 
Waenland’s willingness to 
continue to buy our 
Treasury Bonds and to 
finance our debt.  In  terms 
of cost, this option will be 
the most costly. 
This option will have some  
positive impact on 
Waenland’s willingness to 
continue to buy our 
Treasury Bonds and to 
continue to finance our 
debt. In  terms of cost, this 
option will be somewhat 
costly. 
This option will have 
some negative   impact 
on Waenland’s 
willingness to continue 
to buy our Treasury 
Bonds and to continue 
to finance our debt.  In  
terms of cost, this 
option will be less 
costly. 
This option will 
have the most  
negative impact on 
Waenland’s  
willingness to 
continue to buy our 
Treasury Bonds and 
to continue to 
finance our debt.  In  
terms of cost, this 




This option will have the 
most positive impact on 
Waenland’s willingness to 
continue with its joint 
military development 
projects with our country.  
In  terms of cost, this 
option will be the most 
costly. 
This option will have some  
positive impact on 
Waenland’s willingness to 
continue with its joint 
military development 
projects with our country. 
In  terms of cost, this 
option will be somewhat 
costly. 
This option will have 
some  negative impact 
on Waenland’s 
willingness to continue 
with its joint military 
development projects 
with our country. 
In  terms of cost, this 
option will be less 
costly. 
This option will 
have the most  
negative impact on 
Waenland’s 
willingness to 
continue with its 
joint military 
development 
projects with our 
country. 
In  terms of cost, 
this option will be 
the least costly. 
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APPENDIX I 




#1. How important is our country’s dependence on Waenland? 
 
Indicate the level of importance by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate 
higher levels of importance. 
  
Not important                 Very Important 
           _________________________________________________________  




#2. How strong is our country’s dependence on Waenland? 
 
Indicate the level of strength by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher 
levels of strength. 
  
Not Strong                 Very Strong 
           _________________________________________________________  




#3. How threatening is the country of Vanutia?  
 
Indicate the level of threat by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher 
levels of threat. 
  
Not threatening                                     Very Threatening 
           _________________________________________________________  




#4. How supportive is the public for any participation in military action against Vanutia?  
 
Indicate level of public support by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate 
higher levels of public support. 
  
Not Supportive                                     Very Supportive 
           _________________________________________________________  





#5. How threatened was the political position of our country’s leader? 
  
Indicate the level of threat by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher 
levels of threat. 
  
Not threatened                                     Very Threatened 
           _________________________________________________________  
           0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10    
 
 


















































POST-EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 
 




















Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Participation 
Source 
Type II Sum of 







3.992a 3 1.331 6.613 .001 .234 .965 
Intercept 13.928 1 13.928 69.210 .000 .516 1.000 
Pl 2.872 1 2.872 14.271 .000 .180 .961 
Ad 1.852 1 1.852 9.203 .003 .124 .848 
pl * ad .004 1 .004 .019 .890 .000 .052 
Error 13.080 65 .201 
    
Total 31.000 69 
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                         Table J-2. Tabulated Cell and Marginal Means 
 
    High AD 
 





Scenario ID: 3129 
Option 1:   12%  (2) 
Option 2:   19%   (3) 
Option 3:   56%  (9) 
Option 4:   12%  (2) 
 
Participate:  31% 
Not participate:  68% 
  
Total participants: 16 
 
Scenario ID: 3130 
Option 1:  0  % 
Option 2:  0  % 
Option 3: 75%  (6) 
Option 4: 25%  (2) 
 
Participate: 0 
Not participate:  100 
 
Total participants: 8 
 
Avg:   6% 







Low PL  Option 1: 19%  (4) 
Option 2: 57%  (12) 
Option 3: 19%   (4) 
Option 4: 5%    (1) 
 
Participate: 76% 
Not participate: 24%   
 
Total participants: 21 
 
Option 1: 12%  (3) 
Option 2: 29%  (7) 
Option 3: 42%  (10) 
Option 4: 17%  (4) 
 
Participate: 41% 
Not participate: 59%  
 
Total participants: 24 
   
Avg:  15.5% 
Avg:  43 % 
Avg:  30.5% 
Avg:  11% 
 
Avg: 58.5 % 






Avg:   15.5% 
Avg:   38 % 
Avg:   37.5 % 
Avg:    8.5% 
 
 
Avg:   53.5% 
Avg:   46 % 
Avg:     6% 
Avg:   14.5% 
Avg:   58.5% 
Avg:    21 % 
 
 
Avg:  20.5 % 





































Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Decision 
Source 
Type II Sum 







8.700a 3 2.900 4.248 .008 .164 .840 
Intercept 448.928 1 448.928 657.628 .000 .910 1.000 
Ad 4.827 1 4.827 7.071 .010 .098 .745 
Pl 5.525 1 5.525 8.094 .006 .111 .800 
ad * pl .004 1 .004 .006 .940 .000 .051 
Error 44.372 65 .683     




     
a. R Squared = .164 (Adjusted R Squared = .125) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
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Table J-4. Effects of Alliance Dependence and Political Loss on Compensatory vs 
Noncompensatory Decision Processing 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:CSI      
Source 
Type II Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model .768a 3 .256 1.280 .289 .056 
Intercept 36.232 1 36.232 181.159 .000 .736 
Ad .108 1 .108 .538 .466 .008 
Pl .504 1 .504 2.520 .117 .037 
ad * pl .226 1 .226 1.129 .292 .017 
Error 13.000 65 .200    
Total 50.000 69     
Corrected Total 13.768 68     
a. R Squared = .056 (Adjusted R Squared = .012)    






Table J-5. Compensatory vs Noncompensatory Decision Processing 
 
    High AD 
 




Noncompensatory: 75%  
 
Compensatory: 0 % 
Noncompensatory: 100 %  
 
Avg:   21.9% 
Avg:   87.5% 
 
    
Low PL  Compensatory:  38% 
Noncompensatory: 62%  
 
Compensatory: 33% 
Noncompensatory: 67%  
   
Avg:   35.5% 




Avg:   40.9% 
Avg:   68.5%   
Avg:   16.5% 
Avg:   83.5% 
Avg:    
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